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Summary 
This thesis analyses current South African copyright law to ascertain the proper 
interpretation and application of the fair dealing provisions contained in the Copyright Act 
98 of 1978. Copyright law ensures that authors’ works are not used without their consent, 
which they can grant subject to compensation or conditions attached to the use. Fair 
dealing exceptions allow the general public to use copyright works for certain purposes 
without the copyright owner’s consent and without paying compensation. These provisions 
are intended to balance copyright owners’ interests with the interest that members of the 
public have in using copyright works for socially beneficial purposes. These provisions 
typically allow the use of a copyright work for the purposes of research or private study, 
personal or private use, criticism and review, and news reporting. Unfortunately there is no 
South African case law concerning the fair dealing provisions, and the application of these 
exceptions remains unclear. This study aims to clarify the extent of application of the fair 
dealing exceptions to copyright infringement so that courts may be more willing to consider 
foreign and international law and in doing so develop South African intellectual property 
law. 
The social and economic policy considerations underlying the fair dealing exceptions are 
considered to determine their function. International conventions relating to copyright and 
neighbouring rights are examined, specifically the provisions allowing exceptions to 
copyright. The legislation and case law of Australia and the United Kingdom are analysed 
to determine the proper interpretation and application of these statutory defences. This 
knowledge is then used to inform South African law.  
The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 does not contain a fair dealing exception for parody and 
satire. Australian legislation does contain such an exception, and it is analysed in that 
context. An exception for parody is proposed for South African law, and the need for and 
application of this provision is considered. The constitutionality of the proposed exception 
is evaluated in terms of its impact on the constitutional property rights of copyright owners.  
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 Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek Suid-Afrikaanse outeursreg om die behoorlike uitleg en 
toepassing van die “billike gebruik”-bepalings in die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1978 te 
bepaal. Outeursreg beskerm die werk van ŉ outeur teen ongemagtigde gebruik van haar 
intellektuele eiendom. Gebruik kan deur die outeur gemagtig word, òf teen vergoeding òf 
onderhewig aan bepaalde voorwaardes. Artikels 12-19B (die billike gebruik-bepalings) van 
die Wet op Outeursreg laat ander toe om sekere werke te gebruik sonder die toestemming 
van die eienaar van die werk en sonder om vergoeding te betaal. Die bepalings streef om 
ŉ balans te tref tussen die belange van die outeur en die belange van die publiek. ŉ Werk 
mag volgens hierdie bepalings tipies gebruik word vir die doeleindes van navorsing of 
private studie, persoonlike of private gebruik, beoordeling of resensie, of om nuus te 
rapporteer. Daar is tans geen Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak rakende hierdie uitsonderings 
nie, en hul toepassing is dus onseker. Hierdie tesis beoog om die werking van die billike 
gebruik-bepalings duidelik uiteen te sit om hoër gewilligheid in howe te skep om 
internasionale en buitelandse reg toe te pas, en sodoende Suid-Afrikaanse immateriële 
goederereg te ontwikkel. 
Die sosiale en ekonomiese beleidsoorwegings wat die bepalings ondersteun word 
geanaliseer om die doel daarvan te bepaal. Internasionale outeursreg-verdragte word 
bespreek om ŉ raamwerk vir die uitsonderings te skep. Wetgewing en regspraak van 
Australië en die Verenigde Koninkryk word ondersoek, en die kennis wat daar opgedoen 
word, word toegepas op die Suid-Afrikaanse bepalings. 
Die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1978 bevat geen uitsondering vir die doeleindes van 
parodie en satire nie. Die Australiese Wet op Outeursreg 63 van 1968 bevat wel so ŉ 
uitsondering, en dit word in hierdie verband beoordeel. ŉ Uitsondering vir parodie en satire 
word voorgestel en oorweeg in die konteks van Suid-Afrikaanse outeursreg. Die 
grondwetlikheid van die voorgestelde uitsondering word bepaal na aanleiding van die 
impak wat dit sal hê op outeurs se eiendomsreg.  
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1  Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction 
Copyright grants the author of an intellectual creation a limited monopoly of exclusive 
rights over her product.1 The owner can exploit these rights commercially, but as with 
ownership of tangible property these rights are limited by the rights and entitlements of 
others and by restrictions imposed in the public interest by state regulation.2 In certain 
circumstances other persons have entitlements to use the owner’s intellectual property 
without her consent; fair dealing exceptions protect these entitlements and limit copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights to their works accordingly.3 Claims of copyright infringement are 
frequently invalid because the use of the work falls into one of the purposes that are 
considered fair.4 By invoking a fair dealing exception, a person is permitted to use 
copyright content for reasonable purposes without the consent of the copyright owner and 
without paying compensation.5  
Fair dealing finds application when a substantial part of a protected copyright work is used 
in a way that seemingly conflicts with the exclusive rights in that work.6 Members of the 
public are permitted to use copyright works for certain predetermined purposes, which 
constitute an exhaustive list. Using a work for a purpose other than those that are 
statutorily embodied cannot be justified, regardless of the fairness of the use. 
Fair dealing is not a precise notion and leaves much to the discretion of the court.7 The 
ambiguity of this statutory doctrine has contributed to many untenable threats of legal 
action, which may cause users to refrain from legitimate uses of copyright works.8 The 
South African fair dealing provisions are further confused by the section 13 Copyright 
                                            
1
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-1; Deazley R Rethinking Copyright: 
History, Theory, Language (2006) 106; Stokes S Digital Copyright: Law and Practice (3
rd
 ed 2009) 18. 
2
 Van der Walt AJ & Pienaar GJ Introduction to the Law of Property (6
th
 ed 2009) 40-41. 
3
 S 12 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. See also ss 29-30 of the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act of 1998 and ss 40-42, 103A-103C of the Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968. 
4
 Cotter TF “Fair use and copyright overenforcement” (2008) 93 Iowa Law Review 1271-1318 at 1273-1274. 
5
 Ghosh S “The fable of the commons: Exclusivity and the construction of intellectual property markets” 
(2007) 40 University of California Davis Law Review 855-890 at 881.  
6
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-65 – 1-68, 1-92. 
7
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-93. 
8
 Cotter TF “Fair use and copyright overenforcement” (2008) 93 Iowa Law Review 1271-1318 at 1273; Olson 
DS “First amendment based copyright misuse” (2011) 52 William and Mary Law Review 537-606 at 557. 
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Regulations published by the Minister of Economic Affairs.9 The fair dealing exceptions, 
which act as defences to claims of primary infringement, are currently being ignored in 
many situations where they could find application. This can be as a result of many factors, 
notably the potentially exorbitant legal costs implicit in adjudicating disputes arising from 
the vagueness that characterises the provisions. This means that copyright owners are 
able to wield allegations of infringement without any prospect of judicial success, because 
the action is unlikely to be pursued.10 
Fair dealing exceptions act as balancing mechanisms between the interests of copyright 
owners and the public interest in education, freedom of expression and honest public 
discourse, and the freedom of the media to report current events, and have become an 
indispensable part of copyright law globally. This thesis provides a reflective exposition of 
these provisions and suggests ways to develop South African copyright law by way of 
legislative intervention and judicial interpretation. 
 
1 2 Research Problems, Hypotheses, Research Aims and Methodology 
The South African Copyright Act contains fair dealing exceptions for research or private 
study, personal or private use, criticism or review and news reporting. The United 
Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 provides for the same categories 
except for personal or private use. The Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968 does not 
contain this provision either, but contains more extensive fair dealing exceptions than the 
legislation of South Africa or the United Kingdom because of the inclusion of an exception 
for parody and satire.11 All of the fair use factors in American copyright law have been 
included in the Australian Copyright Act to guide courts in deciding what constitutes a fair 
dealing, and extra-judicial thresholds have been introduced to aid users align their conduct 
with what the law allows ex ante.12  
                                            
9
 GN 2530 published in GG 6252 on 22-12-1978.   
10
 Lessig L Free culture: How big media uses technology and the law to lock down culture and control 
creativity (2004) 292; Olson DS “First amendment based copyright misuse” (2011) 52 William and Mary Law 
Review 537-606 at 541-542. 
11
 See ss 40-42 & 103A-C of the Copyright Act 63 of 1968. 
12
 Ss 40(2), 103C(2), 248A(1A) of the Copyright Act 63 of 1968. The American Copyright Act exempts any 
conduct that can be justified as fair according to four factors, but includes “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” as examples of 
the type of activity that will be exempted: s 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 
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The fair dealing exceptions have been absent from South African litigation, and courts 
have at no time considered – let alone developed – the statutory defences. No legal 
precedent has been set to date and the concept has been left scantly reviewed in South 
African jurisprudence, and the resulting lacuna discourages the public from embracing fair 
dealing as a defence to a claim of copyright infringement. Similarly, courts in analogous 
jurisdictions are reluctant to develop the fair dealing defence because of its notorious 
vagueness.13 The main research question is how South African copyright law can be 
developed by way of legislative intervention and judicial interpretation to promote greater 
clarity about and beneficial use of the fair dealing defence.  
At the outset of this study the originating theories of copyright and their role in 
contemporary society, especially those relating to the fair dealing exceptions, are 
considered with reference to the academic literature on the subject. The nature of users’ 
entitlements under the fair dealing exceptions is imprecise, which compounds the 
uncertainty that shrouds the embodiment of the public interest in copyright exceptions. It is 
therefore necessary to systematically assess the proper interpretation and application of 
these important statutory provisions and the impact they have on allowing legitimate 
unlicensed uses of protected copyright works. The nature and function of copyright 
exceptions in general and the fair dealing exceptions specifically are examined to enable a 
critical analysis of the relevant legislative provisions and show how they operate. The 
underlying social and economic considerations determine whether the specific legislative 
provisions give proper recognition and protection to the policy concerns that they are 
intended to address.  
For a discussion of this nature it is necessary to identify and analyse international 
conventions relevant to copyright; treaties governing neighbouring rights are considered 
additionally, as some of the exceptions discussed apply to audio-visual works and 
performances.14 This creates a framework that allows national legislation to be understood 
in terms of international mandates and concessions.  
Apart from international law, the paucity of South African case law and academic 
contributions requires a comparative evaluation of the topic. A comparative basis is 
established by analysing the legislation of Australia and the United Kingdom and 
                                            
13
 Olson DS “First amendment based copyright misuse” (2011) 52 William and Mary Law Review 537-606 at 
558-559. 
14
 See eg s 17 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978; s 30 of the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act of 1988; s 103A-103C of the Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968. 
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ascertaining how fair dealing has been interpreted in case law in those jurisdictions. South 
African and Australian copyright law stems from British legislation and all three countries 
are under the same international obligations (for the purposes of this thesis), making them 
ideal for comparison. Courts in both Australia and the United Kingdom have applied the 
fair dealing exceptions on numerous occasions and have set precedents, which will be 
useful to South African courts when similar cases arise. The South African provisions are 
discussed by drawing on the conclusions from the analyses of case law and academic 
literature in the previous chapters. This thesis relies on academic commentary from all 
three jurisdictions to provide a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of the 
statutory exceptions.  
The Australian Copyright Act expressly recognises parody as a form of fair dealing,15 but 
the South African Copyright Act and the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act of 1988 do not contain this exception. No study of the need for an exception for parody 
has been undertaken in the South African context, although this has occurred in the United 
Kingdom.16 This thesis considers a parody exception in South African law and explains 
how such an exception could function. The relation between copyright owners’ proprietary 
interests, exceptions to the application of copyright, and section 25 of the Constitution has 
not been addressed in existing academic discourse either and is therefore discussed here. 
A constitutional analysis of the impact that such an exception would have on the rights of 
copyright owners is employed to determine whether the promulgation of a parody 
exception would be constitutionally valid. The methodology expounded by the 
Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
                                            
15
 S 41A.  
16
 See the existing academic commentary, which focusses mainly on trademark parody in the wake of the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC): 
Rimmer M “The Black Label: Trade mark dilution, culture jamming and the No Logo movement” (2008) 5 
Scripted 70-138; Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-140 – 42-144; Deacon J & Govender I 
“Trade mark parody in South Africa – The last laugh!” (2007) 32 Journal for Juridical Science 18-46; Illsley T 
“How to tell a take-off from a rip-off: Trade mark parody and freedom of expression in South Africa” (2006) 22 
South African Journal of Human Rights 119-125; Dean OH ‘Trade-mark dilution laughed off’ (2005) Oct De 
Rebus 18-22; Pistorius T “Trade-mark tarnishment: Should we ‘Laugh It Off’ all the way to ‘Telkomsucks’ and 
‘Hellcom’?” (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal 727-740; Smith A “Trade-mark dilution – You 
can’t laugh it off” (2004) 12 Juta’s Business Law 196-200. For parody of copyright in South Africa, see 
Stilwell V & Alberts W “Pretty women and copyright law” (2011) Jul Without Prejudice 52-53; Milo D, Penfold 
G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-145 – 42-148; Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: 
Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-
343. 
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African Revenue Service17 is followed to determine whether the proposed legislative action 
would constitute a deprivation of constitutional property rights, and if so whether this 
deprivation would be justifiable in terms of section 25(1).  
By the conclusion of the study it should be possible to draw parallels between the fair 
dealing exceptions in South Africa and those in Australia and the United Kingdom 
regarding the way they are formulated and applied by the respective courts, and guidelines 
can be extrapolated for the benefit of the South African judiciary and academic community. 
 
1 3 Overview of Chapters 
The thesis starts by considering the theoretical justifications underlying copyright law and 
exceptions to copyright protection. The social and economic considerations for granting 
exclusive use rights over tangible and intangible property are investigated to illustrate the 
rationales for the reification of intellectual property. The nature of the fair dealing 
exceptions is explained to illustrate the operation of the entitlements that the law grants to 
users. The different approaches to constructing exceptions of this kind are compared to 
differentiate between fair dealing and the fair use doctrine. Chapter 3 turns to international 
law to create a framework in which to consider national legislation. The provisions relating 
to copyright protection and exceptions to copyright in the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,18 the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)19 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty20 are examined, as well as the 
effect of the Rome Convention,21 TRIPS and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty22 on neighbouring rights. South Africa, Australia and the United Kingdom variously 
incur obligations in terms of these treaties, and the provisions regulating exceptions in 
these conventions are analysed accordingly.  
                                            
17
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
18
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886). 
19
 World Trade Organisation Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (15-4-1994) Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 1869 UNTS 299 (1994). 
20
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 65 (1996). 
21
 World Intellectual Property Organisation International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (26-10-1961) 496 UNTS 43 (1961). 
22
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 76 
(1996). 
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Chapter 4 undertakes a comparative study of the copyright law of the United Kingdom and 
Australia. The chapter provides a concise history of the progress of copyright law in the 
respective jurisdictions, tracks the developments effected by case law, international 
obligations and legislative initiative, and compares the rights granted to copyright owners 
by the current statutes. The fair dealing provisions are analysed individually, with particular 
emphasis on the judicial interpretation and application that the foreign courts have 
followed. The construction of the Australian exception for parody is analysed to create a 
context to consider this exception in South African law.  
Chapter 5 draws on the research conducted in the previous chapters as a basis for 
interpreting and understanding the fair dealing provisions of the South African Copyright 
Act. The exceptions for research or private study, personal or private use, criticism or 
review, and news reporting are analysed and the conclusions drawn from the United 
Kingdom and Australia are transposed, mutatis mutandis. The exceptions for quotations 
and illustrations are not traditionally associated with fair dealing, but nonetheless warrant 
brief discussion. The constituent elements of the fairness inquiry inherent in all fair dealing 
cases are discussed throughout the thesis by means of case law analysis, and brought 
together in chapter 5.23 The most important factors consulted by foreign courts and the 
general objective standard against which fair dealing claims are measured are set out to 
illustrate the emphasis of the exceptions.  
Chapter 5 examines the need for an exception for parody and postulates a hypothetical 
exception in South African law to determine how it would function. South African 
jurisprudence relating to intellectual property parody is scrutinised with reference to foreign 
cases and academic commentary. The seminal American case of Campbell aka 
Skyywalker et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc24 is incorporated into the discussion to illustrate 
where the emphasis of the exception should lie. The value of freedom of creative 
expression that the exception would represent is examined to shed light on the 
constitutional basis for its inclusion. After ascertaining the desirability of incorporating this 
exception into South African copyright law, the Constitutional Court’s decision in Laugh It 
Off Promotions CC v SAB International25 – which dealt with trademark parody – is 
considered in the context of property interests conflicting with freedom of expression. With 
this clarification of the parody exception in the South African setting, the exception is 
                                            
23
 See section 2 3 6 of chapter 5. 
24
 Campbell aka Skyywalker et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc [1993] 510 US 569. 
25
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). 
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subjected to constitutional analysis to determine the legitimacy of the proposed provision. 
The methodology devised in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance26 is followed to establish whether the hypothetical exception would constitute an 
unjustifiable deprivation of copyright owners’ property rights. This systematic approach 
considers the impact that other Constitutional Court cases have had on the test, and 
accommodates the intangible nature of the property.  
The concluding chapter demonstrates how the main hypotheses and research aims are 
approached throughout the thesis and brings together the respective conclusions drawn 
from the analyses in the previous chapters. Certain recommendations are made to assist 
courts when applying the fair dealing provisions and to move the legislature to develop the 
Copyright Act and bring South Africa in line with global developments in this area.  
 
1 4 Scope 
This thesis sets out to establish the limits of the South African fair dealing provisions. 
However, the relation between fair dealing and the moral rights of authors is not 
considered, and all references to copyright owners’ rights should be construed as 
references to economic rights granted by copyright. The constricting effect that contract 
law may have on the application of fair dealing is not considered because of the broad 
scope of terms that are frequently imposed by means of licencing agreements. 
Technological protection measures and the impact that their application may have on 
users’ entitlements also fall beyond the ambit of this thesis.27 The implications of fair 
dealing in the digital realm have been extensively researched elsewhere.28 The public 
interest defence, which is sometimes raised in conjunction with the defence of fair 
dealing,29 will not be discussed separately. The fair dealing provisions of the Performers’ 
Protection Act 11 of 1967 are also not included, as the research here focuses exclusively 
                                            
26
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
27
 For further reading on this topic, see generally Efroni Z Access-Right: The Future of Digital Copyright Law 
(2011) Oxford University Press: New York. 
28
 See Schӧnwetter T The Implications of Digitizing and the Internet for “Fair Use” in South Africa (LLM thesis 
University of Cape Town 2005). 
29
 See eg Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 149 CA; Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others 
[2001] Ch 143; Beloff v Pressdram [1973] 1 All ER 241; Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another [1971] 1 
All ER 1023 CA. 
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on the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. The terms “phonogram” and “sound recording” are used 
synonymously throughout this thesis, as are “typographical arrangements” and “published 
editions”, depending on which term is used by the legislation or convention in question. 
When a copyright work is referred to, it is assumed that copyright subsists in the work in 
question and no consent has been obtained for the use of that work. 
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2  Theoretical Analysis of Fair Dealing 
 
2 1 Introduction 
Copyright law strives to balance the rights of creators of copyright works and the interests 
of the public. This chapter creates the context for considering the role of exceptions to 
copyright, particularly the fair dealing exceptions. The abstract nature of property rights is 
considered to provide an understanding of their primary functions in the context of both 
corporeal and incorporeal property. The rationales for awarding property rights to authors 
are then explained to demonstrate the purpose of copyright law and the objectives it aims 
to achieve. It is shown that copyright law functions as a legal device employed to 
encourage the socially beneficial activity of creating cultural and intellectual products, and 
how the system would be fundamentally flawed and unworkable without exceptions to limit 
copyright owners’ rights. The immanent paradox that exists is analysed to illustrate the 
need for curtailing copyright.  
Economic arguments for the promulgation of fair dealing exceptions are analysed to 
measure the effect that the fair dealing exceptions have on protecting the interests and 
fundamental rights of the public. The exposition then considers policy arguments for 
limiting copyright and the effect that limitation will have on the incentive to create. 
Exceptions could assume various possible legal constructions, but the internal modifier 
role that statute plays leads to a definite conclusion. The legal nature of fair dealing 
exceptions is explained in Hohfeldian terms to illustrate the way that users are protected 
against the overzealous application of copyright owners’ property rights.  
Two possible linguistic constructions of the exceptions are shown, each with its own 
benefits and drawbacks. The difference in construction between the unitary system and 
the particle system is explained, leading to the conclusion that a hybrid construction is 
preferable. The difference between fair dealing and fair use is demonstrated against this 
framework. The notion of fairness inherent in both fair dealing and fair use provisions is not 
discussed here, but is discussed in subsequent chapters in light of the meaning that 
judicial interpretation gives this concept.1  
                                            
1
 See chapters 4 and 5 in this regard. 
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2 2 Reification of Intellectual Property Rights 
The nature of modern copyright is defined by statute to be proprietary.2 The reason for 
defining intellectual property rights generally (and copyright specifically) as proprietary is 
because the law awards authors a negative exclusionary right similar to ownership of 
corporeal objects. The legal consequences attached to intellectual property resemble 
those of property law; the owner of a copyright work is granted a real right akin to the 
exclusionary rights in property law.3 In the case of intellectual property, the law creates a 
legal object by attaching real rights to it, while the object of the rights can be an abstract 
legal conception.4 This view is best understood through the process of dematerialisation of 
property, which allows the rights in property to be viewed as abstract and independent of 
the corporeality of the object. This paradigm has obvious benefits to the area of copyright 
law, which protects the expression of an idea rather than the medium through which it is 
expressed. These rights enable a copyright owner to authorise or prohibit various acts in 
relation to a work (which is the object of the rights). The rights are enforceable against 
third parties without their prior consent, which is a characteristic of real rights.5  
The distinction between civilian and common law property traditions provides a better 
grasp of the concepts inherent in intellectual property law. The notional ambit covered by 
the two systems is the same, although the approach is markedly different.6 The civilian 
tradition is based on the Roman law concept of ownership (dominium), which is the most 
complete entitlement to an object with the principal remedy being the rei vindicatio.7 The 
English law system relies on relative title, where the strongest among competing 
entitlements succeeds. The South African common law approach to property incorporates 
                                            
2
 S 1 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 states that “[c]opyright is a property right”. As will be 
shown in later chapters, both other jurisdictions considered share their ancestry and basis with the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. Although it is generally accepted that copyright is a property right, 
several theorists have expressed doubt as to whether copyright is properly defined as proprietary: see Harris 
JW Property and Justice (1996) 42-47; Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 200, 210-213; 
Penner JE The Idea of Property in Law (1996) 119-120; McFarlane B The Structure of Property Law (2008) 
134-136. 
3
 Gray K “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 at 301. 
4
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 10. 
5
 The moral rights that attach to the author of a work are not discussed, as fair dealing is raised as a defence 
to a claim of infringement of the economic rights in a work. 
6
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 9. 
7
 Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 9; Van der Walt AJ 
& Pienaar G Introduction to the Law of Property (6
th
 ed 2009) 40-41. 
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Roman-Dutch law (and thus the concept of dominium),8 but the law of copyright does not 
adhere to this approach; South African copyright law’s genesis is in the statutes of the 
United Kingdom, as will be seen in chapter 5.9 Furthermore, where the object of a right is 
incorporeal even civil law systems find it necessary to rely on tortious remedies rather than 
proprietary remedies, as there is no object to vindicate, although the manner in which it 
differs from the rei vindicatio is practically insignificant.10 Accordingly, the nature of title in 
copyright law is best classified as relative and the remedies tortious.11 This context is 
fundamental to a proper understanding of the nature of the rights that subsist in copyright 
works, and more importantly the nature of exceptions to these rights.12  
The justifications for protecting intellectual property by statute are based on social benefit, 
rather than the idea of the natural rights of authors to their works.13 The various theories 
substantiating the moral justifications for granting property rights over the expression of 
ideas are therefore not discussed;14 the focus falls instead on the justifications for limiting 
the statutory rights. In order to comprehensively understand the legitimacy of curtailing the 
application of an owner’s rights, a discursive overview of the law and economics elements 
underlying the rights is necessary. These policy considerations comprise a completely 
independent basis of justification to natural rights theories and moral justifications.15  
 
2 3 Policy and Theory 
The social objectives of the law of (physical) property are relevant considerations for 
granting property rights in intellectual creations.16 Without exclusive rights in physical 
property, two major economic problems are foreseen. Firstly, in the absence of exclusive 
                                            
8
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 6-7; 
Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 9. 
9
 Chapter 5 section 2 1. 
10
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 9-10. 
11
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 9. 
12
 The constitutional aspects are considered in chapter 5 section 3 2. 
13
 Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 118; Fisher WW 
“Reconstructing the fair use doctrine” (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 1659-1795 at 1687-1692; Garnett K, 
Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 27. 
14
 A thorough examination can be found in Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 22-28, 41-
117. 
15
 Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 25. 
16
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 158. 
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use rights, land and other property will be overused.17 The allegory of the tragedy of the 
commons is often incited to demonstrate the need for allocating common (corporeal) 
resources to individual entities in an effort to guard against the overconsumption of 
property held in common.18 However, the intrinsic risk of the tragedy of the commons is not 
applicable to intellectual property for the simple reason that the products of the intellect are 
non-rivalrous and therefore cannot be consumed, obviating the potential for 
overconsumption.19 The use of a copyright work by one person does not reduce its value 
to another, as is the case with corporeal property. Stated in economic terms, the marginal 
cost of intellectual property approaches zero, and can even be negative.20 Accordingly, it is 
more accurate to define intellectual property as a public good in the economic sense, and 
physical property as a private good.21 The non-exclusive character of intellectual property 
is important to all justificatory theories of copyright, both for granting rights and limiting 
them.22 
The second economic consideration is that without exclusive rights in property there will be 
insufficient incentive to improve the property, and land would be allowed to lie fallow.23 
Again this consideration carries less weight in the context of intellectual property, as it is 
                                            
17
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 158. 
18
 The tragedy of the commons was first demonstrated in the context of the natural sciences: Hardin G “The 
tragedy of the commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243-1248. The point illustrated by the article is that when 
each member of a community has unregulated access to unallocated resources held in common, every 
rational actor consumes as much of the commons as he can in order to maximise his own utility at minimal 
costs, leaving insufficient resources for the remainder of the community. See Ghosh S “The fable of the 
commons: Exclusivity and the construction of the intellectual property market” (2007) 40 University of 
California Davis Law Review 855-890 for an exposition of how this tragedy relates to distributive justice in 
the field of intellectual property. See also Heller M “The tragedy of the anticommons: Property in the 
transition from Marx to markets” (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621-688 for a demonstration of the 
transactional inefficiency that results from awarding too many rights over physical or intellectual property. 
19
 Freedom in the commons would not be ruinous to existing resources (as it would be with rivalrous 
resources), but it will remove most of the incentive to contribute to existing resources. Alternative methods of 
stimulating the production of copyright works which do not restrict the availability and use of the works are 
conceivable, but current statutes utilise the economic incentive theory described below. For an alternative 
theory, see Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical 
Concepts in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 108-109; Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) 
CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 2 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-
2012). 
20
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 159; Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” 
(2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 1 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 
20-5-2012). 
21
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 52. 
22
 Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 100. 
23
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 158. 
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more inefficient to have unowned land than it is to have unowned intellectual property.24 
Furthermore, the incorporeal nature of copyright works prevents deterioration and spoilage 
of the products. Accordingly, a different theoretical basis is needed to justify the reification 
of non-rivalrous, abstract objects. 
The rationale for granting exclusionary rights over intellectual property is based on the 
utilitarian objective of encouraging socially beneficial activities.25 This is achieved by 
providing an economic incentive to create works.26 The law creates (proprietary) 
authorisation rights that hold economic benefit to incentivise the creation and disclosure of 
copyright works.27 This utilitarian approach predicts that without guaranteed protection of 
(property) rights, there would be no incentive to create works.28 The rationale therefore 
revolves around providing works for the users of intellectual products, not rewarding the 
creators; the economic incentive is merely a means to serve the public.29 However, this 
social policy model has transformed into arguments for individual entitlement.30 An 
inherent tension exists between the exploitation of the rights granted and the purpose for 
which they were granted (allowing the public to make use of these works), as private 
property rights enhance one person’s freedom at the expense of everyone else’s.31 This 
approach is paradoxical, as it prevents many of the uses that it purports to promote.32 
                                            
24
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 52. 
25
 Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 25; Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in 
Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 107-108. See also art 1 
s 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America 1787. The role of utilitarian considerations is apparent 
in s 15 (3A) of the South African Copyright Act, which permits reproductions of three-dimensional artistic 
works if they “primarily have a utilitarian purpose and are made by an industrial process”. 
26
 This is therefore an instrumentalist justification: Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 25. 
Incentives other than economic, such as the desire to be recognised as the author of a work, are often 
embodied by moral rights (eg the right to claim paternity).  
27
 Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 122. 
28
 Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 107-108. It is clear that this economic incentive model has no interest in rewarding 
natural rights or moral desert: Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in 
intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 
at 122-123. 
29
 Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 120. 
30
 Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 124. 
31
 Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 100. 
32
 Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 108. 
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Property must serve a social function and the individual rights in property must be 
measured against the social justifications for granting them.33 Property rights should be 
limited when they start hindering the pursuit of more highly valued social objectives.34 
Exclusive rights have the obvious effect of limiting the distribution and use of intellectual 
property. As a counter-measure to excessive privatisation of copyright works, the law sets 
a limit on the scope of the rights to prevent the copyright owner from exercising her 
economic rights in instances where doing so would be contrary to the public interest. This 
is achieved by limiting the scope of application of the owner’s rights and specifically 
allowing the public to use a work without authorisation or compensation. However, just as 
the award and reification of rights in a copyright work require justification on social policy 
grounds, creating exceptions to these rights must also be justified by policy 
considerations.35 The raison d’être of every exception lies in the calculation that the social 
benefit it provides is greater than the private loss it causes.36 The exceptions are a 
necessary condition for the subsistence of the property rights that vest in a copyright work, 
as they seek to address mutual interferences between the owner of the work and public 
users.37  
The law awards authors a limited monopoly over the exploitation of their works in 
exchange for the public disclosure thereof.38 This monopoly takes the form of a number of 
core rights to use the work in different ways, which is described as ownership. Key among 
them are the rights to make reproductions of a work, publish a work, broadcast or publicly 
perform a work, make an adaptation of a work, and the right to commercially rent a work to 
the public.39 The economic nature of these rights is evident. The author’s property rights 
compete against several other fundamental rights vested in the public, such as the right to 
freedom of information and freedom of expression, as well as the public interest inherent in 
promoting education. In the face of these conflicts, property rights are often limited to avoid 
infringing other basic human rights and freedoms.40 Exceptions such as fair dealing (or fair 
                                            
33
 Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 116. 
34
 Gray K “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 at 297. 
35
 Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 127. 
36
 Aufderheide P & Jaszi P Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright (2011) 24. 
37
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 140. 
38
 Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 100. 
39
 The exclusive rights vary slightly from one statute to the next, but these are some of the core rights 
embodied in the legislation of the three jurisdictions considered in this thesis.  
40
 Gray K “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 at 297. 
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use, depending on the jurisdiction in question) manage to mediate much of the tension 
between copyright law and rights like freedom of expression.41 
The creation of real rights over incorporeal objects results in various social and economic 
problems arising, which are partially addressed by the exceptions to copyright. The fees 
involved in the use of copyright works could cause some users to resort to other products 
instead, which may cost society more to produce.42 This then leads to a loss of efficiency, 
as the marginal cost to the copyright owner of allowing the use is around zero.43 Moreover, 
creators of works routinely rely on existing works as an impetus for their creative 
process.44 If potential creators are precluded from using existing products by expansive 
intellectual property rights, the creation of new intellectual property is obstructed, which is 
counterproductive and economically inefficient.45 Limiting the effect of real rights may 
therefore be necessary to maximise the creation of intellectual property. In this case the 
conflict between the creation interest and use interest disappears, as they are both served 
by the limitation of rights.46 Copyright law therefore allows unlicensed use of copyright 
material to enable new creators to contribute to the culture of works that spawned their 
own.47 These arguments for unconstrained access to and use of available works weigh in 
on the balance of interests embodied in copyright policy. Copyright owners should be 
empowered to recoup their initial investment, but the rights granted should not prohibit 
legitimate public use.48  
                                            
41
 Denicola RC “Copyright and free speech: Constitutional limitations on the protection of expression” (1979) 
67 California Law Review 283-316 at 297. For a discussion of the relationship between fair use and free 
speech, see generally Netanel NW Copyright’s Paradox (2008) 30-194; Benkler Y “Free as the air to 
common use: First Amendment constraints on enclosure of the public domain” (1999) 74 New York 
University Law Review 354-446; Denicola RC “Copyright and free speech: Constitutional limitations on the 
protection of expression” (1979) 67 California Law Review 283-316. 
42
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 162; Landes WM & Posner RA “An economic analysis of 
copyright law” (1989) 18 The Journal of Legal Studies 325-363 at 357-358. 
43
 The marginal cost can even be negative, meaning that certain benefits to the copyright owners exist in 
allowing the reproduction of a work: Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D 
(ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 159. 
44
 This is particularly true of parodies. See Aufderheide P & Jaszi P Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put 
Balance Back in Copyright (2011) 16, 22-23; Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) 
Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 101; Boyer M “The economics of 
copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 3 <available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
45
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 162. 
46
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 164. 
47
 Aufderheide P & Jaszi P Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright (2011) 17. 
48
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 162; Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual rights and 
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In addition to the economic problems that are mitigated by the limitation of intellectual 
property rights, various prominent economic rationales in support of the fair dealing 
exceptions specifically can be identified and require consideration. The market for 
copyright works is riddled with obstacles ranging from imperfect information to exorbitant 
costs resulting from monopolistic markets (which lead to the price being too high and 
distribution being too low).49 Fair dealing helps alleviate these difficulties by allowing 
limited productive uses of copyright works by removing the obstacle of obtaining all of the 
relevant licences, which would require significant time and resources.50 Fair dealing also 
restrains the potential market power that copyright owners exert over the imperfectly 
competitive market.51 Copyright owners are able to exercise their market power 
unabatedly if there is no substitute for a work, restricting public access to a work that could 
prove valuable to many who cannot afford the price set by the owner.52 Fair dealing allows 
limited uses of these works without the consent of the copyright owner, thereby harnessing 
the market power they would otherwise be able to exert. However, imperfect substitutes 
for most copyright works do exist, which limits the force of this rationale.53  
The dissemination of ideas, knowledge and information constitutes a strong economic and 
social justification both for awarding property rights and curtailing them.54 Excessive 
protection can lead to the tragedy of the anticommons,55 where the high number of 
individual copyright owners acts as a deterrent to using any combination of their works 
because of the transaction costs involved in the use.56 If permission had to be sought prior 
to the use of a copyright work in every instance, very few uses would prevail. Copyright 
works will therefore be underused, which is economically inefficient. This frustrates the 
                                                                                                                                                 
social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I 
(2006) 114-154 at 122. 
49
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 3, 
31-36 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
50
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 31 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
51
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 28-
30 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
52
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 29 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
53
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 30 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
54
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 30 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
55
 Initially proposed by Michelman FI “Ethics, economics, and law of property” in Pennock JR & Chapman JW 
(eds) NOMOS XXIV (1982) 3-40 and expanded to the field of intellectual property in Heller M “The tragedy of 
the anticommons: Property in the transition from Marx to markets” (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621-688. 
56
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 30 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
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social objective of abundant dissemination of information, which in turn has a devastating 
effect on the initial goal that copyright law sets out to achieve.57 Fair dealing exceptions 
counter the detrimental effects of the absence of efficient markets by allowing certain 
legitimate uses without the consent of the copyright owner.58 The exceptions embody one 
of the social objectives underlying copyright law by promoting the free flow of information 
where the market fails to sufficiently allocate this resource.  
Apart from the role that exceptions play in alleviating various social and economic 
problems that arise from extensive property rights in copyright works, a reasonable 
limitation on the owners’ rights could actually aid their interests in certain ways.59 Fair 
dealing for the purpose of criticism or review is one concrete example of this contention. 
This exception allows users to reproduce portions of a (or even the entire) work without 
consent to properly review or level criticism against it.60 If consent had to be obtained 
before the work could be used in this way, it would invalidate all credibility of the review, as 
the copyright owner would not allow such use if the review were negative.61 By obviating 
the need for authorisation (and the concomitant influence that the copyright owner could 
exert over the review) fair dealing allows users to give their honest and accurate opinion of 
a work.62 Even unfavourable reviews can stimulate sales (which is obviously in the interest 
of the owners) if the alternative is no review at all.63 Moreover, when an unfavourable 
review negatively impacts on the demand for the work, it is not because it acts as a 
substitute for the work (and therefore does not directly infringe the owner’s economic 
rights). The detriment would be caused by drawing attention to various flaws of the work, 
thus increasing the available supply of information, without undermining the reward 
incentive for creating worthwhile intellectual products.64 This form of harm is not what the 
law tries to prevent by encouraging the production of intellectual property.65 It can 
therefore be concluded that fair dealing exceptions embody a multitude of legitimate 
economic and social policy considerations. 
                                            
57
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 31 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
58
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 34 
<available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
59
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54.  
60
 See the discussion of this exception at chapter 4 sections 2 3 3 & 3 3 3 and chapter 5 section 2 3 3. 
61
 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 164; Landes WM & Posner RA “An economic analysis of 
copyright law” (1989) 18 The Journal of Legal Studies 325-363 at 358-359. 
62
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
63
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
64
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
65
 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 18 
 
Economic reward is the method used to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts”, as it is phrased in the Constitution of the United States of America.66 There can be 
no objection to using a work in a way that does not impact on the economic exploitability, 
which is the primary incentive to continue creating works.67 It follows that in situations 
where no economic harm is suffered there is a vested public interest in using copyright 
works that outweighs the private interests of copyright owners. The fair dealing provisions 
aim to provide the basis for such use. This is evidenced by the current international 
standard which legislation must comply with, requiring that all exceptions must be special 
cases that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of a work or unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the owner.68 Exceptions that conform to this standard will 
therefore only allow uses of a work that do not detract from the economic incentive to 
create works. This is a reflection of the chief social objective of copyright law and an 
essential embodiment of the public interest. The fair dealing exceptions therefore perform 
a vital role in copyright law. 
2 4 Nature of Exceptions 
The nature of copyright exceptions is a topic of academic disagreement. The legislative 
effort at restricting owners’ rights can be succinctly described as “a chaos theory-like line 
that encloses the notional area of the property right”.69 It has been suggested that the 
proprietary nature of the rights in a copyright work necessarily means that the exceptions 
also have a proprietary nature.70 This follows from the contention that exceptions limit an 
owner’s full ownership of her work in specific situations.71 The exceptions are therefore 
properly classified as limited real rights, akin to servitudes in the context of corporeal 
property. However, this construction is untenable. A major problem that immediately arises 
is the imprecise boundaries that such a limited real right would have. It becomes evident 
later in this thesis that the scope of the fair dealing exceptions remains unclear because it 
allows for judicial discretion in the determination of the fairness of each use. This 
                                            
66
 Art 1 s 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America 1787. See Dean OH Handbook of South 
African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-1 – 1-2. 
67
 As will be seen in chapters 3 and 4, economic detriment is an important factor when determining the 
fairness of a use, although it is not dispositive. 
68
 Art 9(2) of the World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886), restated and extended in art 13 of the World Trade 
Organisation Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (15-4-1994) Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 1869 UNTS 299 (1994). See the discussion in chapter 
3 section 2 2 relating to the expansion of the three-step test. 
69
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 142. 
70
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 140. 
71
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 138. 
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undermines the desire for property rights to be clearly defined, because they are binding 
on third parties.72 The general approach to constructing the exceptions in legislation and 
treaties also does not suggest that the public has a property right entitling them to use 
works in certain specified instances.73 Furthermore, the holder of a right is entitled to 
institute an action on the basis of that right; as will be seen in the paragraphs that follow, 
this is not the case with fair dealing exceptions. It would therefore be tenuous to say that 
the law confers property rights on every member of the public to use copyright works.  
There is support for the contention that fair dealing provisions constitute rights: the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that these exceptions create users’ rights,74 a stance that 
has been hailed as a positive development.75 Unfortunately, the court merely alluded to the 
exceptions as being better understood as users’ rights (and continued to refer to them as 
such) without providing an explanation of why this is the case. This characterisation 
obviously does not mean that the rights are real. Instead, these rights should be seen as 
public entitlements granted by legislation that form an integral part in the balance of 
copyright if they are to be considered rights.76  
It is submitted that the most accurate view is that the property rights of authors are 
intentionally demarcated to fall short of the uses framed by the exceptions to copyright 
(such as fair dealing provisions). The copyright owner retains her property rights to exploit 
her work in the normal way, but these rights do not extend to certain prescribed instances. 
This is demonstrated by the phrase “copyright shall not be infringed [by the use of a work 
for certain purposes]”, which is consistently employed in fair dealing provisions.77 In cases 
of internal modification (or “immanent limitation”), the law notionally restricts the scope of 
                                            
72
 If the boundaries of the rights are not clearly defined, the public is prone to use works unlawfully in good 
faith: Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 142 
73
 The specific constructions of the various limitations clauses and exceptions are discussed in chapters 3, 4 
and 5. See also section 5 of this chapter. 
74
 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 SCC 13 paras 12, 48. The fair dealing provisions 
in s 29 of the Canadian Copyright Act of 1985 are substantively identical to the South African counterparts 
(discussed in chapter 5), meaning that the nature of the Canadian exceptions have direct bearing on the 
South African position. 
75
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 19, 
47 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). Vaver clearly supports the 
contention that these exceptions constitute users’ rights: Vaver D Copyright Law: Essentials of Canadian 
Law (2000) 171; Vaver D “Publishers and copyright: Rights without duties?” (2006) 40 Bibliotheksdienst 743-
750 at 747. 
76
 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 140. 
77
 See ss 29(1), 30(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; ss 40(1), 41(1), 41A, 42(1) of the 
Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968; s 12(1) of the South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
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the rights from the outset without limiting any specific rights.78 This methodology perfectly 
describes fair dealing provisions, as the phrase “copyright shall not be infringed” limits 
ownership and does not differentiate between specific rights. The statutory source of the 
rights acts as an internal modifier, delimiting certain uses from the content of the rights and 
thus rendering these exceptions outside of the ambit of the author’s property rights.79 The 
law itself is the most important indicator of the limitations of the right,80 and indicates that 
these specific instances fall outside the scope of the copyright owner’s property rights. The 
statute restricts the content of the rights ab initio by determining their limits and describing 
conduct that falls outside of these boundaries.81  
The legislation that grants the rights delimits them from certain spheres of application, 
leaving a protected array of privileges out of the control of the rights holders. Members of 
the public therefore enjoy privileges (or “liberties”)82 which they can rely on to use a 
copyright work without consent for purposes that are deemed fair. The legal conception of 
a privilege entails the permission to act in a certain way without being liable for damages.83 
A privilege has as a no-right as a correlative, meaning that no person has a right to 
summon state intervention to prevent the holder of the privilege from engaging in certain 
conduct.84 The view that the exceptions amount to users’ privileges is prevalent in 
academic discourse.85 The nature of a right is cited to support this view: the existence of a 
right necessarily implies that another party owes the holder of the right a concomitant 
duty.86 It is argued that because a user who relies on an exception to use a work is not 
                                            
78
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 73 n 165; Rautenbach IM General Provisions of 
the South African Bill of Rights (1995) 105-106. 
79
 Van der Walt AJ “The limits of constitutional property law” (1997) 12 South African Public Law 275-330 at 
280. 
80
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 159; Van der Walt AJ 
“The limits of constitutional property law” (1997) 12 South African Public Law 275-330 at 280.  
81
 Van der Walt AJ “The limits of constitutional property law” (1997) 12 South African Public Law 275-330 at 
280-281; Van der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative Analysis of Section 25 of the 
South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 75. 
82
 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 36. 
83
 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 30-32; Singer JW Entitlements: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 132. 
84
 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 30, 32; Singer JW “The legal rights debate in analytical jurisprudence from Bentham to 
Hohfeld” (1982) 1982 Wisconsin Law Review 975-1059 at 986-989. 
85
 See Benkler Y “Free as the air to common use: First Amendment constraints on enclosure of the public 
domain” (1999) 74 New York University Law Review 354-446; Waldron J “From authors to copiers: Individual 
rights and social values in intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 114-154 at 126; Cahir J “The public domain: Right or liberty?” in Waelde C & MacQueen H 
(eds) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 35-52. 
86
 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 30-34; Singer JW Entitlements: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 132; Cahir J “The public 
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owed a duty by the copyright owner (or anyone else), the exceptions cannot constitute 
rights.87 The absence of a duty precludes the possibility of a right in terms of Hohfeldian 
correlatives.88 This contention is supported by the interest theory used to inform the 
substance of rights, according to which the holder of a right is a passive beneficiary of 
supportive duties owed to her by others.89 Accordingly, copyright owners are not entitled to 
succeed in legal action against users because the latter have the benefit of privileges, 
which renders their conduct lawful, while the copyright owner has a no-right in these 
instances. Everyone has the freedom to use copyright works in line with the content of the 
privileges, and no party has the right to stop anyone else from doing so. However, 
copyright owners are under no duty to enable the use of their works. Privileges do not 
necessarily entail correlative duties imposed on other people (because other persons may 
also enjoy liberties), meaning that third parties have no obligation to allow the holder of the 
privilege to exercise it.90 This conception does not exclude the possibility of duties being 
imposed on others to respect a user’s privilege (which is what the Supreme Court of 
Canada implicitly held),91 but it does not require it. A privilege can exist without any 
correlative duties on others to respect it; whether such concomitant duties exist is a matter 
of policy and justice, to be expressed in statute.92 Legislation will have to be clear when 
and on whom such a duty is imposed.  
The privilege acts as an affirmative defence, exempting the beneficiary from liability for 
copyright infringement by rendering the activity lawful. Accordingly, the exceptions justify 
the user’s conduct, instead of excusing it.93 However, privileges do not entitle the 
                                                                                                                                                 
domain: Right or liberty?” in Waelde C & MacQueen H (eds) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the 
Public Domain (2007) 35-52 at 36. 
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 Cahir J “The public domain: Right or liberty?” in Waelde C & MacQueen H (eds) Intellectual Property: The 
Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 35-52 at 40-41. 
88
 Cahir J “The public domain: Right or liberty?” in Waelde C & MacQueen H (eds) Intellectual Property: The 
Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 35-52 at 40. 
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 Rainbolt GW “Rights theory” (2006) 1 Philosophy Compass 1-11 at 4; Cahir J “The public domain: Right or 
liberty?” in Waelde C & MacQueen H (eds) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain 
(2007) 35-52 at 38.  
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 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 30, 32; Singer JW “The legal rights debate in analytical jurisprudence from Bentham to 
Hohfeld” (1982) 1982 Wisconsin Law Review 975-1059 at 988. 
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92
 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 36. 
93
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beneficiary to state intervention to enforce his entitlements;94 they do not act as a 
foundation for a cause of action if encroached upon, unless correlative duties are imposed.  
Users should be able to use works freely for certain purposes without fear of judicial 
recourse. However, this is only possible with extra-judicial certainty regarding the precise 
ambit of the conduct that is deemed lawful, which would detract from the flexibility of the 
exceptions (which allows the judiciary to achieve just results on every set of facts).  The 
approaches to constructing exceptions need to be examined to find the optimal balance 
between flexibility and certainty.  
2 5 Construction of Exceptions 
Limitations of rights are predominantly set out in the statute that grants the author the 
economic rights, giving them the same authority as the rights themselves. Two 
approaches are prevalent in the construction of exceptions in copyright law, sometimes 
distinguished by the civil/common law divide.95 The first approach, known as the “unitary 
system”,96 establishes a general rule or principle that prescribes the characteristics of the 
conduct that the law exempts from liability.97 International treaties are exemplary of this 
approach, as it is a sensible model to use when trying to cater for a large variety of legal 
systems. The three-step test contained in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention,98 which has 
three criteria that exempting legislative provisions must conform to, is a clear 
demonstration of this construction.99 The second approach, known as the “particle 
system”,100 forsakes the generalised construction of exemption for a specific set of 
purposes for which a copyright work can be used. Countries with legislated fair dealing 
provisions fall into this category.101 
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 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 36; Singer JW “The legal rights debate in analytical jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld” 
(1982) 1982 Wisconsin Law Review 975-1059 at 988.  
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 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 141. 
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 Also referred to as the “hedgehog” system: Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property 
Rights in Creative Works (2011) 141.  
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 The German provision is a prime example of this approach: see s 24 UrheberGesetz 1965. 
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 World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886). 
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 See the discussion in chapter 3 section 2 1. 
100
 Also referred to as the “fox” approach: Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property 
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A large number of jurisdictions that adopt the unitary system also have detailed 
subdivisions providing a clearer exposition of the general rule.102 The United States of 
America has a general fair use principle – which is distinguished from fair dealing precisely 
on this basis – that allows uses for any purpose if they can be justified in terms of four 
factors used to determine the fairness.103 However, the general rule in the principal 
provision is supplemented by a set of specific purposes which are issued as a list of 
practices that will often qualify as fair. This hybrid model is to be preferred, as it allows for 
an open range of uses to be justified while providing a degree of legal certainty with regard 
to certain specific uses that will regularly be justified.  
Exceptions allowing certain individual uses (like the fair use exceptions) are generally quite 
vague. Framing an exception with open-ended application has the benefit of allowing the 
exception to be applied in a flexible manner to each factual situation, enabling a judge to 
apply the consideration of overall fairness to achieve a just result while gradually 
developing the law by establishing precedent. However, this approach has the obvious 
pitfall of legal uncertainty, leaving users unclear as to whether their actions (which may be 
undertaken with honest intentions) will be exempted by law. It is necessary that the fair 
dealing exceptions remain flexible to accommodate legitimate uses and deny exemption to 
brazenly illegitimate uses. Accordingly, it is desirable to circumscribe guidelines illustrating 
the type of conduct that will be found permissible, without removing the element of judicial 
discretion to determine the overall fairness of the action or restricting the types of 
permitted uses to a numerus clausus. Extra-judicial certainty can be achieved to some 
extent by providing such guidelines, which could operate as an efficient and inexpensive 
mechanism to alleviate much of the inherent tension and uncertainty while protecting the 
intrinsic flexibility of the exceptions as they stand.104 The concept of fairness, which is an 
indispensable requirement of the exceptions, is discussed in later chapters in light of the 
meaning that it has been given by the judiciary.105 Policy considerations play a pivotal role 
in the determination of whether conduct should be exempted from copyright protection, 
and are manifested in certain factors that courts take into account when deciding a fair 
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 Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 141. 
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 S 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 
104
 See s 40(5) of the Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968, where precise guidelines are set out that deem 
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dealing case.106 It is possible to legislate factors to serve as guidelines without 
jeopardising the inherent flexibility of these exceptions, as has been done in Australia.107 
 
2 6 Conclusion 
Copyright law promotes the creation of works that are socially desirable. The proprietary 
nature of copyright provides strong protection for owners of works, but presents a paradox 
between the rights granted and the reasons for granting them. Fair dealing exceptions 
attempt to regulate copyright owners’ property rights to balance the interests of the public 
and the interests of copyright owners. The exceptions allow valuable uses of works that do 
not materially impact on the commercial exploitation of the work, thereby alleviating part of 
the initial paradox.  
The various rationales proposed for these exceptions show that each exception is 
calculated to achieve a greater social benefit than the individual loss it causes by taking 
account of the economic incentive necessary to promote the creation of copyright works. It 
is suggested that certain unauthorised uses may even be beneficial to the economic 
interests of copyright owners.108 In this way copyright owners’ interests are protected and 
the dissemination of ideas and information is promoted. Furthermore, fair dealing allows 
derivative use of copyright works in the process of creating new works (parody being a 
prime example), which promotes the philosophy underlying copyright law. 
The analysis of the nature of the exceptions shows that fair dealing provisions create 
public law entitlements to use protected works for certain socially beneficial purposes. 
These entitlements stem from the internal modification that copyright legislation performs, 
defining copyright owners’ rights to fall short of these prescribed instances. These 
entitlements take the form of privileges (in terms of Hohfeldian conceptions) which justify 
users’ actions rather than excusing them. This view is supported by the fact that fair 
dealing is an affirmative defence, not a negating defence. The exceptions declare the 
user’s conduct to be lawful, and form a constituent part of the proprietary nature of 
copyright. Policy considerations can necessitate the imposition of correlative duties, which 
would serve to protect users’ privileges, although this is not achieved by the legislation of 
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the jurisdictions considered. Accordingly, users are left without the ability to protect their 
liberties from outside interference.  
The two statutory constructions that are traditionally used demonstrate the different 
approaches to embodying the objectives of fair dealing. The type of conduct allowed is 
similar, although the unitary system permits a larger range of uses than the particle 
system. It is suggested that the merits of both systems should ideally be combined by 
making use of a hybrid system, like the American fair use provision. This allows a greater 
scope of exemption for genuinely deserving conduct, without compromising on legal 
certainty.  
The context that this chapter creates allows a meaningful analysis of the way in which fair 
dealing exceptions function to follow. Against this background, the next chapter examines 
the international law framework that informs national copyright legislation. It is then 
possible to provide a comparative analysis of fair dealing exceptions in the United 
Kingdom and Australia. This comprehensive theoretical, normative and comparative 
foundation enables a reflective analysis of the exceptions contained in South African 
legislation. 
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3 International Law on Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights 
 
3 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the most prominent international instruments 
relating to the protection of intellectual property, more specifically copyright, that are 
binding in South African law. This will serve to create a framework of international law 
mandates informing national legislation, which will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
Specific attention is paid to provisions in international instruments concerning the rights 
granted to copyright owners, the exceptions to and limitations on these rights and the 
effect on users’ entitlements to use such works. The development of international 
copyright law is traced to serve as a framework for the analysis of national legislation that 
follows. 
Section 231(2) of the South African Constitution declares that international agreements are 
binding on the Republic of South Africa once parliament has ratified or acceded to the 
text.1 South African courts, tribunals and forums are also mandated to consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.2 International agreements as referred 
to in these provisions are synonymous with treaties and the terms are therefore used 
interchangeably.3 International agreements become law in South Africa once national 
legislation is enacted that gives effect to the obligations.4 South Africa nonetheless 
remains bound by all treaties which were binding at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution.5 Courts are instructed to interpret legislation in a manner that is consistent 
with international law when possible.6 Accordingly, a dualist approach to international law 
is followed.7 South African copyright law is integrated into the international framework of 
                                            
1
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
2
 S 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
3
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (4
th
 ed 2011) 61. 
4
 S 231(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See Dugard J International Law: A South 
African Perspective (4
th
 ed 2011) 60-62 for a discussion of international agreements that are not enacted into 
law by Parliament.  
5
 S 231(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6
 S 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (4
th
 ed 2011) 42-43. 
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copyright protection, with legislation modelled according to the standards entrenched by a 
variety of treaties.8   
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), along with the United Nations (UN) 
and World Trade Organisation (WTO), is the driving force behind some of the most 
weighty treaties and conventions concerning copyright protection. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights assures that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author”.9 This statement is reiterated in article 15(1)(c) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,10 which recognises the right of 
everyone “[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”.11 The instruments 
that expand on these provisions are, for the purposes of copyright and neighbouring rights, 
primarily the WIPO Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(Berne Convention),12 the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention),13 the 
Copyright Treaty (WCT),14 the Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT),15 and the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).16  
These international treaties and covenants have fostered a global regime of intellectual 
property standards and have been integral in transforming many national regimes on the 
intellectual property legislative front.17 It is necessary to examine the provisions of these 
treaties relating to the fortification of copyright and the most prevalent effects that this 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-162. See chapter 5 generally for a 
detailed discussion of the provisions of the South African legislation. 
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 Art 27(2) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc 
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 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16-12-1966) 993 UNTS 3 
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 World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 76 
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 World Trade Organisation Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (15-4-1994) Marrakesh 
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fortification has had on what is traditionally seen as “fair dealing” with such works.18 By 
examining these instruments in conjunction with national legislation, it is possible to create 
a contextual framework for the subsequent chapters that provide comparative analyses.19  
The UN Universal Copyright Convention (UCC)20 is a treaty that has little relevance today 
but was an important stepping stone during the latter part of the twentieth century. For this 
reason the discussion of the treaty can be confined to a few general observations. The 
primary aim of the convention was to provide common guidelines between various states 
in the Americas and the member states of the Berne Convention.21 The UCC is not (nor 
was it intended to be) a comprehensive model of regulation, but rather an introductory step 
towards the Berne Convention which could later be built upon.22 A general approach is 
adopted regarding the obligations of contracting members instead of the more specific and 
rigid mandates imposed by the Berne Convention.23 As a result, many of the provisions of 
the UCC are less arduous and impose lighter requirements to be adopted in legislation.24 
Furthermore, there is no mention of any exceptions to copyright, or any general protection 
of moral rights. 
The greatest impact of the UCC is considered to be the adherence of the United States of 
America, who at that time was not party to the Berne Convention, and “the entry of that 
important country into general international copyright relations”.25 Today the UCC is of little 
significance as the shift towards the Berne Convention has practically enveloped the need 
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 “Fair dealing” should be construed to include the American corollary “fair use” for the purposes of this 
chapter only. 
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 Eg the general term of protection contained in art IV(2) is 25 years post mortem auctoris and the only 
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the Berne Convention respectively. 
25
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for the former, with all UCC members now having acceded to the more comprehensive 
framework of the Berne Convention.26 
The respective sets of legislation in force in Australia, the United Kingdom and South 
Africa have followed the international standards set by the instruments discussed in this 
chapter, and are analysed in chapters 4 and 5 concurrently. The treaties discussed in this 
chapter operate as the link between the assorted national legislative schemes.27 The 
countries are variously parties to the same agreements, and authors therefore enjoy the 
benefit of protection in foreign territory under the principle of national treatment.28 
Contracting states to a particular convention are required to provide certain minimum 
standards of protection, which can then be claimed by a qualifying national of another 
contracting state. This means that the legislation promulgated by one member state can 
be used to enforce the rights of a national of a different member state.29  
The rights granted to authors of works are discussed separately to those that attach to the 
performance of a work, reducing that performance to a phonogram, and broadcasting a 
performance generally. The act of creating a work is the focus of section 2, while section 3 
discusses the legal aspects of the subsequent performance of the work. These latter rights 
are supplementary to and in no way detract from the rights of the author of a work, rather 
operating completely autonomously.30 Some of the legislation discussed in later chapters 
deal with these neighbouring rights together with copyright, making a discursive overview 
of the international framework of neighbouring rights necessary. 
 
3 2 Copyright 
3 2 1 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne 
Convention) 
The Berne Convention – originating in 1886 – has been redrafted, revised and amended 
eight times since its inception. The current text, the Paris Act,31 was last amended on 28 
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 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond II (2
nd
 ed 2006) 1202-1203. 
27
 See Wallace RMM International Law (5
th
 ed 2005) 262 in this regard. 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-166. 
29
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-166. 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-191. 
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 1161 UNTS 3 (1971). 
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September 1979.32 For the sake of concision, reference to the Berne Convention should 
be construed as reference to the latest text as amended, unless another version of the text 
is cited. The Republic of South Africa and Australia signed the Berne Convention on 
October 3, 1928 and April 14, 1928 respectively, while the United Kingdom and the United 
States signed the treaty on December 5, 1887 and March 1, 1989 respectively. South 
Africa has ratified the Brussels text of 1948 regarding substantive provisions and the Paris 
Act of 1979 regarding administrative provisions. Nonetheless, the South African Copyright 
Act 98 of 1978 was drafted to comply with the latest text and although no formal steps 
have been taken to accede to the Paris Act, the required legislative measures are in 
place.33 For this reason, and because of the effect of article 9 of TRIPS and article 1(4) of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty,34 the latest text of the Berne Convention is analysed in this 
chapter. 
The Berne Convention is based on the principle of national treatment, according to which 
the primary method of enforcement is through national legislation.35 The protection is 
therefore dependent on the national legislation of the country in which protection is being 
asserted.36 
Article 2 of the Berne Convention delineates the categories of works that are endowed with 
protection which, in terms of the treaty, extends territorially to every signatory party.37 This 
extensive, although not exhaustive,38 list essentially corresponds with the categories of 
works enumerated in the South African Copyright Act,39 the Australian Copyright Act,40 
and the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act.41 Article 2(8) of the Berne 
Convention, however, explicitly excludes news of the day and miscellaneous facts of press 
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 The 1886 text was the first to introduce minimum standards of protection. See generally Jaszi P “A garland 
of reflections on three international copyright topics” (1989) 8 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Review 47-
72 at 50. 
33
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-166. 
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 These articles incorporate the substantive provisions of the Paris Act; see the discussions in sections 2 2 
and 2 3 respectively. 
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 Jaszi P “A garland of reflections on three international copyright topics” (1989) 8 Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Review 47-72 at 59. 
36
 Art 5. 
37
 Art 2(1) explains “literary and artistic works shall include every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain”. 
38
 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond I (2
nd
 ed 2006) 504; Nordemann W, Vinck K, Hertin PW & Meyer G International Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights Law: Commentary (1990) 44.  
39
 S 2(1)(h)-(i) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
40
 Ss 32 & 89-92, read with s 10, of the Copyright Act 63 of 1968. 
41
 S 1 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (hereafter CDPA). 
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information from being protected. As facts are not protected by copyright in any event,42 
this provision is thought to reinforce the dichotomy between the subject matter and the 
expression.43  
The Berne Convention provides for minimum standards of protection, meaning that 
exceptions to the rights of authors must also be provided for.44 The primary limitations on 
the protection granted by article 2 are contained in article 2bis. The works provided for in 
these exceptions are not free of copyright protection; rather, an exception is made that 
allows the use of the copyright material in certain circumstances, as discussed in chapter 
2.45 Article 2bis(1) aims to exclude public political speeches and speeches made in legal 
proceedings from copyright, which means that they can be reproduced without fear of 
infringement. Subsection (2) of article 2bis allows national legislators to provide for further 
exceptions where it is deemed to be in the public interest for certain expressions (namely 
“lectures, addresses and other works of the same nature which are delivered in public”) to 
be reproduced and relayed to the public.46 It is clear from the formulation and scope of the 
provision that it is the manifestation of the public interest in information that makes it 
possible for media actors to disseminate public speeches without fear of infringing 
copyright.47 However, the subsequent provision curbs the effect of the article by providing 
that “[notwithstanding], the author shall enjoy the exclusive right of making a collection of 
his works mentioned in the preceding paragraphs”.48 This mandate prohibits publications 
such as journals and other anthologies by any entity other than the author.   
Article 9(2) deals with exceptions to the exclusive right of reproduction by establishing a 
three-step test setting out the requirements to be met by any legislative provision granting 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-25. 
43
 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond I (2
nd
 ed 2006) 498-499. See also art 9(2) of TRIPS, discussed in section 2 2. 
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 Nordemann W, Vinck K, Hertin PW & Meyer G International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Law: 
Commentary (1990) 54. 
45
 Nordemann W, Vinck K, Hertin PW & Meyer G International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Law: 
Commentary (1990) 54. See also chapter 2 section 4. 
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 Art 2
bis
(2) states that “[i]t shall also be a matter for legislation in countries of the Union to determine the 
conditions under which lectures, addresses and other works of the same nature which are delivered in public 
may be reproduced by press, broadcast, communicated to the public by wire and made the subject of public 
communication as envisaged in Article 11
bis
(1) of this Convention [which relates to rights in broadcasting], 
when such use is justified by the informatory purpose.” 
47
 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond I (2
nd
 ed 2006) 807-808. Only the South African Copyright Act embodies this provision in s 12(6), 
while in the other jurisdictions reliance will have to be on fair dealing for purposes of reporting news and 
current events. 
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bis
 (3). 
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exemption from infringement of the right to reproduce.49 In terms of this test, exceptions 
relating to the reproduction of a protected work must (i) be confined to special cases, (ii) 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, and (iii) not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.50 This test has subsequently been extended to all rights 
granted to copyright owners by the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, thus becoming the international baseline 
for exceptions to any and all rights.51  
Article 10 – entitled “Certain Free Uses of Works” – provides the international minimum fair 
dealing standards to be implemented by member states. This article is aimed at the 
protection of public interest rather than the protection of the author’s rights.52 Subsection 
(1) provides as follows: 
“It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully 
made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and 
their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from 
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries.” 
This provision can be related to article 2(8), discussed above, both having the aim of free 
global dissemination of information.53 While article 2(8) withholds copyright protection from 
facts, article 10(1) does not derogate from the protection of works, but allows certain uses 
of these works. It is argued that these limitations and exceptions constitute imperative 
mandates for member states to allow deviation from the protection of authors’ rights, and if 
copyright protection is indeed given in these circumstances it will be contrary to the Berne 
Convention.54 This is known as the principle of maximum protection, which obliges national 
legislatures to cap the protection given to copyright owners according to certain 
provisions.55 The mandatory exception therefore serves to grant a minimum entitlement to 
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 Sheat K “Libraries, copyright and the global digital environment” (2004) 22 The Electronic Library 487-491 
at 488. 
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 See sections 2 2 and 2 3 of this chapter respectively. 
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 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond I (2
nd
 ed 2006) 331-332. 
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 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond I (2
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Beyond I (2
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 Ricketson S & Ginsburg JC International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond I (2
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users.56 It is submitted that this principle necessitates application to other exceptions of a 
permissive nature to create the intended balance.57 
The provision sets out three requirements that must be met before the exception can be 
applied. Firstly, the work must have been lawfully available to the public, indicating that the 
author consented to its disclosure. This clause has a wider scope than what is envisioned 
by the term “published” and includes the lawful availability through any means, not only by 
means of copies of the work.58 It follows that if a work is lawfully (with the consent of the 
author) performed in public, it is open to quotation by critics and reviewers. 
Secondly, the quotation must be made in a manner that is compatible with “fair practice”. 
The elementary meaning given to the phrase “fair practice” corresponds with the implicit 
intention of limiting “free” uses of a work as contained in this provision to socially beneficial 
purposes, such as encouraging further creativity and innovation.59 This interpretation is 
consistent with allowing users the liberty of exploiting the work without consent when the 
use outweighs the copyright owner’s interest in excluding such use.60 This is usually 
implemented with fair dealing or fair use provisions. Among other factors, the length of the 
extract will be objectively considered when determining whether the quotation is 
compatible with fair practice, although this criterion is not dispositive.61 Moreover, two of 
the constituent factors of the three-step test of article 9(2) are also applicable to this 
consideration: is the use in conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, and does the 
use unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author?62   
The third requirement is that the extent of the quotation does not exceed the justifying 
purpose. No list of such purposes is provided in the Berne Convention, and member states 
are therefore left without context as to what might constitute one. Ricketson and Ginsburg 
contend that, based on the preparatory work of the Paris Act, a number of contexts would 
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 Kur A & Ruse-Khan HG “Enough is enough – The notion of binding ceilings in international intellectual 
property protection” Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law Research Paper 
Series No 09-01 (2008) 1-69 at 18 <available at 
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give proper meaning to this clause.63 These include scientific, critical, informative and 
educational purposes, as well as quotations made for judicial or political, or even 
entertainment purposes.64 While not confined merely to literary works,65 this clause makes 
it possible for works to be reproduced without the consent of the copyright owner for a 
purpose that can be justified as “fair practice”. This exception serves the public interest in 
the dissemination of literary and artistic works. 
Article 10(2) strives to prevent the stringent application of copyright law in cases where 
copyright works are used for educational purposes. The provision states: 
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union ... to permit the utilization, to 
the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in 
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization 
is compatible with fair practice.” 
The purpose of this statement is to promote education by precluding possible objections of 
copyright infringement when protected works are included in materials used for teaching. 
Again, this exception is predicated on the otherwise-infringing act falling within the 
boundaries of fair practice, which leaves a broad spectrum of interpretation as with article 
10(1).66 The word “utilization” supersedes the term “excerpts” contained in the Brussels 
Act of 1948, meaning that the entire work may now be used instead of only a part of a 
work, as long as it is justified by the purpose.67 Furthermore, a wide array of uses is 
permitted by the provision, enabling teachers to make full use of “publications, broadcasts 
or sound or visual recordings”. This provides educators with the discretion to make use of 
a variety of mediums of expression, given the rapidly progressing nature of technology.68 
There is also no restriction on the number of copies that may be made for this purpose, 
although it must comply with fair practice. However, there is a specific limitation on the 
allowable use of protected material: the teaching must take place in a public or private 
school or tertiary institution, and the exception finds no application in the case of general 
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public teaching.69 The permissive language of this exception, when compared to the 
imperative language of article 10(1), indicates that there is no obligation on member states 
to enact this exception. The purpose of this distinction is less than clear, as the public 
interest served by teaching can surely not be treated as inferior to that served by 
quotations.70 Article 10(3) imposes additional fair practice requirements by insisting that 
the author and source of the work are mentioned, which reinforces the author’s moral 
rights (in this case the right to be acknowledged as the author).71 It is submitted that the 
defence of fair dealing can therefore not find application in the case of infringement of 
moral rights, as this will clearly be beyond the awning of fair practice.  
Article 10bis is entitled “Further Possible Free Uses of Works” and provides supplementary 
instances in which member states can indemnify infringing uses of copyright protected 
works. This is not an obligatory provision; rather, it is left to the discretion of national 
legislatures to determine whether and to what extent these exceptions to the rights of the 
copyright owner will be introduced.72  
The first envisioned scenario is the reproduction of media articles relating to topical 
economic, political or religious events.73 This provision covers not only the subject matter 
of articles, but extends beyond reproductions to include broadcasts and communications 
of the same nature by wire to the public.74 Although these acts of dissemination could not 
possibly have foreseen the digital environment, there is nothing in this provision that 
prevents member states from incorporating this exception in national legislation.75 
However, the reproduction, broadcasting and communication by wire are contingent on the 
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copyright owner not expressly prohibiting such acts.76 The moral rights of the author are 
again stated in the latter part of the clause, while further actuating national legislatures to 
promulgate the legal consequences of not acknowledging the source.  
Article 10(2) calls for legislators to consider the consequences of incidental exposure of 
copyright protected works in pursuance of reporting current events. This provision does 
not constitute a mandate, but rather leaves it to national legislatures to implement.77 The 
provision explicitly accounts for “literary or artistic works seen or heard in the course of 
[reporting on current events]”.78 The form of reporting to the public can be by photography, 
cinematography, broadcasting or communication to the public by wire. To give meaningful 
effect to this provision, legislatures of member states should extend the scope to include 
sound recordings, which are often the medium of expression of said literary works and 
form an integral part of cinematographic works and broadcasts.79  
The copyright work must have been seen or heard while reporting on current events, 
which necessarily implies that there can be no claim to the exception where such material 
was added after recording the footage for the sake of embellishment.80 In essence, the 
infringement must have occurred while reporting current events. A further requirement is 
that the use of the protected work must be “justified by the informatory purpose”.81 This 
phrase replaced the term “short extracts” that appeared in the Brussels Act, which 
suggests that the emphasis has shifted from the length or duration of the use per se, to the 
length or duration needed to serve the purpose. The inquiry will be to the nature of the 
work used and the purpose served by its inclusion in the report.82  
Article 10bis(2) exceeds the scope of article 2bis(2), as the former allows for making a 
cinematographic film to report current events, while the latter does not. Notwithstanding, 
the former article is aimed exclusively at reporting current events, while the latter is aimed 
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at informing the public and is therefore not subject to the temporal restriction.83 
Furthermore, an entire work may be used to inform the public in terms of article 2bis(2), 
while this is not the case with article 10bis(2).84 
The rights relating to the authorisation of communicating a work to the public are 
addressed in articles 11 to 11ter. These rights relate to the authorisation of the performance 
of a work, communication to the public of such performance and broadcasting rights.  
The performance of a work can be effected by a person (such as an actor or musician) or 
by means of a mechanical device (as suggested by the phrase “by any means or process” 
in article 11(1)(i)).85 Performance differs from reproduction precisely because no copy of 
the original is necessarily made; the work is presented in a non-material form.86 The right 
to authorise the public performance of a dramatic, musical or dramatico-musical work is to 
vest in the author of the work, while the right to communicate the performance to the public 
is also to be granted to the author of the work.87 Article 11(2) assures that the author is to 
enjoy the same rights over any translation of the work. These rights are recapitulated for 
authors of literary works in article 11ter, with performance being replaced by recitation.  
Article 11bis, which covers broadcasting and related rights, is applicable to all the subject 
matter covered in the Berne Convention, although it does not apply to all forms of 
transmission.88 Notably, article 11bis does not fall within the scope of “any communication 
to the public” as contained in articles 11(1)(ii) and 11ter(1)(ii), instead constituting its own 
form of communication that qualifies the scope of these articles.89 Article 11bis(1)(i)-(iii) 
regulates broadcasting, rebroadcasting, wired dissemination of broadcasts and public 
communication of broadcasts by means of loudspeakers or analogous instruments. The 
right to authorise all of these acts – separately from authorising performance and 
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communication to the public – is granted to the author of the work.90 However, the 
performance of a work itself attracts protection, which is discussed later in this chapter.91 
Further implicit exceptions to the rights granted in this convention exist that can also be 
adopted in national legislation.92 Chief among them is the minor reservations doctrine, 
which is based on the de minimis principle,93 and is applicable to the performance or 
communication of a work to the public.94 According to this doctrine, exceptions to the rights 
granted to authors will be allowed when the infringing use is de minimis.95 The envisioned 
contexts include the use of a work for charitable performances, public concerts on the 
occasion of festivals or holidays, and concerts for military bands.96 Although this is by no 
means an exhaustive list, it serves to illustrate the emphasis of the de minimis aspect, 
which is that the use is for a public interest that justifies the diminution of the author’s 
rights and will have no material effect on the commercial exploitation of the work.97 This 
doctrine applies in addition to and has no effect on the application of the fair dealing 
exceptions. 
The Berne Convention is not only the world’s oldest treaty on copyright, but also 
independently the most comprehensive.98 The economic rights granted to authors and the 
limitations on these rights constitute the minimum standards that have become the 
international baseline. Articles 10 and 10bis are of particular relevance to this analysis as 
they sketch the contexts in which works can be used without the consent of the copyright 
owner. These provisions form the basis of the user entitlements that are discussed 
throughout this thesis. 
As will be seen as this chapter progresses, subsequent treaties explicitly use the Berne 
Convention as the basis for protection by incorporating its provisions and expanding on 
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them accordingly. This should be seen as the development of the Berne Convention rather 
than autonomous growth of the field of copyright law.99 The discussion of the treaties that 
follow should therefore be understood in this context.  
 
3 2 2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – 
Copyright 
The TRIPS agreement, which is annexure 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), is binding on all members of the WTO since January 
1, 1995. South Africa – like both other jurisdictions considered in this thesis – is a member 
of the WTO and must accordingly comply with this agreement. TRIPS forges international 
trade rules in an attempt to harmonise the global protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights generally and copyright specifically.100 The subject matter of protection is 
both copyright and neighbouring rights, with the most substantive treaties at the time of 
TRIPS’s conception being the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention 
respectively.101 The text of TRIPS in effect combines the texts of these two earlier treaties 
by means of incorporation by reference and recycling the syntax dually, while updating and 
extending their reach. 
TRIPS is characterised by its protective stance towards intellectual property owners and 
sets the standards for international trade relations regarding intellectual property rights.102 
Article 2(2) explicitly states that the provisions in the agreement shall not derogate from 
existing obligations between contracting parties, accordingly building on existing standards 
and obligations. This clause fortifies the standards of protection and exceptions of the 
other copyright and related rights agreements discussed in this chapter.103  
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TRIPS increases the international standard of economic protection to include commercial 
rental rights,104 as well as recognising computer programs as a type of work worth 
protecting.105 TRIPS expressly incorporates the Berne Convention’s limitations and 
exceptions in addition to its standards of protection.106 Interestingly, the moral rights of 
authors are specifically excluded by this incorporating provision.107 Article 3(1), which 
deals with national treatment, specifically provides that the protection to be granted to 
foreign nationals is subject to the exceptions provided by the Berne Convention. This 
entails at least the exception relating to quotations,108 which is mandatory, and other 
exceptions that member states have promulgated in terms of the Berne Convention.109 
Article 13 of TRIPS essentially contains the three-step test originally found in article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention.110 The works referred to by article 13 of TRIPS must be construed 
to include all of the types of works that are protected by the Berne Convention, as well as 
those introduced by TRIPS. This means that all works are affected by the three-step test 
contained in article 13 of TRIPS, not only the literary and artistic works that the Berne 
Convention refers to.111 The application of the exception is also extended beyond the 
reproduction right that is the exclusive ambit of article 9(2) of Berne.112 Article 13 applies to 
all rights granted by the Berne Convention (namely translation,113 public performance,114 
broadcasting and other communication to the public,115 public recitation,116 and 
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adaptation117), as well as the rental right in TRIPS.118 However, with regard to the 
standards of protection set by the Berne Convention, the TRIPS agreement is clearly 
subsidiary119 and the limitations and exceptions cannot detract from the protection 
provided by Berne.120 Regarding the right to rental of computer programs and 
cinematographic works, article 13 allows exceptions and limitations to be applied without 
being subject to the incorporation of the substantive provisions of Berne.121 Accordingly, 
member states may provide for greater limitations and exceptions to the rental right 
without the further qualification of complying with the Berne Convention.122  
One subtle yet significant difference between the three-step test in article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention and the counterpart in article 13 of the TRIPS agreement is the last step of the 
test. The test in Berne relates to the “legitimate interests of the author”, while the corollary 
provision in TRIPS refers to the “legitimate interests of the right holder”. These two terms 
will frequently denote the same party, but there are situations in which this will not be the 
case.123 Performers are therefore also potentially affected by this provision. Furthermore, 
the right holder will not always be entitled to moral rights, regardless of the convention 
used to claim protection, as moral rights attach to the author and are non-transferrable.124 
The legitimate interests of a right holder in terms of the TRIPS agreement will therefore not 
include the moral rights, even if the right holder is the author.125 It follows that if a member 
of the WTO is not a signatory of the Berne Convention, moral rights will not accrue to the 
author and can therefore not be infringed by the application of the three-step test in article 
13, regardless of whether a sufficient acknowledgement of the author is made.126  
By incorporating the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, TRIPS obliges 
member states to provide at least the exception allowing quotations as contained in article 
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10(1) of the Berne Convention,127 while all other exceptions in the treaty are 
discretionary.128 The general scope of article 13 of TRIPS is compatible with the 
exceptions contained in article 10 of the Berne Convention, as the proper interpretation of 
the latter conforms to the standards of the three-step test.129 The requirement that the 
permitted use be compatible with fair practice satisfies the last two legs of the test (that the 
use does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, and that it does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder).130 As for the first step of 
the test, the exceptions envisaged by article 10(1) and (2) – the exceptions catering for 
quotation and teaching – are sufficiently narrowly defined to be regarded as “certain 
special cases”, as required by article 13 of TRIPS.131 Moreover, article 10(3) of the Berne 
Convention further requires that the preceding exempted uses acknowledge the author 
and source of the work. Although these two conditions are similar to the author’s moral 
rights, they stand independent of article 6bis of the Berne Convention (which is expressly 
excluded from incorporation into TRIPS by article 9(1)) and rather constitute elements of 
fair practice.132 For this reason both requirements must be complied with under the TRIPS 
agreement. 
The question of whether the minor reservations doctrine133 should also conform to article 
13 should be considered.134 Although in many cases national exceptions dealing with de 
minimis exceptions will, per definition, be in conformity with the three-step test, this is 
irrelevant.135 The three-step test is concerned only with those exceptions that are not de 
minimis and for this reason need to comply with the test.136 It follows that where an 
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exception is de minimis, the three-step test contained in article 13 of TRIPS should not be 
applied.137 
The TRIPS agreement expands the international protection of copyright while emphasising 
the importance of international trade rules.138 TRIPS has raised the level of protection 
granted to authors generally while focusing on particular aspects that were in need of 
attention.139 The agreement brought international copyright law up to date as regards the 
protection of computer programs and databases, and further extended the content of 
protection over these two categories of works by making provision for the rental right.140 
With regard to exceptions and limitations, TRIPS generalises the three-step test of the 
Berne Convention, making it applicable to any and all material derogations of rights 
granted in terms of both the Berne Convention and TRIPS, and protects the rights of 
copyright owners rather than authors.141 
 
3 2 3 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
The WCT was drafted and adopted simultaneously with the WPPT142 (which addresses 
neighbouring rights to copyright). The sphere of application of the WCT is the rights of 
authors of literary and artistic works, while the WPPT applies to the rights of performers 
and producers of phonograms. The WCT was introduced as an answer to the calls of the 
international intellectual property community that the interpretation of existing treaties was 
becoming increasingly unclear with the advent of new technological methods of exploiting 
copyright works.143 The treaty is a marked development in respect of regulating 
technological advances, although it should be considered only the genesis of international 
law innovation in this regard.144 The WCT is designed as a special agreement (as 
contemplated in article 20 of the Berne Convention) and is meant to extend the protection 
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and contain provisions that are in conformity with the Berne Convention.145 It is further 
stated that nothing in this treaty shall derogate from the Berne Convention and that it has 
no relation to any other treaty.146 Accordingly, the WCT is subject to the Berne Convention 
and the basis for protection is national treatment as per the latter. Article 1(4) of the WCT 
requires contracting parties to comply with all of the substantive provisions of the Berne 
Convention, as well as the appendix, importantly including the moral rights that were 
neglected in TRIPS.147 The WCT therefore incorporates by reference all the rights in the 
Berne Convention and contracting parties are obliged to apply these provisions, 
irrespective of whether they are signatory to the latter.148 
A notable addition to the subject matter covered by the WCT is the emergence of 
computer programs, which for the first time enjoy WIPO-sanctioned protection in terms of 
this convention as well as WTO protection in terms of TRIPS.149 Article 4 states that 
computer programs are to be protected as literary works in accordance with the Berne 
Convention’s definition of the term, regardless of the mode or form of expression of the 
program. This is a conspicuous illustration of one of the objectives of the treaty – to 
provide protection for developing technology.  
The economic rights of authors are severally the right of distribution, rental and 
communication to the public.150 The right of reproduction is embodied in an agreed 
statement concerning article 1(4), stating: 
“The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions 
permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular to the use of works 
in digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an 
electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention.” 
The right of reproduction is therefore incorporated by reference and further extended by 
this convention to apply to the digital environment. Similarly, the three-step test in article 
9(2) of the Berne Convention, which is to be applied to all exceptions and limitations to the 
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reproduction right contained in national legislation, must equally be applied under the 
WCT.151 
The right of distribution – as contained in article 6 – relates only to the distribution and 
circulation of a work embodied in tangible objects.152 Although in some countries the right 
of distribution was considered an indistinguishable tenet of the right of reproduction, this 
view was not global.153 This right was not included in the Berne Convention and therefore 
represents a great development in the protection of authors’ economic rights.154 The 
inclusion of this separate provision in the WCT provides the international mandate to 
attribute the right to authorise distribution to the author. 
The right of rental that was introduced by TRIPS155 is reiterated by article 7 of the WCT. 
The agreed statement to article 6 explicitly applies to article 7 equally, meaning that the 
right of rental extends only to those works embodied in tangible objects.156 Article 7(1) 
delineates the applicable subject matter for this section, covering computer programs, 
cinematographic works and the works contained in phonograms. Nonetheless, the 
subsequent section restricts the extent of this right in the instance of both computer 
programs and cinematographic works.157  
The exclusive right to authorise the communication of a work to the public is cloaked in the 
existent protection of the Berne Convention. Article 8 specifically makes this right subject 
to the operation of the provisions of the Berne Convention dealing with the same 
entitlements.158 The article reads: 
“Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 
14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall 
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by 
wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
                                            
151
 See section 2 3 above. 
152
 Agreed statement to arts 6 & 7, stating: “As used in these Articles, the expressions ‘copies’ and ‘original 
and copies,’ being subject to the right of distribution and the right of rental under the said Articles, refer 
exclusively to fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects.” 
153
 Sterling JAL World Copyright Law (2008) 889. 
154
 Sterling JAL World Copyright Law (2008) 889. However, the right of distribution is given to the author in 
the case of the cinematographic adaptation of their work: see art 14(1) of the Berne Convention. 
155
 Art 11. 
156
 See n 152 above. 
157
 Art 7(2)(i)&(ii). 
158
 For the discussion of the counterparts in the Berne Convention, see section 2 1. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 46 
 
way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.”159 
This provision should be interpreted as “both an extension and clarification of the rights 
accorded in this area by the Berne Convention”.160 Article 8 extends on the protection of 
Berne by making the right available to all authors of literary and artistic works, not merely 
the authors of literary works as with the Berne Convention corollary (article 11ter). 
Moreover, it exceeds Berne by stating that the on-demand availability right shall also be 
accorded to the author.161 This clause provides the author with the right to exploit his 
product in a more technologically suitable manner.162  
The permissible limitations and exceptions to the rights of the author are set out in article 
10. Article 10(1) is a restatement of the three-step test originally contained in article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention. However, it refers to rights granted under “this Treaty” and should 
accordingly be applied to the extended protection granted in the WCT, as well as all rights 
that the Berne Convention provides for.163 The second part of article 10 is substantially the 
same as the first part, but relates to the application of the Berne Convention.164 This 
nuanced approach effectively favours authors, by extending the three-step test to apply to 
all rights granted by the Berne Convention and not just to the right of reproduction in article 
9(1) as intended by the Berne Convention text itself.165 Accordingly, any member state of 
the WCT is obliged to subject all limitations and exceptions to the criteria of the three-step 
test when any right granted under the Berne Convention or the WCT is in question. The 
potential application of this clause was considered by some to be crippling to Berne-
compliant exceptions already granted by national legislation.166 For this reason an agreed 
statement was included as an endnote, which attempts to address these concerns. This 
agreed statement to article 10 asserts that member states are to extend the application of 
any exceptions that are suitable under the Berne Convention to the digital environment. 
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Furthermore, these states are permitted to formulate new exceptions and limitations on the 
rights of authors that are “appropriate in the digital network environment”. Nonetheless, the 
scope of existing exceptions under the Berne Convention remains unaltered by this 
provision.167 
The interpretation of this provision has proven difficult. Ricketson and Ginsburg note that 
some existing exceptions that are to be extended to the digital environment could still meet 
the criteria under the Berne Convention, but could simultaneously fail the three-step 
test.168 In such a situation the authors suggest the three-step test is not to be applied.169 
This is based on the last sentence of the agreed statement to article 10, which states: 
“It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope of 
applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention.” 
This safeguarding clause prevents potential conflict in the process of national 
implementation of the WCT in regimes based on Berne-standard protection. It would 
therefore be necessary for the WCT to bear an express provision dealing with a new 
system of exceptions and limitations, not merely a provision extending the scope of 
existing derogations of authors’ rights.170 
These provisions form the international standard of copyright protection and exceptions, 
and are to be reflected in national legislation. Against this understanding of international 
copyright law, it is now possible to assess the conventions covering neighbouring rights to 
determine how they pertain to the treaties discussed above. 
 
3 3  Neighbouring Rights 
3 3 1 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention) 
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The Rome Convention, as the long title suggests, is aimed at solidifying copyright and 
neighbouring rights surrounding performers and producers, and how their products are 
relayed to the public. Although South Africa is not party to the treaty, the Rome Convention 
is heavily relied on by the WPPT171 – especially with regard to exceptions and limitations – 
as the former provides a sound basis for legislation pertaining to aural works.  
The intended recipients of protection under this convention are performers of aural works 
and producers who first commit such performance to record, as well as broadcasting 
organisations.172 The reason for this is that such actors were not protected by the Berne 
Convention, which consequently led to the implementation of the Rome Convention.173 
The foundation of the protection awarded to performers is markedly different from that 
given to producers of phonograms and broadcasters. The performance of a work is the 
unique presentation of a protected work, while the protection of producers and 
broadcasters is only for their technological input, not their creativity.174 While the Berne 
Convention sets out the categories of works to be protected and the methods of 
enforcement to be encouraged, the Rome Convention more substantively illustrates the 
rights to be adopted by national legislation. The Rome Convention differs from the UCC in 
that the former convention introduced rights that were, at the time of its drafting, not 
recognised by any international convention.175 As mentioned earlier, the performers of 
literary and artistic works are not necessarily also the authors of those works.  
Article 1 explicitly assures that the copyright in literary and artistic works is to remain 
unaffected by the provisions of this convention. The distinction lies between performing 
rights and performers’ rights: performing rights are usually automatically granted to the 
author and pertain to her consent to perform her work in public, while performers’ rights, 
which are derivative, relate to neighbouring rights that attach to the performance of a 
work.176 The work that is performed need not be under copyright protection, but must 
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merely be subject matter that is capable of attracting copyright.177 Naturally, where the 
performer is also the author of the work the overlap between the Rome Convention and 
any other convention or legislation will be supplementary to the rights of the author. If this 
is not the case, the performance of the work may be an infringement of the rights of the 
author to authorise performance, while still attracting protection to the performance 
itself.178 
The Rome Convention utilises the principle of national treatment and sets out minimum 
substantive rights to be protected by rights of authorisation.179 The minima performers’ 
rights that are to be protected by national legislation are set out in article 7. The provision 
does not formulate the rights, but rather leaves the content of the rights to the discretion of 
each contracting state.180 The first act envisioned by this article is the broadcast, or other 
communication to the public, of a performance without the consent of the performer.181 
The convention requires national legislation to ensure that this right belongs to the 
performer, except where the performance already constitutes a broadcast performance or 
where the broadcast is made from a (presumably legitimate) fixation that presents a 
limitation on the performer’s rights. This leaves the situation where the work consists of a 
live performance by the author that has not been reduced to a physical medium with the 
author’s consent. Under these circumstances any unauthorised fixation and subsequent 
broadcast will be an infringement of the rights to be granted to the performer because 
there is no authorisation for doing so.182  
The next right to be granted to performers is the exclusive right of first fixation.183 This 
provision is inextricably linked to the prevention of unauthorised broadcasting and other 
reproductions,184 both of which are inversely contingent on an existent fixation. The 
prohibition on broadcasting without consent, as discussed above, contains the proviso that 
the broadcast was not made from a fixation. This is arguably to allow for the operation of 
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fair dealing and other exceptions with a performance once it has been fixed to a medium 
with the consent of the performer. Nonetheless, the prohibition remains absolute until the 
first fixation of the performance. 
Article 7(1)(c) aims to prevent the unauthorised reproduction of a fixation of a performance 
made contrary to the performer’s intentions. The formulation of the provision indicates that 
the act itself of making the fixation of a performance is not prohibited; rather, the use of the 
fixation – whether made with or without the consent of the performer – is decisive as to 
whether the reproduction is prohibited.185 Reproduction is therefore contingent on a 
contractual basis. In terms of the first subsection of the prohibition on reproduction, if the 
initial fixation was made without the consent of the performer, any reproduction of such 
fixation is prohibited.186 Notwithstanding, only the reproduction is prohibited, not the 
original act of making the fixation. If consent is given for the original fixation of a 
performance, a reproduction of that fixation is to be prohibited only if such reproduction is 
in conflict with the purpose for which consent was given.187 This provision is broadly 
formulated, leaving ample discretionary leeway for legislatures. The need for the consent 
of the performer may still be obviated if the original fixation was made for purposes of the 
specific instances of fair dealing contained in article 15 of this convention. However, if a 
reproduction of a fixation is made that complies with fair dealing but the reproduction itself 
is for a different purpose, such reproduction is also to be prohibited.188 The permeating 
rationale of this provision appears to be to prohibit reproductions of fixations of 
performances that are contrary to the purpose for which consent was given, or – absent 
consent – any reproductions at all. Even though article 7 is the most important provision 
relating to performers’ rights in the convention, the level of protection is strikingly lower 
than those of both phonogram producers and broadcasters as no minimum rights are 
given to performers, merely the mandate that legislatures provide a method of preventing 
infringement for performers.189 
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The minimum protection to be granted to producers of phonograms in terms of this 
convention is the reproduction right, as concisely set out in article 10.190 According to this 
article, the producer of a phonogram has the exclusive right to authorise direct or indirect 
reproduction. The former type of reproduction involves making a copy of the original by 
means of moulding and casting – or, presumably in the current digital age, making a digital 
copy of the original191 – while indirect reproduction concerns the reproduction of a 
broadcast of a phonogram over a wireless transmission service such as radio or 
television.192 Only the first fixation of an aural work qualifies the maker as a producer of a 
phonogram and subsequent reproductions are not given the protection of the first 
producer.193 The convention does not, however, grant producers of phonograms the right 
to control distributions.194 
The rights of broadcasting organisations are substantively similar to those of performers. 
Such organisations are to be awarded the right to authorise or prohibit rebroadcasts, 
fixation of the original broadcast and the reproduction of such fixations.195 The elements of 
consent for the initial fixation and the purpose of fixations made for fair dealing that are 
present in the provision prohibiting the reproduction of performances are reiterated here.196 
The purposes warranting exemption are provided in article 15(1) of the Rome Convention. 
The first occurrence of the fair dealing purpose in the Rome Convention is for private use, 
denoting use of a non-commercial nature.197 A private use is regarded as being neither 
public nor for profit, although the cumulative effect of private use may change the nature to 
commercial.198 Moreover, where professional activity coincides with private activity in the 
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same location, commercial and private uses are distinguished to give meaningful effect to 
fair dealing exceptions.199  
Ricketson and Ginsburg argue that this particular clause is not subject to the Berne 
Convention’s three-step test. They contend that “there is nothing in the text of article 
15(1)(a) that qualifies the adjective ‘private’ as distinct from ‘professional’ or ‘commercial’ 
uses, and ... it is inappropriate to go further and consider the effect on the normal 
exploitation of the work or the legitimate interests of the right holder (as under the article 
9(2) approach)”.200 Private use can therefore be seen as the copying of performances, 
phonograms and broadcasts for exclusive home use by an individual without the intention 
to distribute or otherwise profit from the work. Private use also includes performance in the 
family circle, not only the individual private performance.201  
Article 15(1)(b) permits the use of short excerpts for purposes of reporting current events. 
This provision is directed at providing a framework for the international dissemination of 
information regarding current events.202 Notwithstanding, the use of an excerpt of a 
performance, phonogram or broadcast must be justified by the purpose of news reporting, 
and cannot be used as a soundtrack or background music. The addition of the adjective 
“short” differentiates this provision from its counterpart in the Berne Convention,203 making 
the latter more comprehensive in relation to literary and artistic works. This indicates that a 
substantial part, or excerpt, of a performance cannot justifiably be used in a report. 
Broadcasting organisations are legitimated in making ephemeral fixations of protected 
performances and phonograms by means of their own facilities for their own broadcasts.204 
The ephemeral requirement is not defined in this treaty, but is generally considered to 
mean any fixation made by such organisations must be destroyed after a reasonable time, 
the duration of which is left to national legislatures.205 The purpose of this provision is 
elucidated by article 11bis(3) of the Berne Convention, which explains “[t]he preservation of 
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these recordings in official archives [being justified by] their exceptional documentary 
character”.  
Using protected works solely for teaching or scientific research is also to be exempted by 
national legislation.206 The purpose of this exception is self-evidently the progress of 
education and knowledge through research. The public interest manifest in education is 
sufficiently robust to outweigh certain rights granted to performers and producers of 
phonograms and broadcasts.207 Allowing the reproduction and dissemination of protected 
materials for teaching – whether in primary, secondary or tertiary institutions – is clearly 
justified by the didactic purpose.208 However, the phrase “scientific research” is more 
obscure in the context of this convention.209 Nordemann et al discuss the peculiarity of this 
phrase, noting that:  
“Commercial phonograms and radio and television programs could scarcely offer material 
for use in scientific research. A greater usefulness may be found in the fields of the cultural 
and social sciences. Care must therefore be taken that normal use is not encroached upon 
by the use of the label of ‘science’. For this reason, strict adherence to the concept of 
science at the internationally recognised level must be the guide for an application of this 
exception.”210  
The authors also note that research is generally not a public activity, while the distribution 
to the public of works covered by this section negates the activity entirely.211 
The term “scientific” may therefore be out of place with regard to normal usage of 
performances. However, a similar proviso is found in article II of the appendix to the Berne 
Convention, relating to allowances for developing countries, which permits these states to 
grant a licence to broadcasting organisations for the translation of a literary or artistic 
work.212  
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Notwithstanding the specific cases of fair dealing provided for by article 15(1), the 
subsequent subsection extends the ambit of the permissible exceptions to those covering 
copyright in literary and artistic works in domestic legislation.213 This refers to the 
exceptions provided for in the Berne Convention,214 which creates some adhesion 
between the incongruent relationships between them.215 Such exceptions in national law 
still need to be in conformity with the conventions from which they were adopted, whether 
the legislating state is party to them or not.216 The only proviso in article 15(2) of the Rome 
Convention is that if the exceptions are incorporated from other categories of works, 
compulsory licences must nonetheless be compatible with this convention. 
The Rome Convention pioneered the standards of protection for performers, producers of 
phonograms and broadcasting organisations alike. The basic rights to authorise fixation, 
reproduction and relaying the performance to the public are the primary application of 
protection. Specific contexts are identified that allow certain uses of performances which 
can be justified by the public interest, while still protecting the pecuniary interests of rights 
holders. The specific inclusion of exceptions for private use, reporting on current events, 
and teaching and scientific research reflects the balance between the interests of rights 
holders and the general public.  
Although to date only 94 states have acceded to the Rome Convention, its substantive 
contents and exceptions have been adopted in national legislation globally (including both 
South Africa and the United States of America).217 The Rome Convention has therefore 
served not only as a precursor to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, but 
also as the introduction of neighbouring rights protecting performers and producers of 
phonograms.  
 
3 3 2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – 
Neighbouring Rights 
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The economic rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organisations contained in TRIPS are modelled on the provisions of the Rome Convention. 
Although member states are not instructed to apply the Rome Convention unless they are 
party to it,218 the rights in TRIPS itself parallel or exceed those in the Rome Convention.219 
Article 14(1) of TRIPS is substantively identical to article 7(1) of the Rome Convention, 
even to the extent of the wording; the provision provides that member states shall award 
performers “the possibility of preventing” certain acts without their authorisation.220 The 
conduct to be prohibited is the fixation of unfixed performances, the reproduction of fixed 
performances, and broadcasting or communicating the performances to the public, which 
amounts to the same content as article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.221 A subtle 
difference is that the TRIPS agreement refers to wireless broadcasts, while the Rome 
Convention does not specify the method of broadcasting which is to be prohibited. With 
regard to producers of phonograms, the right of reproduction is transplanted directly from 
article 10 of the Rome Convention.222 
The rights of broadcasting organisations are also similar to those contained in the Rome 
Convention. TRIPS provides that broadcasting organisations are to be granted the rights 
to prohibit the fixation of their broadcasts, the reproduction of such fixations, the 
rebroadcast (by wireless means) of their broadcasts, and the communication to the public 
of televised broadcasts.223 These rights are reflected more comprehensively in article 13 of 
the Rome Convention (save for the wireless aspect). However, TRIPS does contain a 
deviation: if a member state does not grant these rights to the broadcasting organisations, 
the copyright owners of the subject matter of the broadcast must have the possibility of 
preventing all of the above conduct (subject to the Berne Convention).224 This clause was 
inserted to achieve a compromise between countries that, at the time of the inception of 
TRIPS, already provided these rights for broadcasting organisations, and those countries 
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that had accorded these rights to copyright owners.225 This issue was ignored by the 
subsequent WIPO treaties (the WCT and the WPPT). 
The novel right of rental that TRIPS introduces is extended, mutatis mutandis, to 
producers of phonograms and “any other right holders in phonograms”.226 The latter part of 
this statement suggests that if the performer of a work holds rights in the phonogram, she 
would share in the rental right.227 
The exceptions and limitations on the neighbouring rights provided in TRIPS are embodied 
in articles 3(1) and 14(6) respectively. Article 3(1) explicitly refers to the exceptions 
contained in article 15 of the Rome Convention. The provision places no obligation on 
member states to enact these exceptions, instead being permissive in character.228 The 
exceptions that are allowed in terms of this formulation are exceptions for private use, 
short excerpts for use in reporting current events, ephemeral fixation by broadcasting 
organisations, and uses for the purposes of teaching or scientific research.229 The article 
also envisages that exceptions to the rights of copyright owners in literary and artistic 
works may be extended to the field of neighbouring rights.230  
Article 14(6) provides that member states may enact limitations, exceptions, reservations 
and conditions in relation to the above (excluding the right to rental) to the extent provided 
for in the Rome Convention. This provision appears to add nothing to the permissible 
exceptions and limitations provided for in article 3(1) of TRIPS.231 However, this is subject 
to the application of article 18 of the Berne Convention, which stipulates that the treaty 
shall not apply with retroactive effect to works where the term of copyright protection has 
expired.232 Accordingly, protection of works already in the public domain is excluded. 
Although it seems that TRIPS does not expand on the levels of protection or exceptions 
provided in the Rome Convention, it does extend their application as more countries are 
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party to the World Trade Organisation (and therefore party to TRIPS) than are signatories 
to the Rome Convention. The economic rights in the Rome Convention are therefore 
relevant to a larger global community than before the adoption of TRIPS, and the 
commercial rental rights are also granted to producers of phonograms. The specific 
exceptions of private use, reporting on current events, ephemeral fixation, and teaching 
and scientific research, although not mandated, are also extended to a broader 
international community. Furthermore, the exceptions to and limitations on the rights 
granted to the copyright owners of literary and artistic works may now be expanded to the 
neighbouring rights covered by TRIPS.  
 
3 3 3 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
The WPPT is the most comprehensive treaty covering neighbouring rights to copyright.233 
Although South Africa signed the convention,234 no effort has been made to incorporate 
any of the provisions into legislation.235 The WPPT does not extend the rights and 
protections of preceding treaties, but instead endeavours to exist as an independent 
instrument and provide its own substantive content.236 For this reason it is not required of a 
contracting state to be a member, or apply the provisions, of the Rome Convention or 
TRIPS. 
The principle of national treatment is once again utilised by this convention in articles 3(1) 
and 4(1). The definition clause makes it clear that the convention extends beyond the 
reach of the Rome Convention.237 The definition of “performers”, for example, has been 
expanded to include renditions of “expressions of folklore” in addition to those of literary 
and artistic works.238 This term can be understood to include “productions consisting of 
characteristic elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and maintained by a 
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community in the country or by individuals reflecting the traditional artistic expectations of 
such a community”.239  
The objectives of this treaty, stated in the preamble, are to (i) develop and maintain the 
protection of these neighbouring rights, (ii) introduce new international rules to provide for 
economic, social and cultural developments, (iii) recognise the impact of information and 
communication technologies on the production and use of these products, and (iv) 
maintain a balance between general public interest in education, research and access to 
information, on the one hand, and the rights of performers and phonogram producers on 
the other. This last objective clearly strives to strike a balance between the public interest 
(as embodied in limitations and exceptions to monopoly rights) and the economic incentive 
used to promote creativity and innovation.240  
Performers are given exclusive moral and economic rights concerning their aural 
performances in chapter II, but this protection is not extended to audio-visual works.241 
This is significant because it differs from the Rome Convention in these respects, as the 
latter does not provide for moral rights and in certain instances does apply to audio-visual 
performances.242 The economic rights of performers over their unfixed performances are 
provided for in article 6 of the WPPT. This provision explains that performers are to have 
the exclusive right to authorise both the fixation and broadcast of their performances.243 In 
relation to the rights granted by the Rome Convention, this stipulation is more concrete in 
its formulation; while the Rome Convention provides only that member states must provide 
“the possibility of prevention”, the WPPT adopts a positive formulation.244 
The right to reproduce forms the essence of the performer’s rights under the WPPT and is 
contained in a single sentence in article 7.245 According to this clause, “[p]erformers shall 
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect reproduction of their 
performances fixed in phonograms, in any manner or form”. This provision is 
supplemented by an agreed statement of the WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain 
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Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions, which adopted the convention, contained in 
the endnotes of the WPPT. The addition reads as follows:  
“The reproduction right, as set out in Articles 7 and 11, and the exceptions permitted 
thereunder through Article 16, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular to the use 
of performances and phonograms in digital form. It is understood that the storage of a 
protected performance or phonogram in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a 
reproduction within the meaning of these Articles.” 
These provisions form the core protection of a performer’s rights over fixed performances. 
Implicit in this is that unfixed performances are not subject to the exclusive right of the 
performer to restrict reproductions.246 The act of recreating a performance (for example by 
means of an impersonation) is not covered by the WPPT and the performer will not be 
awarded the same rights as the author, as only the fixation of those particular sounds is 
covered.247 The terms “direct reproduction” and “indirect reproduction” are not defined in 
this convention and should therefore be construed similarly to their application in the Rome 
Convention.248  
The insertion of the phrase “in any manner or form” in article 7 indicates that digital copies 
of a fixation are intended to be included in the exclusive right of reproduction.249 Whether 
temporary copies of a transient nature are included in the performer’s exclusive rights is 
unclear; it is submitted that the provision does not extend to such copies as a proposed 
clause covering this conduct was removed after a proposal by the South African and 
American delegates, and is therefore not present in the final draft of the convention.250  
Article 8 grants performers the exclusive right of distribution, which is inextricably 
connected to the right of reproduction. The right to authorise commercial rental to the 
public is governed by article 9 and explicitly extends to after the initial distribution of the 
original or copies as provided for in the preceding article.251 The right of making fixed 
performances available is further distinguished from the rights of distribution and rental, 
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and provides that the performer shall enjoy the exclusive right to authorise making the 
performance available in such a manner that the public may access the performance at 
their own spatial and temporal convenience (“on-demand availability right”).252 This 
provision has a counterpart in the WCT, which was concluded simultaneously, and was 
clearly intended to cater for developing technological dissemination of performances.253 
While article 8 refers to distribution of performances embodied in tangible objects,254 article 
10 by contrast relates to distribution “by wire or wireless means”, denoting intangible digital 
copies.255 
Chapter III deals with the rights of producers of phonograms and therefore makes no 
mention of moral rights. The economic rights granted to producers of phonograms 
replicate those granted to performers, although naturally in relation to phonograms. 
Articles 11 and 12 are phrased identically, mutatis mutandis, to articles 7 and 8 (which 
confer the rights of reproduction and distribution respectively) and are supplemented by 
the same agreed statements. Article 13 essentially grants identical rights to producers of 
phonograms over the commercial rental of their phonograms to those of performers, 
mimicking article 9. Article 14 is also a reiteration of article 10 (the right to make fixed 
performances available) with the producers of phonograms being the beneficiaries. 
The exceptions and limitations to these rights are contained in article 16 of Chapter IV of 
the treaty. The first section of the article states that legislatures may provide for exceptions 
to the rights of performers and producers of phonograms to the same extent as they do for 
copyright in artistic and literary works.256 This provision is substantively similar to article 
15(2) of the Rome Convention, without the regulation of compulsory licences. Accordingly, 
all the exceptions relating to copyright works can be extended to provide exceptions to 
neighbouring rights, including those relating to reproduction, quotations and illustrations, 
teaching and research, and news reporting. The second section of the article is a 
reincarnation of the three-step test created in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention,257 
confining any legislative limitations and exceptions to special circumstances that do not 
conflict with the normal exploitation of the performance or phonogram and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the rights of the performer or producer of the phonogram.  
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Article 16 extends the generally accepted limitations on copyright to neighbouring rights, 
while reinforcing the existing standards. It does so pragmatically by transplanting the 
existing domestic model limitations on copyright to the rights of performers and producers 
of phonograms.258 This can be seen as an indirect incorporation of the provisions of the 
Berne and Rome conventions and the WIPO Copyright Treaty if the member states are 
parties to any or all of these conventions.259 However, the use of “may” (instead of “shall”) 
in the positive formulation of article 16(1) indicates that the WPPT does not oblige 
contracting states to provide exceptions to the rights of performers and producers, but 
rather does so by concession. This interpretation is reinforced by the phrasing of article 
16(2), which asserts that if the contracting states do indeed provide such limitations, they 
“shall” be restricted by the framework of the three-step test. However, the first section 
relates to “limitations or exceptions with regard to the protection of performers and 
producers of phonograms ... [in] national legislation”.260 This protection may exceed the 
standards set by the WPPT, while the exceptions to the rights in literary and artistic works 
may be more restricted, as the two categories are not necessarily unified.261 The 
exceptions that can be applied to the rights provided in the WPPT could therefore fall short 
of meaningfully accommodating the interests of users and the public interest, as the 
preamble strives for.  
Article 16 is further augmented by an agreed statement in the appendix, which extends the 
application of the provision to the digital environment.262 Moreover, the agreed statement 
relating to article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty applies mutatis mutandis to article 
10.263 This agreed statement provides that contracting parties are able to extend 
limitations that comply with the three-step test to the digital environment, as well as further 
“devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network 
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environment”.264 This clause can apply to technological protection measures, which could 
have an influence on fair dealing. 
The economic rights granted by the WPPT coincide largely with those contained in earlier 
treaties, although the protection is expressly extended to the digital environment. The 
WPPT is the first convention to provide protection for the moral rights of performers, an 
aspect which was notably lacking in both the Rome Convention and TRIPS. The rights of 
producers of phonograms are identical to those granted to performers by this treaty, even 
to the extent of the right of commercial rental. The rights of both performers and producers 
of phonograms to authorise distribution in tangible objects are differentiated from the rights 
relating to the intangible embodiment of performances. This indicates that the WPPT aims 
to create a basis of protection for the digital form of performances distinct from the 
traditional tangible objects as a medium of expression. This is evidenced by the stated 
objective in the preamble to accommodate the “profound impact of the development and 
convergence of information and communication technologies on the production and use of 
performances and phonograms”. In keeping with this, the WPPT makes provision for 
member states to “devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital 
network environment”.265 The WPPT and the WCT therefore provide the first appropriate 
framework for the protection of copyright and neighbouring rights in the digital 
environment, while leaving enough room for the development of new exceptions and 
limitations that are necessary for the proper functioning of these rights.  
 
3 4 Conclusion 
The international framework for copyright and neighbouring rights was initially created by 
WIPO in the form of the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention respectively. After 
extensive revision of the former, both conventions set the international standards in the 
adjacent fields, which were refurbished by the WTO and WIPO separately in the closing 
years of the twentieth century. The current international minimum standards of protection 
are comprehensive in granting copyright owners, performers and producers of 
phonograms extensive rights over their works and renditions. This is important in the 
South African context, as foreign nationals of member states to these conventions can 
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 See the discussion of the treaty and agreed statement in section 2 3. 
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claim protection of their works in South Africa by means of the principle of national 
treatment. 
The most recent treaties on copyright, namely TRIPS and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
reflect a very protective stance towards the rights granted to copyright owners.266 
Accordingly, a restrictive approach has developed regarding exceptions and limitations to 
these rights. The three-step test that first made its appearance in the Berne Convention 
was originally only applicable to exceptions to the right of reproduction. However, this test 
has become the norm under the latest treaties, being applied to any and all derogations of 
rights granted by the Berne Convention and even extending to new rights and exceptions. 
According to Ricketson, this happened by accident rather than by design merely because 
it was readily available to be adopted at the time that TRIPS was negotiated.267 He 
submits that the construction is not entirely suited to the universal application it has found, 
which could lead to various impediments when considering the ambit of the individual 
steps of the test. This is further compounded when the extended scope of the test must be 
reconciled with earlier conventions to which it was not applicable.268 The extension of this 
approach has therefore led to increasing restrictions regarding fair uses that were allowed 
by the Berne Convention (contained in the same text that introduced the three-step test), 
to which the test was not initially relevant. This is especially true of neighbouring rights, 
where there is an incongruity between the extensive protection granted to performances 
and phonograms and the limited exceptions incorporated from treaties relating to 
copyright.269 
The three-step test is an effective mechanism for preventing indulgent applications of 
limitations and exceptions, but it runs the risk of allowing only unreasonably narrow 
exceptions. This test, which originated in the Berne Convention, has even permeated the 
conventions on neighbouring rights. The international framework of neighbouring rights 
that was initially established by the Rome Convention has subsequently been developed 
by TRIPS and the WPPT, both of which incorporate the three-step test into a realm that it 
was not intended for. This, combined with the substantive minima to be awarded to the 
                                            
266
 Correa CM & Yusuf AA Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2
nd
 ed 2008) 
6-7. 
267
 World Intellectual Property Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights WIPO Study on 
Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment (5-4-2003) SCCR/9/7 
(2003) 65. 
268
 World Intellectual Property Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights WIPO Study on 
Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment (5-4-2003) SCCR/9/7 
(2003) 65. 
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beneficiaries of protection, has led to an equally protective regime regarding neighbouring 
rights. The intellectual property rights granted by these various conventions far outweigh 
the interests of the public reflected in the narrow exceptions allowed.270 The balance 
between these rights and the larger public interest (as a stated objective of both the WCT 
and the WPPT) therefore needs to be addressed.  
Notwithstanding, the framework allowing member states to devise new exceptions that find 
application in the digital environment does exist. It was created by the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty and extended to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and can find 
operation in many useful scenarios (specifically with regard to the access right). This may 
be the mechanism required to redress the balance between over-protection and the public 
domain. 
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 Visser C “International intellectual property norm setting” (2007) 32 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 221-232 at 231. 
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4  Comparative Analyses of Fair Dealing Exceptions in 
the United Kingdom and Australia 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Copyright law is a statutory creation of the United Kingdom, which was subsequently 
extended to the Commonwealth of Australia. This chapter examines the law regulating the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners and the fair dealing provisions which limit these rights 
in the United Kingdom and Australia. In this chapter the exclusive rights (also known as 
restricted acts) granted to copyright owners in the two jurisdictions are compared. The 
requirements for copyright protection are not analysed in this thesis, so it will be assumed 
that copyright subsists in the works considered. Australian copyright law has its foundation 
in the statutes of the United Kingdom and the autonomous development of Australian 
copyright law can serve as a valuable comparative guideline for South African copyright 
law, which is also based on the United Kingdom’s legislation. The similarities and 
differences between the exclusive rights in UK and Australian copyright law are 
highlighted, enabling the fair dealing provisions of both jurisdictions to be compared on 
equal footing. The historical origins of fair dealing exceptions are then traced and the 
developments are illustrated through the various amendments. The current categories of 
fair dealing in the United Kingdom are reiterated in Australia, with the addition of a 
parody/satire fair dealing provision in the latter. Case law is discussed to illustrate the 
construction and functioning of the various fair dealing defences. Although the public 
interest defence is often raised in conjunction with fair dealing (especially for purposes of 
news reporting and criticism or review), the scope of this thesis does not extend to this 
defence.1 Australian courts frequently rely on British and other commonwealth case law for 
authority, and vice versa, and the case law should therefore be considered with this in 
mind.2  
 
4 2 United Kingdom 
                                            
1
 See section 3 of chapter 2 for a discussion of how fair dealing exceptions reflect the public interest. 
2
 See eg Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch) para 
35; Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 paras 18, 65; Stevens v 
Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 65 IPR 513 para 31. 
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4 2 1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom’s copyright system is based on the economic and social justification 
theories discussed in chapter 2.3 Copyright law arose in the United Kingdom as a result of 
the threat of unauthorised book printing.4 The first copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne 
of 1709, was introduced to protect publishers from this danger and is the foundation of 
modern copyright law.5 Literary works are therefore the oldest category of works protected 
by copyright, although copyright law has expanded its application to much more than 
printed editions of literary works.  
The United Kingdom has been party to the Berne Convention6 since its inception in 1887 
and ratified the latest text, the Paris Act,7 on July 24 1971. The United Kingdom is also 
party to the Rome Convention,8 the UCC,9 TRIPS,10 the WCT11 and the WPPT.12 Although 
a common law copyright in unpublished works was initially recognised, the case of 
Donaldson v Beckett13 saw the end of this phenomenon and the only current source of 
protection is statute.14 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (hereafter the 
CDPA) is the source of protection of copyright owners’ economic and moral rights, and 
performers’ rights. One of the controversial aspects of this latest Act is the absence of 
regulation of private copying (copying sound recordings and audio-visual works for non-
commercial, domestic use) and parody, which are recent additions to Australian copyright 
law.15 The Act has been amended numerous times, primarily to incorporate the directives 
of the European Commission.16  
                                            
3
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 27. 
4
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 29. 
5
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 34. 
6
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886). See chapter 3 section 2 1. 
7
 1161 UNTS 3 (1971). 
8
 World Intellectual Property Organisation International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (26-10-1961) 496 UNTS 43 (1961). See chapter 
3 section 3 1. 
9
 United Nations Universal Copyright Convention (6-9-1952) 216 UNTS 132 (1952). See chapter 3 section 1. 
10
 World Trade Organisation Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (15-4-1994) Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 1869 UNTS 299 (1994). See chapter 3 
sections 2 2 and 3 2. 
11
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 65 (1996). See chapter 3 
section 2 3. 
12
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 76 
(1996). See chapter 3 section 3 3. 
13
 Donaldson v Beckett (1774) 4 Burr 2408. 
14
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 41. 
15
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 44. 
16
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 44-45. 
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4 2 2 Rights Subsisting in Copyright 
The CDPA grants a statutory property right in original literary, artistic, musical and 
dramatic works, sound recordings (referred to as phonograms in chapter 3), films, 
broadcasts and published editions.17 This is an exhaustive list of the subject matter that 
can be endowed with copyright protection. The CDPA deals with literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works separately from sound recordings, films and broadcasts, and treats the 
typographical arrangement of a published edition separately still.  
Copyright grants the author an exclusive right to authorise certain acts in relation to her 
work.18 The exclusive acts that have a bearing on the fair dealing provisions are discussed 
in this section to provide a context in which to examine the fair dealing exception. The 
essence of copyright protection is the prohibition of unauthorised reproductions of 
protected works.19 Copyright owners are also granted a number of other rights in Chapter 
II of the CDPA in accordance with European Directives and, most recently, the Information 
Society Directive.20 Copyright is infringed by an unauthorised person doing, or authorising 
another person to do, any of the acts listed in Chapter II. Infringement of any of the rights 
granted to copyright owners gives rise to a remedy in the form of an action for 
infringement, which is the primary method of enforcing copyright.21 There must be a 
primary infringement of a substantial part of a copyright work and guilty knowledge must 
be attributable to the infringing party for such an action to arise.22 A copyright owner is not 
required to show damage; she only needs to prove that one of the restricted acts was 
done without authorisation.23 The defence of fair dealing can then be raised against a 
claim for the infringement of any of the economic rights discussed below. 
Section 16 of the CDPA defines the restricted acts that are the substance of the exclusive 
rights granted to the copyright owner. These acts are considered below to give a 
comprehensive background of fair dealing as a defence to a claim of infringement of one 
of these acts. As mentioned, the right to authorise reproductions of a work is the essence 
                                            
17
 S 1(1)(a)-(c) of the CDPA. 
18
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 367. 
19
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 28. 
20
 Directive 2001/29/EC. See also Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 368. 
21
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 367. 
22
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 367. 
23
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 369. 
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of a copyright owner’s rights, not coincidentally being the oldest right. The Information 
Society Directive24 fully defines the scope of the right and specifically provides that “this 
Directive should define the scope of the acts covered by the reproduction right with regard 
to the different beneficiaries”.25 The content of this right includes the “exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means 
and in any form, in whole or in part” of authors’ works,26 performers’ fixations of their 
performances,27 and phonogram producers’ phonograms.28 This goes beyond the 
reproduction right envisaged by the Berne Convention, which merely requires the right to 
prohibit reproduction without going into any more detail.29  The CDPA needed no 
amendment as it already complied with the Information Society Directive.30  
The exclusive right of reproduction as contained in section 1731 of the CDPA is compliant 
with the Information Society Directive, although it employs different terminology. The right 
granted in terms of the CDPA covers direct and indirect copies,32 as well as permanent 
and transient copies as envisioned by the Information Society Directive.33 The term “copy” 
comprises two elements: (i) a considerable level of similarity, evaluated objectively, 
between the original and the alleged infringement, and (ii) a causal connection between 
the original and the alleged copy.34 The question to consider is not whether the alleged 
infringer used the claimant’s work in a derivative way, but whether the work was copied.35 
The allegedly infringing copy must therefore represent the original in an objective and 
substantial way. Making use of a work, for example as inspiration for a derivative work, will 
therefore not be an infringement of the reproduction right if there is no substantial similarity 
in the expression of the concept represented.36  
                                            
24
 Directive 2001/29/EC. 
25
 Directive 2001/29/EC para 21. 
26
 Art 2(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
27
 Art 2(b) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
28
 Art 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
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 Art 9 of the Berne Convention. 
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 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 370. 
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 This section is prefaced by section 16(1)(a), which states that the owner of the copyright in a work has the 
exclusive right to copy the work. 
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 S 16(3)(b) of the CDPA states that “[r]eferences … to the doing of an act restricted by the copyright in a 
work are to the doing of it … either directly or indirectly”. 
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 S 17(6) of the CDPA. 
34
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
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 ed 2005) 370. 
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 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
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 ed 2005) 371. 
36
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 371. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 69 
 
Less than complete copying can still be an infringement of the reproduction right if the 
amount copied is not negligible. This is to ensure that the skill, effort and labour of the 
author are rewarded, while safeguarding against overreaching claims of ownership.  
The WIPO Copyright treaty allows exceptions to be devised to accommodate the use of 
works in the digital environment.37 The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations,38 giving 
effect to a mandate of the Information Society Directive,39 introduced an exemption clause 
relating to transient or incidental digital copies in the form of section 28A of the CDPA. This 
exception is applicable to literary, artistic, dramatic and musical works, published editions, 
sound recordings and films, but is specifically not applicable to computer programs or 
databases. According to this provision, a copy that is necessarily made as part of a 
technological process and which is transient or incidental will not be an infringement if its 
sole purpose is to enable the transmission of a work over a network,40 or to enable a lawful 
use of the work,41 if the copy is of no independent economic significance. The reason for 
this provision is to enable efficient lawful use and proper functioning of digital networks 
without fear of copyright infringement.42 The exception was deemed to comply with the 
three-step test required by article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, and the test was therefore 
not added as an additional qualification.43 This is an important exception to the 
reproduction right; if the exception was absent, the mere act of browsing webpages on the 
World Wide Web would necessarily infringe all varieties of works, from artistic, literary and 
musical to sound recordings and films.  
The transient copy exception is clearly aimed at two different situations: where the copy 
enables the transmission of a work between third parties via an intermediary, and where 
the copy is made to facilitate a lawful use. This exception only relates to the reproduction 
of a work, and therefore cannot be raised as a defence against a claim for infringement of 
the distribution (or any other) right.44 Furthermore, the copy must be temporary of nature, 
as well as transient and incidental. The use of the term “transient” indicates that not only 
must the copy be temporary, but more specifically of a fleeting duration. This will be 
achieved when a copy is made by a computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) for 
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 Agreed statement to art 10 of the WCT. 
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 Reg 8(1) of the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/2498). 
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 Art 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
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purposes of accessing and viewing a file, or by a web browser caching data.45 “Incidental” 
implies that the primary purpose pursued is not making the copy, and the reproduction 
occurs only as a necessary part of the technological process.46 Lastly, the copy must be of 
no independent economic significance, implying that it must serve only as a copy for the 
purposes of transmitting the work over a digital network, or enabling a lawful use.47 This 
brings the provision squarely in line with the international mandate of article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention. 
Section 18 of the CDPA gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to control the issue 
of copies of her work to the public, which is known as the distribution right. This right can 
concisely be described as the right to authorise the first public release onto the market of 
the original or copies of a work. Certain European Commission Directives48 have required 
amendment of the CDPA with regard to the distribution right, giving rise to various sets of 
regulations in the United Kingdom.49 Section 18(3) explains that the sale, importation, 
distribution, hiring or loan (other than to friends and family) of a work amounts to issuing 
copies to the public.50 This right enables copyright owners to prohibit the issue of any 
(additional) copies, even if the work has previously been made available to the public.51 In 
effect, this means that the copyright owner can regulate the number of copies of her work 
in circulation.52  
The distribution right supersedes the right to publish contained in the United Kingdom’s 
Copyright Act of 1956.53 The difference in terminology has a great effect on the content of 
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the right. The distribution right has a close relationship with the reproduction right, and 
acquired new meaning with the advent of the digital age and the internet specifically. If a 
consumer were to make use of peer-to-peer sharing software to download an 
unauthorised copy of a copyright work, this would constitute an infringement of the 
reproduction right. Similarly, the person “sharing” the work (making it available for 
download) would in turn be liable of infringement of the distribution right. This issue has 
received much consideration in American case law,54 with courts grappling with the 
definition and extent of the distribution right. However, there is a paucity of case law in the 
United Kingdom in this regard and the way that the courts will handle this issue remains to 
be seen. 
The rental and lending rights of the copyright owner are regulated separately from the 
distribution rights. As discussed in chapter 3,55 rental and lending rights were first 
recognised by the TRIPS agreement in 1994. Section 18A of the CDPA was consequently 
added to cater for these categories of rights.56 The rationale behind excluding works of 
architecture in buildings is the wish to prevent the copyright owner from asserting a right to 
lease the building.57 Section 18A(2) distinguishes between the acts of rental and lending 
on the basis of whether a direct or indirect economic advantage is gained. Economic 
advantage denotes situations where establishments make a profit from the lending 
activities.58 If such an advantage is gained, the rental right is applicable;59 if no such 
advantage is gained, lending rights are applicable.60 Importantly, both definitions make it 
clear that these restricted acts relate to the public, so by implication lending to friends or 
family is of no concern to the copyright owner.61 Nonetheless, lending between 
establishments that in turn make a work available to the public (such as libraries) is 
expressly exempted from the scope of the lending right.62  
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 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 454 F Supp 2d 966 (CD Cal 2005); Universal City 
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The performance right is also provided for in the CDPA. Section 19 states that the public 
performance of a dramatic, literary or musical work is an act restricted by copyright and 
therefore the copyright owner has the right to authorise the performance of her work.63 
Furthermore, playing or showing a sound recording, film or broadcast in public is also a 
restricted act that must be authorised.64 The producer of the sound recording will hold the 
copyright in such a work,65 although the author of the musical or literary work will also have 
copyright in the work embodied in the sound recording.  
Against this discussion of the economic rights granted by the CDPA, the fair dealing 
exceptions that limit the owner’s property rights can be analysed. As will be seen, fair 
dealing provisions act as defences against a claim for the infringement of any of these 
economic rights. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the effect that these exceptions 
have on the rights individually.  
 
4 2 3 Fair Dealing 
4 2 3 1 Introduction 
The point of departure in copyright law is that when a person undertakes an act restricted 
by copyright without authorisation, he infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 
Unless a statutory defence can be successfully raised, the user will be found liable of 
infringing one or more of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. The fair dealing provisions 
constitute some of these statutory defences. 
The fair dealing defence was introduced in the United Kingdom by the Copyright Act of 
1911.66 The fair dealing exceptions contained in the 1911 Act are included and expanded 
on in the CDPA.67 There is an exhaustive list of situations that can be raised as fair dealing 
defences: using a copyright work for the purposes of research or private study, criticism or 
review, or reporting current events can qualify as fair dealing and consequently be 
exempted from liability for infringement in terms of the CDPA. However, there is no open-
ended defence of fairness as is the case with fair use. Accordingly, the inquiry of whether 
the particular use is exempted must start with the question whether the exception applies 
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to that type of work, and whether the use is for one of the approved purposes.68 If both of 
these questions are answered in the affirmative, the inquiry proceeds to the second stage, 
where it is established whether there has been a sufficient acknowledgement of the source 
(if necessary), and whether the use is in fact fair.69  
The United Kingdom is party to the Berne Convention and the statutory exceptions must 
therefore be in line with the framework created by this treaty.70 The Information Society 
Directive required various amendments to be made to the CDPA to comply with the 
mandates regarding fair dealing. Article 5(3) of the Directive stipulates that for fair dealing 
to apply to research and private study, the act in question must be for a non-commercial 
purpose.71 Section 30(1) of the CDPA has been amended to state that fair dealing for 
purposes of criticism or review will only be allowed if the work has been made lawfully 
available to the public.72  
The fairness inquiry is an objective analysis, measured against the standard of whether “a 
fair minded and honest person would have dealt with the copyright work in the manner in 
which the defendant did for the purpose in question”.73 The decision of whether the use of 
a work is fair will ultimately be a matter of impression, but a variety of factors remain 
important (to varying degrees, depending on the specific purpose of fair dealing and the 
facts of each case).74 One of the most important factors considered is the extent to which 
the use competes with the exploitation of the work by the copyright owner.75 Here the 
courts take instruction from article 9(2) of the Berne Convention – expanded by article 13 
of TRIPS – which allows member states to permit exceptions to the reproduction right in 
specific cases where the reproduction by a user does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the owner or conflict with the normal exploitation of the work.76 
Furthermore, the court will have regard to how much of the work has been used and the 
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extent of the use, as well as whether the purpose achieved by using the work could have 
been achieved without relying on the reproduction, although an affirmative answer will not 
automatically render the use unfair.77  
A defence that is closely related to the fair dealing exceptions is the reproduction of a work 
in the public interest.78 Although the defences are often raised in conjunction with one 
another,79 the public interest defence falls beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be 
analysed separately.  
 
4 2 3 2 Research and Private Study 
The rationale behind the first of the fair dealing exceptions, allowing non-commercial 
research and private study, is to afford students and researchers the opportunity to access 
and use works protected by copyright.80 The exception relates to literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, as well as the typographical arrangement of a work, but requires that a 
sufficient acknowledgment of the author and source of the work must be made in the case 
of research, unless this proves to be practically impossible.81 One aspect that is notably 
lacking from this exception is the inclusion of cinematographic films and sound recordings, 
which are becoming an increasingly prevalent means of conveying information.82 Making 
use of a sound recording for the purpose of research would therefore infringe the copyright 
in the sound recording itself, but not the musical work underlying it.83 As is shown later in 
this chapter,84 the Australian equivalent is to be preferred in this respect because of its 
broader construction and scope.  
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 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 40; Ashdown v Telegraph Group 
[2002] Ch 149 CA paras 76-81; Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
I (15
th
 ed 2005) 499. 
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 See eg Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another [1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA; Beloff v Pressdram [1973] 1 
All ER 241; Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143; Ashdown v Telegraph Group 
[2002] Ch 149 CA.  
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 S 29. See Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 
485. 
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 S 29(1)-(2). In terms of s 29(2) no acknowledgment is required in the case of typographical arrangements 
(published editions). 
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 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 485. 
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 Burrell R & Coleman A Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (2005) 116. 
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The Information Society Directive allows member states to provide exceptions for private 
study and research not only to the reproduction right, but also to the distribution right.85 In 
this respect the CDPA clearly states that fair dealing with a work “does not infringe any 
copyright in the work”,86 which extends the scope of the exception to all the exclusive 
rights granted to copyright owners. This syntax was formulated on the premise that fair 
dealing for the purposes of research or study will rarely, if ever, have an impact on any 
rights other than reproduction and distribution.87 
The meaning of “non-commercial research” is not exact, as the CDPA implemented the 
qualification without incorporating a correlative definition.88 However, the meaning of the 
term is informed by recital 42 of the Information Society Directive (which is the cause of its 
inclusion), which states: 
“[T]he non-commercial nature of the activity in question should be determined by that 
activity as such. The organisational structure and the means of funding of the establishment 
concerned are not the decisive factors in this respect.” 
It is clear from the above extract that the determination of whether the allegedly infringing 
act does indeed infringe is unique to each specific scenario, and the conduct can be found 
to be non-commercial regardless of the otherwise-indicating organisational structure. It is 
suggested that the activity complained of should be viewed on a continuum representing 
intentions to profit and didactic purposes as the two extremes, with the purpose of the 
specific research being determinative instead of the larger purpose of the researcher.89 
Notwithstanding, research carried out for a non-profit organisation with the intention to 
raise funds for the organisation will likely still be deemed to be of a commercial nature.90  
The requirement that a sufficient acknowledgment must be made in the case of research is 
a reflection of the standards of fair practice that are expected of users, although section 
29(1B) provides that no acknowledgment needs to be made if it is impossible for practical 
reasons. This provision will have effect in three scenarios. The first situation envisioned by 
this clause is where a work was published anonymously. However, while the Information 
Society Directive requires that the author must be acknowledged if her identity is known 
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 Art 5(2)(b), (3)(a) & (4). 
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 S 29(1)&(1C). 
87
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 489. 
88
 Incorporated by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/2498) following the 
imperative mandate in recital 42 of the Information Society Directive. 
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 ed 2005) 486. 
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even where the work was published anonymously,91 the CDPA does not contain any 
provision to this effect. The CDPA is therefore not in compliance with the Directive in this 
regard.92 Secondly, where the work is unpublished and it is not possible to establish the 
author’s identity by reasonable enquiry, the user will be excused from making a sufficient 
acknowledgement.93 Finally, if the work was originally published with the author’s name 
but it has since become impossible to name her for reasons of practicality, no 
acknowledgement needs to be made.94 If, for example, the copy of a work used for 
research does not bear the author’s name, the requirement of sufficient acknowledgment 
may be dispensed with if it is not possible to ascertain her identity after reasonable 
enquiry.95 If the author is not also the copyright owner, it is important that the author of the 
work is indicated, not the copyright owner.96 The requirement that the author must be 
acknowledged indicates that the exception applies to the entire research process; from 
procuring the source material to reproductions of such material in the publication of the 
research.97 This view is fortified by the fact that a distinction is drawn in the CDPA between 
research and private study. 
As regards private study, the Information Society Directive requires that the use of a work 
for private study is not for commercial ends, either directly or indirectly.98 This suggests 
that courses presented for vocational improvement will not benefit from this fair dealing 
exception. However, no acknowledgment of the author or source is required in this case 
because the results of the exercise are not published and attribution is therefore 
senseless. The meaning of “non-commercial” as discussed in relation to research applies 
equally to private study.99 The fact that a work is used for private study does not 
necessarily indicate that the use will be protected by the fair dealing exception; a 
contextual evaluation of the use must be undertaken to determine whether the particular 
conduct is exempted.100 
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 Burrell R & Coleman A Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (2005) 118. 
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The CDPA extensively regulates acts of copying by persons other than researchers and 
students.101 In the case of libraries, a librarian cannot rely on the fair dealing provision to 
make copies because this act is regulated by sections 38 – 40. These sections make it 
possible for librarians to provide copies of articles from periodicals and sections from 
published works (subject to certain conditions) without infringing copyright.102 Such 
copying must still, however, be for the purpose of non-commercial research or private 
study, and librarians are therefore exempted from liability if they provide materials for 
others to use for purposes of fair dealing.103 Limited instances of copying are therefore 
allowed where the person doing the research or private study is not the person doing the 
copying. 
Computer programs are the subject of two provisions that curtail the functioning of the fair 
dealing exception.104 Fair dealing does not extend to the act of converting a computer 
program from a low level language105 to a high level language106 or the incidental 
reproduction of the program while doing so.107 Furthermore, it is not fair dealing to 
“observe, study or test the functioning of a computer program in order to determine the 
ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program”.108 The fair dealing 
exception is specifically excluded from these scenarios because they are regulated 
separately in the act.109  
There has been no case law where the defence of fair dealing for research or private study 
has been raised in the United Kingdom and authors have therefore looked to other 
commonwealth jurisdictions for cases where the courts have had the opportunity to 
consider the application of this exception.110 The Supreme Court of Canada decided such 
a case in CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada,111 where it held that the factors 
considered in cases of fair dealing for the purposes of criticism, review and news reporting 
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102
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can be helpful in deciding whether specific acts of research and private study are fair.112 
Interestingly, the Canadian Copyright Act113 does not require that the research must be of 
a non-commercial nature for it to qualify as fair dealing, and the court accordingly held that 
lawyers can rely on the defence even when their actions are commercial and aimed at 
making a profit.114 
It is clear that the UK exception of fair dealing for the purpose of non-commercial research 
or private study is of great importance to the public’s interest in education and developing 
academic schools of thought. However, the provision is formulated narrowly in comparison 
with the Australian equivalent, where a more inclusive approach is adopted.115 
 
4 2 3 3 Criticism and Review 
The next fair dealing provision is section 30 of the CDPA. This section makes it possible to 
use copyright protected works for the purposes of criticism, review and news reporting. For 
the sake of convenience, fair dealing for the purposes of news reporting will be considered 
separately from the two former grounds of exemption.116  
The review and criticism of a work protected by copyright has arguably been allowed since 
the Statute of Anne, but has only found statutory embodiment since the Copyright Act of 
1911.117 The need for this exception stems from the public interest in freedom of 
expression, which should not be unnecessarily curtailed by copyright law.118 This 
exemption is regionally encouraged by the Information Society Directive.119  
The CDPA encapsulates the exception as follows: 
“Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of 
a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is 
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accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made 
available to the public.”120 
The provision does not limit the operation of the exception to certain types of work as in 
the case of research and private study, which means that any work that has been made 
available to the public can be used for purposes of criticism and review.121 Furthermore, 
the provision states that a fair dealing will not infringe “any copyright in the work”, again 
indicating that the defence is not limited to the right of reproduction. Any portion or aspect 
of a work may be used, irrespective of whether it is representative of the work as a 
whole.122 The ideas and concepts underlying the work, or even the manner in which the 
work was produced, may also be the subject of criticism or review.123 The crux of the 
exception is that the reproduction of the work should take place as part of or to enable 
criticism or review of the work, although this need not be the sole purpose.124 In the words 
of Lightman J in Banier v News Group Newspapers Ltd, “[s]ection 30 is designed to protect 
a critic or reviewer who may bona fide wish to use copyright material to illustrate his review 
or criticism”.125 A critic or reviewer has even relied on the fair dealing defence when his 
commentary on a work was predominantly positive.126 As with the other fair dealing 
exceptions, the court will consider the factual context within which the work was used.127 
The decision in Fraser-Woodward Ltd v BBC and Another128 is useful for giving meaning to 
this fair dealing exception. In this case the defendants used various works protected by 
copyright in a television programme. The programme was created with the intention of 
criticising a particular style of journalism and used the media coverage of a high-profile 
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celebrity couple, David and Victoria Beckham, as an illustrative example. During the 
course of the programme, thirteen photographs taken by a Mr Jason Fraser were used 
without the consent of the plaintiff, who owned the copyright in the photographs. An action 
for copyright infringement was instituted and the defence of fair dealing for the purpose of 
criticism or review was raised. All of the photographs in question were allegedly candid 
shots of one or both of the celebrities and used under licence by various tabloid 
newspapers. The defendants showed video footage of the photographs appearing on the 
front page of these newspapers, predominantly accompanied by large text headlines, none 
of which were shown for longer than four seconds. The defendants argued that the 
photographs were used for purposes of criticising the photographs themselves and to 
criticise other works and practices, such as the tabloid coverage of celebrities in general. 
The court (per Mann J) confirmed that when considering whether an infringing use of a 
work can be justified by fair dealing, a liberal interpretation should be employed when 
defining the terms “criticism” and “review” and “[t]he context is likely to be all-important”.129 
This approach is consistent with the interpretation given to the provision relating to fair 
dealing for the purposes of research and private study in Australia, where a contextual 
analysis is followed.130 An equally liberal interpretation was given to the words “another 
work” contained in section 30(1). The plaintiff argued that the style of journalism does not 
qualify as “another work” that can be subjected to criticism or review, because a style of 
journalism cannot be a work for the purposes of copyright law. However, the court rejected 
this argument and pointed to previous cases where it was decided that the criticism 
expressed can relate to the idea or philosophy underlying the work, or even its social and 
moral implications.131 Furthermore, no specific reference to the work being criticised is 
required, which strengthens this affirmation.132  
The plaintiffs also averred that the fair dealing provision could not exempt the defendants’ 
use of the photographs, as there was no sufficient acknowledgement of seven of the 
photographs shown. The court found that this was not the case, as each shot of the 
photographs included the text “Pictures: JASON FRASER”, or where this was not 
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displayed reference was made to the author of the photographs by the narrator.133 The 
court stated that the acknowledgement of the author does not have to be explicit in every 
instance; the requirement of sufficient acknowledgement can be satisfied by an implied 
reference when “anyone paying a moderate amount of attention would be able to identify 
the photographs as from the same series (and therefore the same photographer)”.134  
Although there is no general defence of fairness in the CDPA (such as the fair use defence 
in American copyright law), the use of a work must still be evaluated according to this 
criterion in each case. The court acknowledged that how the programme was made and 
the attitude of the defendant in dealing with intellectual property rights throughout this 
process are relevant considerations to the fairness of the dealing.135 Some of the other 
guidelines that the court laid down for determining the fairness of the use include the 
motives of the user, the general impression of whether there was fair dealing, the quantity 
of the work used, the actual purpose of the use and whether the averred attempt at fair 
dealing is merely a simulation, and whether the reproduction of the work unreasonably 
prejudices the legitimate interests of the work or conflicts with the author’s normal 
exploitation of the work (in accordance with article 9(2) of the Berne Convention).136 The 
court recognised that with the use of a photograph, a much greater portion (if not the entire 
photograph) would likely have to be used, compared to a literary or musical work, for the 
criticism or review to make sense.137 Furthermore, the argument that fair dealing could not 
be relied on in this case because the use of the photographs was of a commercial nature 
was rejected.138 In the court’s opinion, the balance of the interests of the copyright owner, 
on the one hand, and those of the critic on the other, weighed in favour of the critic.139 The 
fair dealing defence was therefore upheld.  
The CDPA includes the performance of a work in the provision relating to criticism and 
review, which permits making quotations from theatrical performances where the script 
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has not been made available to the public.140 However, no express allowance is made for 
parody or caricature of a work, even though this is encouraged by the Information Society 
Directive.141 While the criticism/review provision could feasibly be construed to cover these 
actions, it will not always be clear ex ante whether the parody of the work will fall into one 
of the categories of the numerus clausus of exceptions.142 One consideration that 
gravitates against the inclusion of parody and caricature in the scope of the exception for 
criticism and review is that a sufficient acknowledgment of the source is required by 
section 30(1), which is not provided as a general practice of parodies.143 However, a 
national review of the United Kingdom’s copyright law in 2006 found the benefits of 
including an exception for parody and satire outweigh the costs, and accordingly advised 
the promulgation of such an exception.144 Another review was concluded in 2011, which 
yielded the same results.145 The government has indicated that it will take steps to 
promulgate such an exception by the end of 2012.146 However, in the absence of a specific 
fair dealing clause for parody and satire,147 it would appear that this act is generally not 
exempted and a defence in line with freedom of expression will have to be employed.148  
A work can be the subject of criticism or review only once it has been made available to 
the public. This qualification has its inception in article 5(3)(d) of the Information Society 
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Directive, which caused the CDPA to be amended to comply with this condition.149 The 
qualification is informed by section 30(1A), which states: 
“For the purposes of subsection (1) a work has been made available to the public if it has 
been made available by any means, including—  
(a) the issue of copies to the public; 
(b) making the work available by means of an electronic retrieval system; 
(c) the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public; 
(d) the performance, exhibition, playing or showing of the work in public; 
(e) the communication to the public of the work, 
but in determining generally for the purposes of that subsection whether a work has been made 
available to the public no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act.” 
This qualification to the exception is clearly not aimed at excluding works that have not 
been published, but rather at works that have not been made available to the public by any 
means. This view is supported by subsections (d) and (e), which deem a work to have 
been made available to the public even if no copy of the work has been issued.  
In the case of Hubbard v Vosper,150 the court upheld the defence of fair dealing for the 
purpose of criticism where the literary work in question was distributed only within a small 
sect of a religious community and not intended for wider public dissemination. However, 
this case was decided before the amendment of the CDPA in 2003 that requires the work 
to be made available to the public; the amendment could mean that the case would be 
decided differently today.151 
In HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd152 the defendant (a 
newspaper) published certain extracts from the personal diary of the plaintiff that it had 
acquired from a former employee of the latter. Copies of the diary had been legitimately 
distributed among a group of individuals chosen by the Prince himself on the 
understanding that they were not to be viewed by any other person. The employees of the 
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plaintiff who had access to the diary had all signed confidentiality agreements in terms of 
which they undertook not to distribute copies to any unauthorised persons or divulge the 
contents of the diary. The court unequivocally stated that the “[c]irculation of copies of the 
journal to a number of carefully selected recipients … does not amount to making it 
available to the public”.153 Although the defendant might have been able to rely on fair 
dealing for purposes of criticism or review, this prospect was negated by the fact that the 
literary work was not made available to the public as required by section 30(1).154 These 
cases demonstrate the change in the legal position relating to fair dealing for purposes of 
criticism or review brought about by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations.155  
The condition that the work must previously have been made available to the public places 
a justifiable limit on the scope and application of the fair dealing provision. However, there 
is no reason why a work should not be open to criticism and review once it has been 
lawfully disclosed. The provision as it stands strikes a sensible balance between the 
interests of authors and the public. 
 
4 2 3 4 Reporting Current Events 
As with the fair dealing exception relating to criticism and review, the exception for 
purposes of news reporting first appeared in the Copyright Act of 1911, although it was 
phrased as an exception for “newspaper summary”.156 It is trite law that copyright does not 
grant a monopoly right over information, facts or opinions; merely over how they are 
expressed. The exception of fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting aims to 
legitimise the use of these expressions by journalists reporting to the public.157 The 
exception is clearly based on the public interest in the free dissemination of current and 
relevant information.158 By making use of original quotations, journalists are able to better 
inform the public without tainting the information with an opinion of their own.159 Using the 
original text, sound recording or film footage enables the public to receive information in its 
original form. 
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The Information Society Directive embodies this exception in article 5(3)(c), where it 
states:  
“[R]eproduction by the press, communication to the public or making available of published 
articles on current economic, political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other 
subject-matter of the same character … as long as the source, including the author’s name, 
is indicated, or use of works or other subject-matter in connection with the reporting of 
current events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose [is permitted.]” 
The correlative fair dealing provision in section 30(2) of the CDPA is couched in the 
following terms: 
“Fair dealing with a work (other than a photograph) for the purpose of reporting current 
events does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that (subject to subsection (3)) it 
is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.” 
As with the other fair dealing exceptions in the CDPA, this exception should be interpreted 
liberally.160 The term “current events” is not confined to events that occur within a recent 
temporal context, but rather events that still occupy the public’s mind.161 Again, the text 
does not restrict itself to the reproduction of the work, instead using the familiar phrase 
“any copyright in the work”. Furthermore, the work itself does not have to be a work that 
has been recently produced.162 However, the subject matter cannot merely be of historical 
interest; it must be relevant to contemporary events, whether local, national or 
international.163 Courts have found that even sporting events can qualify as “events” in 
terms of this provision.164 The prevailing view is that “reporting” does not cover editorial or 
opinion pieces, and the reproduction of the work must be aimed at informing the public or 
a section of the public.165 The term “current events” does not extend as far as the term 
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th
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“news” (as used in the Australian provision), according to case law.166 It is unclear why the 
exception is entitled “News Reporting” although it does not use the phrase in the text of the 
provision itself, or why the court reneged from the liberal interpretation of the provision. It is 
submitted that this differentiation amounts to a distinction without a difference, and that the 
liberal interpretation of fair dealing exceptions prevalent in case law requires these terms 
to be viewed as synonyms.  
No distinction is drawn between works that have been made available to the public and 
those that have not. The provision contains no prohibition against using works that have 
not been made available to the public, in contrast with the exception for criticism and 
review. However, courts are likely to consider this in the analysis of whether the use of the 
work is fair.167 A work that has not been made available to the public can still be used (if 
the public interest justifies it), although it will be more difficult to show that the use was 
fair.168 Although it is primarily an objective analysis, certain subjective considerations, such 
as the motives and intentions of the user, are relevant to the fairness of the use.169 The 
method used to acquire the work is also helpful; if, for example, the work was obtained in 
breach of confidence, this will weigh against a finding that the subsequent use was fair.170 
All of these factors will contribute to deciding whether the use was fair, which nonetheless 
remains a matter of impression. Whether it is reasonably necessary to reproduce the work 
to report the events will also be an indication of whether the use is fair.171 Accordingly, if 
the copyright work is used appropriately to relay information to the public, it will indicate a 
fair dealing with the work (subject to the other considerations discussed here). 
The wording of section 30(2) makes it clear that the exception applies to all categories of 
copyright works except photographs. The reason for excluding photographs from the 
scope of this exception is the notion that using a photograph without licence for the 
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purpose of news reporting can never be fair.172 The obvious scenario illustrating this 
rationale is a newspaper using a photograph that a rival newspaper has paid dearly for 
and simply relying on this fair dealing exception to justify it. Notwithstanding, such a 
photograph may still be reproduced and distributed for the purpose of criticism or review, 
but the courts will be wary of a simulated intention and legitimate criticism or review will 
have to be passed on the photograph.173  
The requirement that a sufficient acknowledgement of the source be made is 
unproblematic, as it should prima facie be evident whether such an acknowledgement has 
been made. The considerations discussed in relation to the fair dealing exception for 
purposes of criticism or review,174 especially those taken into account by the court in 
Fraser-Woodward Ltd v BBC,175 should apply mutatis mutandis to the exception of fair 
dealing for the purpose of reporting current events. Subsection (3) alleviates the mandate 
somewhat by providing that when current events are reported by means of a sound 
recording, film or broadcast, no acknowledgement is required where this would be 
practically or otherwise impossible.176 
This exception is clearly necessary for the proper functioning of an independent media. 
The media can rely on this exception to use works protected by copyright without fear of 
infringement, which will often be required to effectively inform the public of important 
current happenings. The intrinsic requirement of fairness prevents undue harm to the 
copyright owner’s legitimate interests, and prevents the exception being relied on to justify 
improper uses. 
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4 3 Australia 
4 3 1 Introduction 
The first federal Australian Copyright Act was passed into law in 1905.177 This Act is 
sanctioned by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, which specifically 
provides the legislature with the power to regulate copyright law.178 The 1905 Act did not 
incorporate the principles or provisions of the Berne Convention (or any other international 
agreements) and sought to free Australia from the UK copyright law as it stood at the 
time.179 The 1905 Act introduced fair dealing to Australian copyright law, with a provision 
that contained the majority of the substance of the contemporary fair dealing exceptions.180 
However, this only lasted until 1912, when the Copyright Act of 1912 was promulgated, 
repealing the 1905 Copyright Act181 and adopting the United Kingdom’s Copyright Act of 
1911 in its entirety (with additional provisions to aid its application in Australia).182 The 
1911 Act statutorily abolished common law copyright and statute is now the only source of 
protection.183 In the United Kingdom the Copyright Act of 1956 repealed the Act of 1911, 
but this Act continued to remain in force in Australia.184 Following the repeal of the Act in 
the United Kingdom, the Australian Attorney-General appointed a committee to examine 
the implications of the United Kingdom’s repeal in Australia and the accession by Australia 
to the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention.185 This body, known as 
the Spicer Committee, published a report in 1959 which provided the impetus for 
legislative reform and consequently formed the foundation of the 1968 Act.186 
The Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968 (hereafter the “Copyright Act”) came into 
operation on May 1, 1969, and regulates the current law of copyright in Australia. Australia 
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is party to the latest text of the Berne Convention (the Paris Act)187 as of March 1, 1978. 
Australia is also party to the Rome Convention,188 the UCC,189 TRIPS,190 the WCT191 and 
the WPPT,192 which are discussed in chapter 3. Part VIII of the Copyright Act makes 
provision for the Act to be applied to qualified works of foreign countries in accordance 
with the principle of national treatment.193  
 
4 3 2 Rights Subsisting in Copyright 
The Copyright Act has a fragmented structure when compared to the CDPA, although the 
substantive provisions are largely similar. The Copyright Act recognises artistic, literary, 
dramatic, and musical works as works eligible for copyright protection.194 Moreover, it 
treats sound recordings, cinematographic films, broadcasts and published editions as 
“subject-matter other than works” also eligible for copyright protection.195 Computer 
programs are protected independently from literary works by the Copyright Act, while the 
CDPA does not treat computer programs as distinct from literary works. Apart from this, 
the categories of subject-matter eligible for protection are identical to those recognised in 
the CDPA, although the CDPA gives separate protection to databases while the Copyright 
Act treats them as a subset of literary works. 
The Copyright Act grants a property right to the author of a work in the form of the 
exclusive right to do or authorise certain acts in relation to that work.196 Accordingly, guilty 
knowledge is irrelevant when establishing infringement.197 These acts correspond with the 
restricted acts granted by the CDPA;198 they entail the reproduction right, the publication 
right, the performance right, the right of communication to the public, the adaptation right, 
and the right to do any of these restricted acts in relation to an adaptation (depending on 
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the type of work in question).199 To comply with TRIPS, the right to authorise the 
commercial rental of a literary, musical or dramatic work, or a computer program or sound 
recording was introduced by the Copyright (World Trade Organization Amendments) 
Act.200 As these rights have already been discussed in relation to the CDPA,201 it is 
unnecessary for present purposes to do so again, given that the rights contained in the 
Copyright Act are substantially the same, save for a few divergences which warrant a brief 
analysis.  
While the CDPA provides for a distribution right, the Copyright Act grants only a 
publication right.202 The right to publish a work has been interpreted by the courts to mean 
the right to make a work public which has not been available to the public previously in the 
copyright territory.203 The publication right does not allow the copyright owner to prohibit 
issuing additional copies to the public (although this could infringe the reproduction right). 
This differs greatly from the distribution right, especially in the digital environment where 
distribution is coupled with reproduction over the internet and both the distributing and 
reproducing parties can be held liable.204 Accordingly, the publication right is not as 
extensive in its scope as the distribution right. 
The rights of public performance and communication to the public contained in the 
Copyright Act of 1968 are very similar to those contained in the CDPA.205 As with the UK 
equivalent, the communication right includes making a work available or transmitting it 
electronically, although it does not include tangible copies (which are addressed by the 
publication right).206 The Copyright Act also includes a broadcast as a communication to 
the public.207  
The rental right – which was introduced internationally by TRIPS as a new addition to the 
exclusive rights208 and introduced into Australian law one year after the commencement of 
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TRIPS209 – applies to different subject-matter than it does in terms of the CDPA. Article 11 
of TRIPS requires member states to provide the rental right to authors of “at least” 
computer programs and cinematographic films if the rental of these works has led to 
widespread copying. While the CDPA protects the rights of the producers of films on this 
occasion, it ignores the owners of computer programs in this context. The Australian 
position, inversely, protects the rights in computer programs, but neglects the rental rights 
of producers of films.210 It must therefore be assumed that the rental of the different types 
of works has different effects in the eyes of the two legislators. 
Sensibly, the rights in respect of computer programs are limited to exclude situations 
where the computer program is not capable of being copied in the ordinary use of the 
machine or device in which it is embodied, and where the computer program is not the 
essential object of the rental.211 The distinction drawn between rental and lending in the 
CDPA is upheld in the Copyright Act, albeit with different terminology. Whereas the CDPA 
refers to “rental”, the Copyright Act employs the term “commercial rental” to illustrate its 
intended distinction from “lending”. The Copyright Act specifically states that it “is not the 
intention of Parliament that a lending arrangement should be regarded as a commercial 
rental arrangement”.212  
The exclusive rights as set out in the Copyright Act therefore do not differ greatly from 
those in the CDPA. With the exceptions of the different subject-matter covered by the 
rental right and the distinction between the publication and distribution rights, the content 
of the protection granted to copyright owners is largely the same. Given this context the 
fair dealing provisions can now be compared in the same light.   
 
4 3 3 Fair Dealing 
4 3 3 1 Introduction 
The fair dealing provisions in the Australian Copyright Act are arranged according to the 
subject-matter each one covers. The fair dealing provisions relating to literary, artistic, 
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dramatic and musical works are contained in Division 3 of Part III,213 while those relating to 
sound recordings, cinematographic films, broadcasts and published editions are contained 
in Division 6 of Part IV.214 The most notable substantive difference in this regard between 
the Copyright Act and the CDPA is that the former contains an additional fair dealing 
exception for parody or satire.215  
When the Copyright Act was promulgated in 1968, it soon proved to not strike an effective 
balance between the interests of the copyright owner and the public interest.216 
Consequently, the first reform committee, known as the Franki Committee, was appointed 
in 1974 to re-examine the reprographic needs and trends in Australia, and the Copyright 
Amendment Act 154 of 1980 was drafted to implement the recommendations made by the 
committee.217 The Amendment Act introduced three subsections to the fair dealing 
provision relating to research and study, which aim to inform users of what will be 
considered fair.218 This amendment introduced the four factors traditionally associated with 
fair use that courts adopted in the United States in the case of Folsom v Marsh,219 as well 
as an additional factor.220 These factors are considered when assessing the use of the 
copyright work to determine the fairness of the conduct. The Act also amended the 
exception by removing the word “private” from private study, thereby making the category 
broader than the UK equivalent.221 Another Copyright Amendment Act222 was promulgated 
shortly afterwards, which extended the application of the fair dealing provisions relating to 
criticism, review and news reporting to audio-visual works.223  
Although various other amendments to copyright law were made around the same time, 
the next amendment to fair dealing came with the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) 
Act224 in 2000. As the short title suggests, the Act was aimed at bringing the legislation 
relating to copyright in line with the technological developments of the past decades.225 For 
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this reason, the term “copy” was replaced by “reproduce” to make it applicable to digital 
technologies (while using the term “facsimile copy” in reference to an analogue copy), both 
in the sections that provide for this exclusive right and the fair dealing provisions relating to 
it.226 The Act also extended the fair dealing provisions to apply to the exclusive right of 
communication to the public and introduced definitions for a “reasonable portion” that may 
be used for fair dealing.227 Although it was suggested that this Act should replace the 
specific fair dealing provisions with a general fair use provision (which would retain the 
specific purposes as indicative of what should be considered fair),228 this suggestion was 
not enacted. 
Pursuant to the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), numerous 
amendments to Australian copyright law were made by the US Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act.229 However, this Act only contained some minor alterations to the 
definitions relating to fair dealing.230 Subsequent to the promulgation of the Implementation 
Act, the Parliamentary Committee launched an inquiry into the desirability of incorporating 
a fair use exception as found in American copyright law.231 Similarly, the Senate Select 
Committee suggested that adopting a fair use defence could provide an adequate redress 
to the balance of interests between copyright owners and users.232 However, instead of 
replicating the American fair use exception, the existing fair dealing provisions were 
retained and a new fair dealing exception providing for parody and satire was added, while 
exceptions were also adopted for time-shifting and format-shifting.233 This Act also clarified 
the meaning and scope of a “reasonable portion” by use of a systematic table inserted into 
the fair dealing for research and study provision.234 Accordingly, no general defence exists 
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and users have to rely on one of the numerus clausus of fair dealing defences, also known 
as “specific purpose” defences.235 
These developments have shaped the copyright law of Australia generally and the fair 
dealings provisions specifically. With this historical context it is possible to analyse the 
amended statute, the Copyright Act, as regards the individual fair dealing provisions.  
 
4 3 3 2 Research and Study 
The first notable difference between the Copyright Act and the CDPA is the omission of 
the prefixes “non-commercial” and “private” before research and study. While the CDPA 
was amended to include the “non-commercial” qualification, the Copyright Act has had no 
such amendment and remains without this criterion.236 By contrast, the Copyright Act was 
amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 154 of 1980 to have the prefix “private” 
removed from “study”.237 The Franki Committee, which suggested the amendment, 
considered the qualification both artificial and impractical.238 The core fair dealing for the 
purpose of research or study provision, section 40(1), states: 
“A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, for the purpose of research or study does not constitute 
an infringement of the copyright in the work.” 
Section 103C(1), which relates to audio-visual works, is substantively identical and the 
commentary on the above section therefore applies, mutatis mutandis, to this section as 
well.239 In contrast to the UK counterpart, this provision does not require a sufficient 
acknowledgement of the author and source to be made in the case of research, although 
this could arguably be relevant to the determination of fairness. The next subsection, 
section 40(1A), reiterates this exception for persons enrolled as external students at an 
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educational institution, but it specifically excludes lecture notes from its definition of literary 
works.240  
The Federal Court of Australia has applied the terms “research” and “study” according to 
their dictionary meanings.241 “Research”, in terms of the Macquarie Dictionary (as relied on 
by the court), is the “diligent and systematic inquiry or investigation into a subject in order 
to discover facts or principles”,242 while study is defined as the “[a]pplication of the mind to 
the acquisition of knowledge, as by reading, investigation, or reflection”.243  
When deciding on whether a particular use qualifies as fair dealing for the purpose of 
research or study, courts are directed by statutory guidelines.244 Courts are instructed to 
consider five factors, namely the purpose and character of the dealing, the nature of the 
work that was used, the possibility of obtaining the work within a reasonable time at an 
ordinary commercial price, the effect of the dealing on the potential market for or the value 
of the work, and the amount and substantiality of the part of the work reproduced if the 
entire work is not used.245 All of these statutory guidelines (except the possibility of 
obtaining the work by legitimate means) correspond with the factors contained in the fair 
use analysis in the American Copyright Act of 1976.246 The fourth consideration – the 
effect of the dealing on the potential market for the work, or the work’s value – is clearly 
aimed at catering for the Berne three-step test.247 These factors aid the courts in 
establishing whether a particular use is fair, which is to be determined on each set of facts 
individually.248 Section 103C, which covers fair dealing in relation to audio-visual works, 
also contains these statutory guidelines, although that is where the provision ends; the 
following commentary therefore relates only to section 40. 
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 The section reads: “A fair dealing with a literary work (other than lecture notes) does not constitute an 
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Subsections (3) and (4) further regulate the application of this fair dealing exception.249 In 
terms of these provisions, an article that appears in a periodical may be reproduced in part 
or in its entirety for the purpose of research or study, unless another article from the same 
publication is also reproduced (provided the latter reproduction is for the purpose of 
different research or another course of study).250  This serves as a quantitative guideline 
regarding what may be reproduced. An article from a periodical publication may therefore 
be reproduced regardless of other statutory guidelines or the size of the article; the 
reproduction will be deemed fair dealing.251 However, the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Copyright Amendment Bill of 2006 makes it clear that more than one article from the same 
periodical may be reproduced if it is for the same research or course of study in terms of 
section 40(4).252 With the amendment of the section, the emphasis has shifted from the 
subject-matter of the articles copied to the nature of the research or study.253 Reproducing 
more than one article from a periodical can now qualify as a deemed fair dealing if it is for 
the same research or study. 
Another quantitative guideline is the reasonable portion test contained in section 40(5) of 
the Copyright Act. This section provides a great deal of clarity to the fair dealing exception 
by providing thresholds for specific portions of works that qualify as “reasonable portions”. 
In terms of this section, if a literary, dramatic or musical work is contained in a published 
edition of at least ten pages, 10% of the total number of pages of the published edition 
may be reproduced, or, alternatively, one chapter if the work is divided into chapters.254 
Furthermore, a reproduction of a literary or dramatic work published in electronic form may 
not exceed 10% of the total number of words or a single chapter if the work is divided into 
chapters.255 If a work is available both in publication and electronic form, the use will 
qualify as a deemed fair dealing if it satisfies either the pagination or word count threshold 
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250
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251
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http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/cab2006223/memo_0.html> (accessed 4-1-2012). See also 
Lahore J Copyright and Designs: Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40066-40067. 
254
 S 40(5)(1)(a), (b). 
255
 S 40(5)(2)(a), (b). These guidelines specifically do not apply to computer programs or electronic 
compilations of data in the case of electronic publications: s 40(5)(1), (2).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
 
of a reasonable portion.256 However, once a reproduction qualifies as a deemed fair 
dealing in terms of subsection (5), any further use of the same work will not be eligible for 
the same exemption.257 Further use may still qualify as a fair dealing, but the usual judicial 
evaluation will have to be consulted to ascertain this. Furthermore, the definition of a 
“reasonable portion” contained in section 10 of the Act258 will not be applicable to the 
inquiry of whether the use qualifies for the protection of subsection (5), as the use will be 
deemed to be a reasonable portion only if it fulfills the criteria of the latter.259 
The five statutory guidelines contained in section 40(2) will still be applicable to the 
evaluation of whether the dealing with a work is a fair dealing if it does not fall within the 
ambit of a reasonable portion in terms of subsection (5). If, for example, an amount of 
more than 10% of the words in an electronic publication is used, the defendant can still 
raise a defence of fair dealing for the purpose of research or study in terms of section 
40(1) and the court will then consider the statutory guidelines contained in section 40(2). 
The deemed fair dealing provisions (section 40(3)-(5)) therefore act as an extra-judicial 
mechanism to determine whether the use qualifies as a fair dealing, failing which the 
courts will have to be consulted. 
The Australian defence of fair dealing for the purpose of research and study has a wider 
range of application than the UK counterpart as it is not confined to non-commercial 
research or private study. The statutory guidelines provide a greater degree of certainty 
than the comparatively uninformed provision in the CDPA, as the Australian courts are 
instructed to take these guidelines into account when assessing the fairness of the 
dealing. Extra-judicial guidelines are also provided to inform users of thresholds that will 
automatically deem conduct to constitute fair dealing. The Australian provision 
incorporates the three-step Berne test, which is absent from the CDPA in the context of 
fair dealing. Accordingly, the Australian provision is better structured and much more 
comprehensive. 
 
4 3 3 3 Criticism and Review 
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Section 41 of the Copyright Act contains the fair dealing exception for purposes of criticism 
or review. This provision is similar to the exception in section 30 of the CDPA,260 except 
that it does not require the work used to have been previously made available to the 
public. Section 103A, which relates to audio-visual subject-matter, is phrased identically, 
mutatis mutandis, to section 41, which states: 
“A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the 
work if it is for the purpose of criticism or review, whether of that work or of another work, 
and a sufficient acknowledgement of the work is made.” 
A “sufficient acknowledgement” is defined in section 10(1) as an acknowledgement 
indicating the title or other description of the work and the name of the author, unless the 
author has indicated that she wishes to remain anonymous in respect of that work. The 
fact that the Act does not prohibit the use of an unpublished work does not mean that such 
works may be freely used; if a work is not available to the public this will be considered 
when evaluating the fairness of the work.261 The criticism or review may also relate to the 
doctrines, ideas and philosophies underlying the work, as in the United Kingdom.262 The 
terms “review” and “criticism” have also been interpreted by the court according to their 
dictionary definitions.263 “Criticism” was held to mean to critical use of the mental faculties, 
while “review” was understood as the process leading to this result.264  
The comprehensive analysis of the fair dealing exception for the purpose of criticism or 
review in CDPA can be applied to the Australian provision, given the similarity of the 
phraseology, the reliance on case law from the United Kingdom,265 and the absence of the 
statutory requirement that the work must have been made available to the public in the 
Australia (which means that earlier UK case law can also be applied as is).266 To guard 
against needless repetition this exception will not be discussed any further in the 
Australian context. 
4 3 3 4 News Reporting 
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The fair dealing exception for the purpose of reporting news is more detailed in its 
construction than its UK counterpart. Although the exception is for the purpose of reporting 
news, this includes reporting on information and events that are relevant to the public 
interest.267 The term “news” has been interpreted by courts in the UK to be wider than the 
term “current events” as used in the CDPA and covers information relating to past events 
that was not previously known.268 Although the provision in the CDPA is entitled “News 
Reporting”, the term is not used in the exception itself and the court has specifically 
interpreted the clause to cover only current events and not news in general, which is at 
odds with the liberal interpretation which the court committed itself to.269 
This fair dealing exception is applicable to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works and 
audio-visual items.270 According to the definition in section 10(1), an artistic work includes 
a photograph and the fair dealing exception therefore covers the use of a photograph as 
well. This is not the position in the CDPA, as the use of another person’s photograph for 
the purpose of reporting current events is never seen as fair.271  
For the use of a work to qualify for protection under this exception, it must be for the 
purpose of reporting news in a magazine, newspaper or similar periodical, and it must be 
accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.272 The exception also extends to news 
reporting by means of a communication or in a cinematographic film.273 Although there is 
no requirement that a sufficient acknowledgement must be made in the latter case, this will 
presumably be an important factor when evaluating the fairness of the use.274 While the 
scope of the Australian exception is greater (as regards both the use of photographs and 
what may be reported), it is otherwise very similar to the exception found in the CDPA in 
its construction and application.  
The Copyright Act makes it clear that “playing a musical work in the course of reporting 
news by means of a communication or in a cinematograph film is not a fair dealing with the 
work for the purposes of this section if the playing of the work does not form part of the 
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news being reported”.275 Although this clause does not appear in the fair dealing exception 
relating to audio-visual items,276 it must be assumed that a musical work in this context 
refers to a musical work embodied in a sound recording for the provision to have any 
meaning. This is in accordance with article 10bis of the Berne Convention, which requires 
that member states must determine the conditions under which the reproduction of such 
works may be permitted.277 It is clear that the use of a musical work must be integral to the 
news being reported, and cannot be used for the embellishment of the report.  
The Australian fair dealing exception relating to news reporting, like the exception relating 
to research and study, is much broader than the UK exception. This makes it possible to 
disseminate historical and contemporary information more freely by reproducing copyright 
works to give the public the benefit of the original prose without opining as to its 
interpretation or meaning.  
 
4 3 3 5 Parody and Satire 
The fair dealing exception for parody and satire was introduced by the Copyright 
Amendment Act 158 of 2006 as a result of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA). The AUSFTA led to increasingly strong protection for copyright owners’ 
interests in Australia, which caused a significant imbalance concerning the protection of 
the public interest.278 This resulted from American standards of protection being 
incorporated into Australian copyright law without necessarily incorporating an extension of 
the existing exceptions governing users’ entitlements. The Australian Copyright Law 
Review Committee considered that the open-ended fair use exception contained in 
American law provided a greater degree of protection for users’ entitlements and the public 
interest than was present in Australian copyright law at the time.279 Furthermore, the 
exceptions allowed by the Information Society Directive280 also granted broader protection 
than the specific fair dealing defences permitted by the Copyright Act. It was therefore 
necessary to expand the defences available to users of copyright works, and the exception 
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for parody and satire was the most pertinent exception to Australia’s cultural traditions and 
the desire for Australian copyright law to be transformative rather than suppressive.281  
The Copyright Amendment Bill Explanatory Memorandum makes it clear that the 
parody/satire exception is not meant to be purely for non-commercial uses, but can be 
employed by the commercial media or in “[an]other commercial setting”.282 The distinction 
between parody and satire is not clear and neither term is defined in the Copyright Act, 
although the two concepts share many characteristics, such as criticism, ridicule and 
comment in a humorous manner.283 American courts have held that satire uses an 
identifiable style to deliver broad commentary on an aspect of society, while parody 
focuses on a specific work or works.284 However, as the Copyright Act clearly caters for 
both parody and satire, it is trivial to fervently draw or uphold a distinction between the two 
terms.285  
The exception relating to parody and satire is contained in section 41A, which states: 
“A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the 
work if it is for the purpose of parody or satire.”286 
This provision concisely encapsulates the public’s interest in transformative critical uses of 
copyright works. The exception exempts a fair dealing from all the restricted acts granted 
to the copyright owner, not only the right of reproduction. Although no case law regarding 
this exception has been reported, the seminal American case of Campbell v Acuff Rose 
Music Inc287 provides some insight as to the nature of the defence (which was raised 
under the fair use defence, as there is no specific exception for parody/satire in American 
copyright law). The court made it clear that a parodic or satirical character must be 
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reasonably perceivable from the use of the work.288 When evaluating the parodying use, 
the court is to refrain from evaluating its quality or humour, or whether it was in good or 
bad taste.289  
The United States Supreme Court held that whether the purpose and character of the use 
is transformative is an important factor that must be considered.290 The court 
acknowledged that a substantial part of a work may have to be used in order for the 
parody to be recognised as relating to that particular work, although the extent of original 
contribution that the parody makes is very important.291 Accordingly, the degree to which 
the parody or satire changes or adds to the original work will be a paramount consideration 
in the assessment of fairness.292 However, the nature of the copyright work being parodied 
is unlikely to be of much assistance regarding the fairness evaluation (although only 
parodies of literary, artistic, dramatic and musical works are eligible for protection).293 The 
effect that the parody or satire has on the market for the original work is also unlikely to be 
great as a parody usually does not act as a substitute for the parodied work, although it is 
conceivable that a parody can usurp the potential market for the original.294 Nonetheless, 
an unfavourable review of a literary or musical work is also likely to influence the demand 
for the product, and a parody or satire should be seen in a similar light.295  
It is submitted that in accordance with the liberal interpretation courts give to all the other 
fair dealing defences, the same approach should be adopted in this case. Moreover, the 
inquiry into the fairness of the dealing should be distinct from whether the particular use 
qualifies as a fair dealing for the purpose of parody or satire. The subjective nature of 
humour should therefore play no role in determining whether the use falls into this 
category of exception, which is traditionally an objective analysis.296 When assessing the 
fairness of the dealing courts are likely to take the fair use factors into account, all of which 
are listed in section 40(2) under the exception of fair dealing for the purpose of research or 
study.297  
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This exception reflects Australia’s accommodation of users’ entitlements and progressive 
copyright regime in general. Although no case law has yet been reported involving this 
defence in Australia, the statutory exception has only existed since 2006 and will likely 
require judicial application in years to come. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
Australian copyright law has its genesis in the law of the United Kingdom, but since the 
promulgation of the Copyright Act 63 of 1968 it has started to surpass the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act of 1988 in respect of the fair dealing exceptions. The Copyright 
Act provides for the same exclusive rights for copyright owners as the CDPA, with the 
exception of the publication right substituting the distribution right. However, the rental and 
lending rights (which are deemed to make a work available to the public by the CDPA for 
purposes of fair dealing for criticism or review)298 apply to different subject-matter in the 
two statutes. The exclusive rights in the United Kingdom apply to literary, dramatic, 
musical and certain artistic works, as well as sound recordings and films,299 while the 
Australian provision covers literary, musical and dramatic works reproduced in sound 
recordings, as well as computer programs.300 The Australian Copyright Act does not 
extend the commercial rental right to films, and the CDPA does not extend this protection 
to computer programs, which are the only two categories of works mentioned in TRIPS.301 
Notwithstanding these differences, the content of the exclusive rights granted by the two 
pieces of legislation are largely similar.  
The fair dealing provisions regarding criticism and review are practically identical in the 
CDPA and the Copyright Act, except that in the Copyright Act there is no requirement that 
the work must have been made available to the public. The Australian provision is 
therefore more flexible, as the courts will not consider the fact that a work has not been 
made available to the public as an absolute bar against employing the defence, but rather 
as a factor when determining whether the use was fair. The research and study exception 
finds a more comprehensive embodiment in the Copyright Act than it does in the CDPA. 
Apart from the statutory guidelines found in section 40(2) of the Copyright Act, the Act 
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delineates situations where the reproduction of a copyright work will be deemed fair 
dealing. This approach is clearly to be preferred, as it provides clarity for users and avoids 
unnecessary judicial recourse. The exception for news reporting is again more lenient in 
the Australian statute, as it extends to the use of photographs. While the inclusion of 
photographs is questionable,302 the extension of the ambit of the provision to historical 
news as opposed to what is strictly relevant at the time seems sensible, as it allows for 
greater dissemination of information.  
Australia’s additional fair dealing exception for the purposes of parody and satire stems 
indirectly from American rather than the law of the United Kingdom.303 Parodying use can 
be seen as copying most of the main elements, but with significant original creative effort. 
This exception makes it permissible to use a copyright work in a substantial but 
transformative way to deliver comment on or ridicule the original work in a humorous way. 
Although the subjective humour involved in the parody or satire is not relevant, other 
subjective factors (such as the motive of the user) may be considered by courts in 
assessing the fairness of the use, as in cases where any of the other fair dealing defences 
are raised. The court will first ascertain whether the use falls within one of the statutory 
categories of fair dealing, and, if it finds in the affirmative, whether the use was fair. The 
fairness inquiry is primarily an objective one, with the definitive question being whether “a 
fair minded and honest person would have dealt with the copyright work in the manner in 
which the defendant did for the purpose in question”.304 The final evaluation therefore 
remains whether the overall impression is that the use made of the work was fair. 
This comparative analysis of the fair dealing provisions contained in the CDPA and 
Australian Copyright Act makes it possible to transpose the commentary to the South 
African provisions, where applicable. The next chapter uses this analysis as a comparative 
basis, using prominent judicial and academic insights to inform the correlative provisions in 
the Copyright Act 98 of 1978.   
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5 Fair Dealing in Terms of South African Copyright 
Law 
 
5 1 Introduction 
This chapter is set against the background of the preceding discussions of the theoretical 
justifications for the delimitation of copyright owners’ rights,1 the international framework of 
copyright law and limitations on copyright,2 and the legislative position and judicial 
development of copyright law in the United Kingdom and Australia.3 The origin and 
historical progression of the statutes governing copyright law has been sketched to draw 
attention to the common roots of all three jurisdictions examined in this thesis. This chapter 
contributes to this exposition by explaining how South African copyright law shares the 
statutory ancestry of the United Kingdom and Australia. The current source of protection in 
South Africa is analysed in this chapter – in the comparative setting provided in the 
previous chapters – to indicate which aspects are comparable and to what extent. The 
chapter then turns to the fair dealing exceptions in South African law and provides an 
exposition of the scope and content of the exceptions, relying on the comparative findings 
in chapter 4. The implicit notion of fairness is explained with reference to the factors 
discussed in that chapter. 
The Australian fair dealing exception for parody and satire provides a basis for considering 
the impact that such an exception would have in South African law, where the conspicuous 
absence of this exception leaves an imbalance between the interests of copyright owners 
and the public. This chapter advocates the promulgation of an exception for parody, 
showing how such a hypothetical exception would function in the South African copyright 
environment. This is done by consulting foreign legislation and case law, specifically from 
Australia and the United States of America. The Constitutional Court decision in Laugh It 
Off Promotions CC v SAB International4 is relied on to define the boundaries of the 
proposed exception in the South African setting. The chapter employs the methodology set 
out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
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Service5 to illustrate the impact of such an exception on the constitutional property rights of 
copyright owners. It concludes that the exception would amount to a deprivation of 
property, but one that is both justifiable in terms of the constitutional property clause and 
desirable in the South African copyright paradigm. 
 
5 2 South African Copyright Law 
5 2 1 Historical Background 
The first legislation to grant a form of copyright in South Africa was the British Literary 
Copyright Act of 1842,6 the successor of the Statute of Anne.7 In terms of this Act, works 
first published in the United Kingdom enjoyed protection in South Africa. This Act was 
given further application in South Africa by the British International Copyright Act of 1886, 
which extended the protection of British copyright legislation to works first published in 
British colonies.8 Modern South African copyright law has its origin in the United 
Kingdom’s Copyright Act of 1911.9 After the United Kingdom’s Copyright Act of 1956 
repealed the 1911 Act, South Africa’s Copyright Act 63 of 1965 similarly repealed the 1916 
Act insofar as it related to copyright.10 This Act did not directly incorporate the United 
Kingdom’s Copyright Act of 1956, although large parts of the United Kingdom’s Act were 
adopted.11 The 1965 Act remained in force until the promulgation of the Copyright Act 98 
of 1978 (hereafter the Copyright Act), which currently serves as the source of copyright 
law in South Africa.12 Although a form of common law copyright existed until the early 20th 
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century, the Copyright Act makes it clear that statute is now the exclusive source of 
copyright.13  
The Copyright Act ventured away from the United Kingdom’s Copyright Act of 1956 in 
numerous respects,14 but is still based on the economic and social justification theories 
discussed in chapter 2.15 The current statutes are comparable because South Africa 
shares its legislative roots of copyright law with Australia and the United Kingdom. All three 
jurisdictions are members of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the United 
Nations, and the World Trade Organisation, which means that their international 
obligations in respect of copyright are also largely the same.16 This chapter shows where 
South Africa has digressed from the standards of protection of, and exceptions to, 
copyright owners’ rights, how the different formulations of similar provisions affect their 
application, and the manner in which courts are likely to interpret these provisions in light 
of foreign case law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
 
5 2 2 Rights Subsisting in Copyright 
The South African Constitution compels courts to take international law into account when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.17 When interpreting legislation, every court must adopt any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that brings it in line with international law.18 This 
indicates that when interpreting the fair dealing provisions of the Copyright Act, the court 
must read them according to the international framework provided by the instruments to 
which South Africa is party. South Africa has been a signatory of the Berne Convention19 
since October 3, 1928, and has ratified the Brussels text20 concerning substantive 
provisions and the Paris text21 in relation to administrative provisions. The Copyright Act 
                                            
13
 S 41(4) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. See Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 
2012) 1-3 – 1-4. Common law copyright has been completely abolished since ss 142-143 of the Patents, 
Trademarks, Designs and Copyright Act 9 of 1916 took effect. 
14
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-4. 
15
 See section 3 of chapter 2. 
16
 South Africa is party to 8 WIPO treaties, while the United Kingdom and Australia are party to 17 and 16 
respectively.  
17
 S 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
18
 S 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Because the section specifically refers to 
“international law” this will include the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, which South Africa has signed but not yet ratified.  
19
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886). 
20
 331 UNTS 217 (1948). 
21
 1161 UNTS 3 (1971). 
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was drafted to allow South Africa to accede to the Paris text in respect of the substantive 
provisions, but no attempt has yet been made to formally accede.22 That being said, article 
9 of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),23 to 
which South Africa is party, requires all members to comply with the substantive provisions 
(articles 1-21) of the Paris Act. The legislative framework is in place in the form of the 
Copyright Act, which complies with the substantive provisions of the Paris Act,24 as South 
Africa incurs obligations under this text because of the incorporation by TRIPS. The two 
WIPO treaties of 1996 – the Copyright Treaty25 and the Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty26 – are not strictly binding on South Africa, as the treaties have been signed but not 
yet ratified by South Africa.27 South Africa is not party to either the Universal Copyright 
Convention28 or the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention),29 both of which are 
discussed in chapter 3.30 
Literary, musical and artistic works, cinematograph films, sound recordings, published 
editions, broadcasts, programme-carrying signals and computer programs are recognised 
as protected categories of works by the Copyright Act.31 These categories cover the same 
subject-matter as the CDPA and the Australian Copyright Act, albeit with a different 
approach.32 The exclusive rights, or restricted acts as they are more commonly known, of 
copyright owners contained in the Copyright Act also correspond largely with those 
                                            
22
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-166. 
23
 World Trade Organisation Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (15-4-1994) Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1C 1869 UNTS 299 (1994). This is also 
required by art 1(4) of the World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 65 
(1996), which South Africa has signed but not ratified. See the discussion of these instruments in sections 2 
2 and 2 3 of chapter 3 respectively. 
24
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-166. 
25
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 65 (1996). 
26
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 76 
(1996). 
27
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-170. See the discussions in sections 
2 3 and 3 3 of chapter 3. Even though the provisions of these treaties have not yet been incorporated into 
South African legislation, courts are required to interpret legislation in accordance with these treaties in terms 
of s 233 of the Constitution. 
28
 United Nations Universal Copyright Convention (6-9-1952) 216 UNTS 132 (1952). 
29
 World Intellectual Property Organisation International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (26-10-1961) 496 UNTS 43 (1961). 
30
 At sections 1 and 3 1 respectively. 
31
 S 2(1). 
32
 Dramatic works are included in the definition of literary works in the Copyright Act, while they are protected 
separately in both the CDPA and the Australian Copyright Act. Furthermore, no distinction is drawn between 
broadcasts and programme-carrying signals in either the CDPA or the Australian Copyright Act. Databases 
are also given separate protection by the CDPA, while the South African and Australian Copyright Acts both 
protect databases as a subset of literary works. Computer programs are protected as literary works by the 
CDPA, while the South African and Australian Copyright Acts treat computer programs as distinct from 
literary works and afford separate protection to these works. 
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granted by the Australian Copyright Act33 and, to a lesser degree, those granted by the 
CDPA.34 In general the right to do or authorise any of the following acts constitute the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner: reproduce the work, publish the work, perform the 
work in public, broadcast or cause the work to be transmitted in a diffusion service, letting 
a work by way of trade, make an adaptation of the work, or do any of the above acts in 
relation to an adaptation of a work. These acts are variously applicable to the separate 
categories of a work, each set of restricted acts specifically provided for in sections 6-
11B,35 which regulate the nature of copyright that vests in each type of work. Since the fair 
dealing provision explicitly states that “[c]opyright shall not be infringed”,36 it is 
unnecessary to delve into the content of each restricted act. The content of the exclusive 
rights in the Australian Copyright Act and the CDPA (discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis) 
can be applied to the South African equivalents to the extent that fair dealing is concerned, 
as the emphasis is on the infringing act (which was by implication not authorised) and not 
on the functioning of the restricted acts. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note some of the 
differences between the restricted acts in order to facilitate a complete illustration of how 
the respective fair dealing provisions considered in this thesis compare to one another. 
The commercial rental right introduced by article 11 of TRIPS37 is granted to 
cinematograph films,38 sound recordings39 and computer programs40 by the South African 
Copyright Act. In all three instances the relevant provision is phrased as the exclusive right 
to do or authorise the “letting, or offering or exposing for hire by way of trade, directly or 
indirectly, a copy [or reproduction] of the [work]”.41 The commercial rental right in the 
Copyright Act therefore surpasses the conditional mandate contained in article 11 of 
TRIPS by granting protection over both cinematograph films and computer programs and 
even provides protection to the owners of the copyright in sound recordings. In this regard 
the Copyright Act exceeds the standard of protection provided in both the CDPA and 
Australian Copyright Act. 
                                            
33
 Discussed in section 3 2 of chapter 4. 
34
 Discussed in section 2 2 of chapter 4. 
35
 S 6 regulates literary and musical works, s 7 artistic works, s 8 cinematograph films, s 9 sound recordings, 
s 10 broadcasts, s 11 programme-carrying signals, s 11A published editions, and s 11B computer programs.  
36
 S 12(1). 
37
 See section 2 2 of chapter 3. 
38
 S 8(1)(g), which was inserted by s 6 of the Copyright Amendment Act 52 of 1984, and substituted by s 8(b) 
of the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992. 
39
 S 9(b), amended by s 7 of the Copyright Amendment Act 52 of 1984 and s 2 of the Copyright Amendment 
Act 61 of 1989, and substituted by s 2 of the Copyright Amendment Act 9 of 2002. 
40
 S 11B(h), which was inserted by s 10 of the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992 and substituted by s 
53 of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997. 
41
 Ss 8(1)(g), 9(b), 11B(h). 
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Unlike the CDPA and Australian Copyright Act,42 the South African counterpart does not 
provide for the exemption of reproductions that are transient in nature and incidental to the 
legitimate use of a copyright work.43 Instead, the Act provides the exclusive right to 
reproduce “in any manner or form”,44 which covers reproductions in non-material form.45 
However, section 13 of the Copyright Act allows exceptions to the reproduction right 
additional to those contained in the Act, which are to be prescribed by regulation, provided 
that these exceptions do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and that they 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the copyright owner.46 The 
Minister of Economic Affairs published such regulations shortly after the promulgation of 
the Copyright Act.47 These regulations provide guidelines for reproductions in general and 
distribution of copies by libraries, archive depots, teachers and local authorities (relating to 
building plans).48 The regulations are supplementary to the fair dealing exceptions49 and 
will therefore only be relied on when an allegedly infringing act cannot be categorised as 
one of the acts allowed as fair dealing. Regulation 2 allows reproductions to be made 
(generally/by any person) and presumably for any purpose, provided that only one copy of 
a reasonable portion of the work is made, “having regard to the totality and meaning of the 
work”.50 This exception is further confined to instances where the cumulative effect of the 
reproductions made does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and “does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate legal interest and residuary rights of the 
author”.51 The construction of the regulation suggests that a court should consider similar 
factors to those relevant to the fair dealing provisions.52 It is submitted that a context-
sensitive analysis of the facts of each case must be employed, including whether the 
essence of the work was reproduced, the use of the work (including whether the use was 
commercial),53 and whether an acknowledgement of the author was made (this is evident 
from the consideration of the author’s residual rights). This provision serves as the basis 
                                            
42
 Discussed in sections 2 2 and 3 2 of chapter 4. 
43
 However, see n 106 below. 
44
 Ss 6(a), 7(a), 8(1)(a), 10(a), 11B(a). 
45
 See Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-68. The broad definition of 
“material form” in s 2(2) extends to digital data or signals, which indicates that this is intended to constitute 
an infringement. 
46
 As required by art 13 of TRIPS. 
47
 The Copyright Regulations of 1978, GN R2530 in GG 6252 of 1978-12-22. 
48
 Regs 2-9A. 
49
 S 13 of the Copyright Act states that any exceptions permitted by regulation are “[i]n addition to 
reproductions permitted in terms of this Act”. 
50
 Reg 2(a). 
51
 Reg 2(b). 
52
 See section 2 3 6. 
53
 This factor is a condition for the reliance on the exception for reproduction by a library or archive depot in 
terms of reg 3(a). 
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for some of the further exceptions created by the regulations54 and clearly operates in 
conjunction with the fair dealing exceptions. Regulations 7-9 (which provide guidelines for 
teachers’ use of reproductions for the purposes of their own research as well as the 
distribution of reproductions to students) serve as an illustration of this.  
 
5 2 3 Fair Dealing 
5 2 3 1 Introduction 
The fair dealing exceptions were introduced into South African law by the adoption of the 
United Kingdom’s Copyright Act of 1911.55 Section 2(1)(i) provided for exemption from 
infringement if a work was used for the purpose of research or private study, criticism or 
review, or newspaper summary.56 The 1911 Act conferred rights over original literary, 
musical, dramatic and artistic works57 and the fair dealing provision applied to all four 
categories of works.58 The South African Copyright Act 63 of 1965 similarly granted 
protection for these types of works,59 but the fair dealing exception did not extend to artistic 
works.60 This Act additionally allowed fair dealing for the purposes of personal or private 
use of a work.61 
The term “fair dealing” was initially absent from the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, but the 
legislator resurrected it by means of the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992.62 The fair 
dealing exceptions in the Copyright Act apply to literary (which includes dramatic) and 
musical works,63 artistic works,64 cinematographic films,65 sound recordings,66 
broadcasts,67 programme-carrying signals,68 published editions69 and computer 
                                            
54
 Reg 2 is expressly referred to by regs 3, 7, 8, 9A. 
55
 This Act was adopted by s 143 of the Patents, Trademarks, Designs and Copyright Act 9 of 1916. 
56
 These categories of fair dealing are reiterated in the CDPA, although the last category – for purposes of 
newspaper summary – has been broadened to reporting current events: see section 2 3 4 of chapter 4. 
57
 S 1(1). 
58
 S 2(1)(i) states that a fair dealing with “any work” shall not infringe copyright. 
59
 S 3. 
60
 S 7(1). 
61
 S 7(1)(a). 
62
 S 11. 
63
 S 12(1). 
64
 S 15(4). 
65
 S 16(1). 
66
 S 17. 
67
 S 18. 
68
 S 19(1). This section does not incorporate the s 12(1) fair dealing provision as the other sections do, but it 
makes provision for the exception for purposes of reporting current events which is substantively similar to s 
12(1)(c)(ii). See the discussion in section 2 3 4. 
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programs.70 The conduct permitted by the fair dealing provisions in the current Act include 
research and private study, personal or private use, criticism and review, and reporting 
current events. The Act does not define the concept of fair dealing, which is in keeping 
with the CDPA and the Australian Copyright Act. Because the concept of “fairness” is by 
no means clearly defined it allows courts to consider everything relevant to the copyright 
owner’s rights and the public interest, in the specific context of the facts of each case, 
before reaching a decision as to whether an infringement occurred. As was seen in the 
discussion of case law in chapter 4, the fair dealing standard is set as whether a “fair 
minded and honest person would have dealt with the copyright work in the manner in 
which the defendant did for the purpose in question”.71  
In 2000, the Department of Trade and Industry published a Draft Amendment Bill72 for 
comment which would have influenced the fair dealing provisions vastly. The Bill purported 
to substitute the concept of fair dealing with “fair practice”, as well as making the 
provisions applicable solely to natural persons.73 More importantly for present purposes, 
the Bill provided guidelines for the courts to consider if a defendant invoked any of the fair 
dealing (or fair practice, as the Bill would have it) defences.74 These guidelines were 
precisely the same as those relating to fair dealing for purposes of research and study 
present in the Australian Copyright Act.75 Although this would have been most welcome, 
the publication for comment was the last that was seen of this Bill and it appears as if it 
has been abandoned. 
No provision is made in the Copyright Act for the use of a copyright work for the purposes 
of parody or satire; nevertheless, the hypothetical operation of a parody exception will be 
considered in the South African context in light of Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB 
International,76 where the defence of parody (as a form of freedom of expression) was 
raised against a claim of trademark infringement.77 The Australian formulation of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
69
 S 19A. 
70
 S 19B(1). 
71
 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 para 44; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 38; Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 498. See section 2 or chapter 4. 
72
 GN 1805 in GG 21156 of 2000-05-10. 
73
 In terms of the proposed amendment of s 12. 
74
 In terms of the proposed subs 14. 
75
 S 40(2)(a)-(e). These guidelines are discussed in section 3 3 2 of chapter 4 and section 2 3 2 of this 
chapter. 
76
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC), hereafter Laugh It Off.   
77
 This case involved alleged trademark infringement by the appellant in the form of facetious T-shirts 
portraying a caricature of the respondent’s well-known trademark. 
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exception, discussed in chapter 4, provides a useful comparative basis for this analysis. 
South African courts have shown a proclivity for considering the legislation and judicial 
decisions of Australia78 and the United Kingdom79 when resolving copyright disputes. For 
this reason it is apposite to take account of the similar legislative provisions and judicial 
factors that are considered in these jurisdictions. Unlike in South Africa, the Australian and 
United Kingdom courts have had occasion to apply the fair dealing exceptions, and 
particularly useful for South Africa is the fact that these cases were heard before the 
substantial amendments of the fair dealing provisions in the CDPA and Australian 
Copyright Act, when they were similar to the current South African counterparts.80 It is 
submitted that South African courts should look to these foreign judgments for guidance 
when confronted with a fair dealing defence.81 
 
 
 
5 2 3 2 Research or Private Study, or Personal or Private Use 
The South African exception of fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study 
can be compared to the exception in both the CDPA and the Australian Copyright Act, but 
on different aspects. The exception relating to literary and musical works is contained in 
section 12(1)(a), and is extended to artistic works,82 broadcasts83 and published editions,84 
                                            
78
 See eg Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (4) SA 458 (SCA) 
472; Helm Textile Mills (Pty) Ltd v Isa Fabrics CC and Others 2005 BIP 349 (T) 357; Biotech Laboratories 
(Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc and Another 2002 (4) SA 249 (SCA) 264; Jacana Education (Pty) Ltd v 
Frandsen Publishers (Pty) Ltd 1998 (2) SA 965 (SCA) 990; Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A Roopanand Bros 
(Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 279 (AD) 317; Apple Computer v Rosy t/a SA Commodity Brokers (Pty) Ltd and 
Another (1984) 134 JOC (D) 136. 
79
 See eg Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (4) SA 458 (SCA) 
472, 474; Accesso CC v Allforms (pty) Ltd and Another 1998 BIP 296 (T) 307-308; Golden China TV Game 
Centre v Nintendo Co Ltd 1997 (1) SA 405 (A) 410-411; Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC and 
Others 1994 (2) SA 464 (W) 472. 
80
 HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 Ch; Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977; Hyde Park Residence v Yelland [2001] Ch 143; 
Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 CA 620, Banier v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd [1997] FSR 812; Time Warner Entertainments LP v Channel Four Television Corporation Plc [1994] 
EMLR 1; De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292; Haines v Copyright Agency Ltd (1982) 
42 ALR 549; Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 485; Hubbard and Another v Vosper 
and Another [1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA. 
81
 See the discussion of these cases in chapter 4 generally. 
82
 S 15(4). 
83
 S 18. 
84
 S 19A. 
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mutatis mutandis. The correlative provision in the CDPA does not apply to broadcasts or 
published editions and therefore has a more limited application. The Australian Copyright 
Act applies the exception to artistic, dramatic, musical and literary works and published 
editions85 as well as audio-visual items,86 which include sound recordings, 
cinematographic films and sound and television broadcasts.87 South Africa’s correlative 
fair dealing exception finds its scope between the exceptions of the other two jurisdictions.  
The fair dealing provision in section 12(1)(a) of the Copyright Act is couched in the 
following terms:  
“Copyright shall not be infringed by any fair dealing with a literary or musical work … for the 
purposes of research or private study by, or the personal or private use of, the person using 
the work.”88 
The terminology used is an amalgamation of the CDPA and the Australian Copyright Act. 
Although there is no requirement that the research must be non-commercial such as in the 
CDPA, the study must still be of a private nature. In this sense the analysis of the meaning 
of “private” in chapter 4 (as it exists in the CDPA) can be readily applied to the South 
African provision.89 The meaning given to this qualification equates to that of “non-
commercial” and the work may not be distributed; however, a contextual evaluation of the 
use for private study must be undertaken to determine whether the particular use can be 
exempted.90 It appears that research undertaken in terms of this provision can be of an 
entirely commercial nature without constituting an infringement.91 The Canadian case of 
CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada even indicates that this provision can 
exempt lawyers’ actions when their research is commercial and aimed at making a profit.92 
                                            
85
 S 40. 
86
 S 103C. 
87
 S 110A. 
88
 The term “fair dealing” was introduced by s 11 of the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992; before this 
amendment there was no recognition of fair dealing in the 1978 Act and the provision read: “Copyright shall 
not be infringed if a literary or musical work is used solely, and then only to the extent reasonably necessary 
[for the purposes of…]”. The fair dealing exception as it stands enjoys “a large measure of international 
recognition and its reintroduction [after its last appearance in the Copyright Act 63 of 1965] brings our law 
more into line with the international laws”: Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 11 2003) 
4-138 n 32B. 
89
 At section 2 3 2 of chapter 4. 
90
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 489. See 
further chapter 4 section 2 3 2. 
91
 Gibson JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and 
Company Law (8
th
 ed 2003) 724. 
92
 CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] SCC 13 para 84. 
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Section 12 does not require a user to make any form of acknowledgement of the source or 
author of the work that has been used. This is the position in Australian law as well.93 
Nonetheless, it is likely that courts will consider whether a sufficient acknowledgement has 
been made as part of the fairness inquiry. Whether it is reasonably necessary to 
acknowledge the author and source of the work will depend largely on the specific use of 
the work. If the research conducted is subsequently published – whether commercially or 
non-commercially – it is likely more necessary that an acknowledgement be made than if 
the work was used exclusively for the purposes of private study.  
The fair dealing exception relating to research and study in the Australian Copyright Act 
provides users and courts with guidelines as to what will be considered fair.94 If a South 
African court is presented with an alleged infringement being justifiable as a fair dealing, it 
is advisable that the court takes the factors laid out in the Australian fair dealing provisions 
into consideration. The relevant considerations will differ according to the similarity of the 
provisions compared, but in the case of research and private study a number of factors 
should be taken into account. Australian courts are instructed to consider at least five 
factors when determining whether an alleged infringement constitutes a fair dealing. The 
five mandatory considerations in section 40(2)(a)-(e) correlate to the fair use factors 
contained in American law, with one additional factor.95 When faced with a claim of fair 
dealing for the purpose of research or study, Australian courts must consider the purpose 
and character of the dealing,96 the nature of the work,97 the possibility of obtaining the 
work within a reasonable time at an ordinary commercial price,98 the effect of the dealing 
on the potential market of the work,99 and the amount and substantiality of the portion that 
has been used.100 These considerations frame the general evaluation of whether a user’s 
conduct amounts to fair dealing. It is submitted that South African courts should not stray 
too far from this evaluation, subject to one proviso: while in Australian law the dealing can 
be of a commercial nature, the South African Act explicitly states that the study undertaken 
must be of a private nature.101 For this reason the first factor considered under Australian 
                                            
93
 S 40 of the Australian Copyright Act. See the discussion in section 3 3 2 of chapter 4. 
94
 S 40. 
95
 See the discussion of the factors and fair dealing for the purpose of research or study generally in 3 3 2 of 
chapter 4. 
96
 S 40(2)(a). 
97
 S 40(2)(b). 
98
 S 40(2)(c). 
99
 S 40(2)(d). 
100
 S 40(2)(e). 
101
 S 12(1)(a). 
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law – the purpose and character of the dealing – will have a more limited scope in the 
South African context, as the dealing will either be for a commercial purpose or it will not. 
This is not to be the end of this inquiry, however, as courts must take any other factors into 
account regarding the nature and purpose of the dealing, although the most important one 
is likely to be whether it is for a commercial purpose. In the case of research, this 
qualification is absent and the evaluation should correspond to a larger extent with the 
Australian approach.  
The Australian Copyright Act further regulates individual academic uses by providing firm 
guidelines to afford a greater degree of certainty to individuals wishing to use copyright 
works in a manner compatible with fair practice. The Act makes it clear that reproducing a 
work (in its entirety) contained in a periodical publication is exempted from infringement.102 
This should be seen as an indication of the sort of activity that the fair dealing provision is 
intended to protect.  
The best illustration of extra-judicial certainty is section 40(5) of the Australian Copyright 
Act, which gives concrete criteria to be observed when employing the fair dealing for the 
purpose of research or study exception. According to this provision, if the portion of a work 
that is reproduced amounts to less than 10% of the total number of pages (or words, 
depending on whether the work is contained in a published edition or digital format) or a 
single chapter if the work is divided into chapters, it qualifies as a “reasonable portion” and 
is accordingly exempted. If the reproduction constitutes more than this reasonable portion, 
the traditional evaluation in terms of the remainder of the section must be undertaken by 
the judiciary. Although this provision will not automatically exempt a user under South 
African law, courts should be cognisant of this threshold when evaluating a fair dealing of 
this nature.  
The South African provision contains an interesting addition to the research or private 
study exception; the section provides that a personal or private use of a work can also 
constitute a fair dealing.103 This appears to be aimed at situations similar to those covered 
by the first part of the clause (research and private study), but for purposes unconnected 
with education or academia. Authors have pointed to the distinction between personal and 
private uses that the legislator presumably intended to draw with the use of the word “or” 
                                            
102
 S 40(3). 
103
 S 12(1)(a). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 117 
 
between the two adjectives, but the difference between the terms remains unclear.104 The 
fact that the source does not have to be mentioned is easily justified, as a reasonable 
interpretation of the provision will exclude any commercial uses of a work (including any 
publication of personal or private use), thereby negating the need for and utility of an 
acknowledgement. The exception is confined to instances where a reproduction of a 
reasonable portion of a work is made for the purposes of using it solely by the reproducer, 
and not where such reproductions are distributed to other persons (although these other 
persons would presumably be able to make a reproduction themselves).105  
If the use is of a personal or private nature, the purpose of the use is irrelevant to 
determining whether the conduct is permissible. The judicial analysis will therefore differ: 
the first step will determine whether the use is of a personal or private nature, instead of 
whether the use falls into one of the permitted categories, and the second step will 
determine the fairness of the conduct in the usual way. The purpose of the use could still 
be relevant to the second step of the judicial analysis where the fairness of the act is 
evaluated, but not the first step. Accordingly, it is submitted that the exception for personal 
or private use should be viewed as an open extension of the permitted uses, but is still 
subject to the same considerations that a court would consider for non-commercial 
research or private study.106 This is in line with the three-step test contained in the Berne 
Convention, which requires exceptions to be confined to special cases that do not conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the rights of the 
copyright owner.107 The South African provision therefore allows a broad variety of private 
uses. The Australian and United Kingdom’s correlative exceptions cover only the activities 
of research and study, while South African courts are not confined to allowing only uses of 
an academic nature.  
 
                                            
104
 Gibson JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and 
Company Law (8
th
 ed 2003) 724. 
105
 Gibson JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and 
Company Law (8
th
 ed 2003) 724; Copeling AJC Copyright and the Act of 1978 (1978) 42. 
106
 One important application of this exception is that it could feasibly be relied upon when reproductions are 
made by a computer’s RAM when accessing works in digital format and on the internet: see Ital EG 
Copyright Law and the Internet in Modern South African Law (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2000) 84-
85. This could be an indirect way of relying on a similar exception to the transient and incidental 
reproductions exception contained in s 28A of the CDPA and ss 38A-38B of the Australian Copyright Act, 
although if the reproduction is made while engaging in commercial activities it will still fall outside the sphere 
of application of this exception. 
107
 The Information Society Directive also makes provision for private uses, although the provisions are 
aimed at “private-copying”, which is a separate exception and therefore falls outside the ambit of fair dealing: 
see paras 38-39 of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
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5 2 3 3 Criticism or Review 
The fair dealing exception for the purposes of criticism or review is succinctly encapsulated 
in section 12(1)(b) as follows: 
“Copyright shall not be infringed by any fair dealing … for the purposes of criticism or review 
of that work or of another work.” 
The exception applies to a broader category of works than the exception relating to 
research or private study, or personal or private use. In addition to the types of works 
covered by that exception, cinematograph films,108 sound recordings109 and computer 
programs can be used for purposes of criticism or review.110 An important condition 
attached to the exemption of the conduct is that the use is accompanied by a reference 
to the source and, if applicable, the name of the author.111 This requirement does not 
present difficulty in interpretation, as it plainly states what is required for compliance 
and is even less troublesome than the “sufficient acknowledgement” requirement in the 
CDPA and Australian Copyright Act.112 
The exception corresponds with the Australian counterpart in all formal aspects, as well 
as the types of work to which it applies.113 The CDPA limits this exception to works that 
have been made available to the public,114 while neither the South African nor the 
Australian exception has this requirement. Accordingly, the South African provision 
should be interpreted in the same way as it has been interpreted by Australian courts115 
and by courts of the United Kingdom before the amendment that introduced the 
contingency.116 Notwithstanding, courts should consider whether the work was made 
available to the public when assessing the fairness of the dealing.117 The fact that it 
                                            
108
 S 16(1). 
109
 S 17. 
110
 S 19B. 
111
 S 12(1). 
112
 Discussed in sections 2 3 3 and 3 3 3 of chapter 4 respectively. 
113
 Ss 41, 103A of the Australian Copyright Act make the exception applicable to literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, and audio-visual items. 
114
 S 30(1) read with s 30(1A). 
115
 See eg De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292. 
116
 The amendment was brought about on the 31
st
 of October 2003 by s 30(1) of the Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations (SI 2003/2498). See the construction of the provision adopted by the courts prior to the 
amendment in Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another [1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA; Time Warner 
Entertainment Ltd v Channel 4 Television Corporation Plc [1994] EMLR 1; Banier v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 812; Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 149 CA. See generally section 2 3 
3 of chapter 4. 
117
 See Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 485. See also section 3 3 3 of chapter 4 
generally. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 119 
 
was not previously made available will, however, not be an absolute prohibition against 
a finding of fair dealing, although it will arguably be easier to justify such a case in 
terms of the exception for reporting current events.118  
The wording of the provision refers to criticism or review of “that or another work”, 
which phrasing is also present in the Australian Copyright Act and the CDPA. This 
indicates that not only can a different work be criticised or reviewed in conjunction with 
the copyright work in question, but the ideas and philosophies underlying a work can 
also be analysed and critiqued.119 In this sense the South African provision is identical 
to the Australian and UK counterparts. It is submitted that the terms “criticism” and 
“review” should be given a liberal interpretation, as has been the approach by courts in 
the United Kingdom.120 
There is no exception for the parody or satire of a work, and users may therefore want 
to rely on the fair dealing for purposes of criticism or review exception if faced with legal 
action. Although parody does not fall squarely within the boundaries of this exception, it 
is conceivable that various forms of parody may be accommodated under this 
exception, although this will not always be clear ex ante. As stated in chapter 4, one 
consideration that indicates that a parody will not be exempted under this exception is 
the fact that generally the author and source of the original work are not mentioned 
when a work is parodied.121 However, courts will be guarded against a simulated 
intention and the user will have to attempt genuine criticism or review of the work and 
not merely try to don this exception as an afterthought.122   
 
5 2 3 4 Reporting Current Events 
                                            
118
 See eg Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another [1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA, where the work was not put 
into general circulation prior to the defendant’s use of it. See also Robertson G & Nicol A Media Law (5
th
 ed 
2007) 373. 
119
 See Lahore J Copyright and Designs: Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40090 for the discussion of this phrase 
in the Australian legislation. In respect of the CDPA, see Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television 
[1999] EMLR 109 CA, where portions of a television programme were reproduced to criticise the style of 
journalism employed. See also Time Warner Entertainment Ltd v Channel 4 Television Corporation Plc 
[1994] EMLR 1, where parts of a cinematograph film were reproduced to criticise the decision to withdraw 
the film A Clockwork Orange from the cinema circuit in the UK. See also the discussion of Fraser-Woodward 
Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch) in section 2 3 3 of chapter 4. 
120
 See eg Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch) 
paras 36-37; Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 CA 620. 
121
 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 336-337. 
122
 See the discussion of a parody defence in the South African context in section 3 below. 
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The fair dealing exception for purposes of reporting current events applies to the same 
categories of works as the exception for criticism or review.123 The exception allows the 
use of a copyright work if it is for the purpose of reporting current events in two situations: 
where the work is used in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical,124 and where the 
work is used in a broadcast or cinematographic film.125 An acknowledgement of the author 
and source required only in the first instance. In this regard the South African exception is 
again more similar to the Australian equivalent than the United Kingdom’s. The Australian 
Copyright Act makes it clear that the use of a copyright work in a newspaper, magazine or 
similar periodical must be accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgment, while this is not 
the case if the work is used in a “communication or … cinematograph film”.126 The CDPA 
does not limit the way in which news can be reported, only requiring that a sufficient 
acknowledgement be made whenever a work is used for this purpose.127 However, if the 
work is used in a sound recording, broadcast or film, an acknowledgement need not be 
made if it would be “impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise”.128 The fine 
distinction of practicality mandates journalists to disclose the source of the material used in 
the United Kingdom, while in South Africa and Australia they will be exempted if the use is 
otherwise fair. Furthermore, in the United Kingdom a photograph is excluded from the 
ambit of fair dealing,129 while in South Africa and Australia users are permitted to make 
use of photographs.  
The provision in the Copyright Act relates to “current events”, which is the same 
terminology used in the CDPA; the Australian Copyright Act employs the term “news”. 
Although the terms appear to be synonymous, a distinction has been drawn by the Civil 
Division of the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom.130 According to the court, the term 
“current events” does not extend as far as “news” as used in the Australian statute and 
only relates to matters that occupy the public’s current interest.131 This means that 
copyright works which were relevant any number of years ago but no longer qualify as 
                                            
123
 Namely literary, musical and artistic works, broadcasts, published editions, sound recordings, 
cinematograph films and computer programs. 
124
 S 12(1)(c)(i). 
125
 S 12(1)(c)(ii). 
126
 S 42(1)(a)-(b). 
127
 S 30(2). 
128
 S 30(3). 
129
 S 30(2). 
130
 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977. 
131
 See Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 paras 41-43 where 
the court endorsed the distinction drawn by the court a quo, reported as Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v 
Marks and Spencer Plc [1999] RPC 539 at 546. See also Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others 
[2001] Ch 143 paras 28-32; Robertson G & Nicol A Media Law (5
th
 ed 2007) 372-374. 
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“current events” will be excluded from the protection of this fair dealing provision. It is 
submitted that this construction is incompatible with the liberal interpretation that the courts 
have committed themselves to in numerous cases, and in effect amounts to a distinction 
without a difference.132 A liberal interpretation of “current events” could feasibly render the 
term synonymous with “news”, making the distinction arbitrary. South African courts will 
therefore not go amiss by relying on Australian jurisprudence in this regard.   
No distinction is drawn between works that have been made available to the public and 
those that have not. It appears that works that have not been disclosed may be 
reproduced for the purpose of reporting current events, although the fact that they have 
not been disclosed, as well as the motives of the user, will likely be considered during the 
fairness enquiry.133 This is a sensible approach, as the role of the media often requires 
disclosing information that is not publicly known. If the work was used appropriately to 
convey information to the public, the use will qualify as fair. The South African exception is 
therefore neither as confined as the United Kingdom’s exception, nor as extensive as 
Australia’s in this regard. 
A provision relating to this fair dealing exception is the exception made for programme-
carrying signals.134 Excerpts of a programme-carrying signal that consist of a report of 
current events (which in turn presumably complies with the fair dealing exception) may be 
distributed without the consent of the copyright owner to the extent that the distribution is 
compatible with fair practice and is justified by the informative purpose of the report 
itself.135 The clause is subject to the proviso that no sporting events may be distributed in 
this manner.136 This provision will not influence whether the use of a work is fair or 
otherwise; it merely allows portions of a report of current events to be distributed on the 
basis of its informative purpose.  
 
5 2 3 5 Quotation and Illustration 
                                            
132
 Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 149 CA para 64; Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and 
Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 paras 40, 75; Pro Sieben AG v Carlton Television Ltd [1999] EMLR 109 CA 
at 614G. 
133
 See Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 75; Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 para 40. See also generally Ashdown v Telegraph 
Group [2002] Ch 149 CA. 
134
 S 19. 
135
 S 19(1). 
136
 S 19(2). 
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The Copyright Act contains an analogous exception to fair dealing allowing the quotation 
of works for various purposes. This exception applies to literary and musical works,137 
cinematograph films,138 sound recordings,139 broadcasts,140 and computer programs.141 
This provision is not generally considered a fair dealing exception, but it has a similar 
construction and effect in the South African Copyright Act. A copyright work that has been 
lawfully made available to the public can be quoted as extensively as the purpose allows, 
provided that a sufficient acknowledgement is made and the quotation is compatible with 
fair practice.142 The purpose of the quotation is clearly of paramount importance, as the 
justification of using the work will depend on the purpose of the use. Unlike the other fair 
dealing provisions, no specific purpose is prescribed and the exception can exempt a 
wider range of activities than the comparatively narrow preceding provisions. The 
construction of this provision is flexible enough to conceivably accommodate commercial 
uses and quotations for purposes traditionally unaffiliated with fair dealing, if the ends 
justify the means. It follows that the first step of the fair dealing evaluation will differ. The 
socially beneficial purpose for which a work is used will serve as the justifying basis, 
allowing copyright owners to object to uses of their works that do not merit exemption.143 
The court will not be confined to ascertaining whether the purpose of the use is formally 
permitted; instead, the court should determine whether the purpose of the use is justifiable, 
and if so whether it is justified by the extent of the use. This flexible construction will 
enable legitimate uses for a wide array of purposes without being detrimental to copyright 
owners’ interests.  
A similar exception exists allowing the use of copyright works by way of illustration for 
teaching purposes.144 This provision contains the same conditions as the preceding one, 
requiring that the use is justified by the purpose, complies with fair practice, and makes a 
sufficient acknowledgment of the author and source of the work. The work may be used in 
                                            
137
 S 12(3). The term “copyright … shall not be infringed” indicates that a legitimate use will be exempted 
from infringing any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 
138
 S 16(1). 
139
 S 17. 
140
 S 18. 
141
 S 19B(1).  
142
 S 12(3). 
143
 An attorney could arguably rely on this exception to use protected works draft an opinion for a client, even 
though a commercial element is evident. The purpose of using the work is itself not commercial and only 
aids in properly performing the legitimate task of providing legal services. 
144
 S 12(4). This exception is applicable to literary and musical works, artistic works (s 15(4)), cinematograph 
films (s 16(1)), sound recordings (s 17), broadcasts (s 18), published editions (s 19A) and computer 
programs (s 19B(1)). 
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a publication, broadcast, or sound or visual record for teaching purposes.145 The purpose 
of the use will again be consulted to determine whether the manner in which the work was 
used is consistent with fair practice. The term “by way of illustration” should be construed 
as meaning “by way of example, for the purpose of clarification”.146 This construction 
means that a work cannot be used as the primary method of teaching, only as an 
illustrative example to aid in the process of teaching.147 Accordingly, this exception cannot 
be relied on to reproduce or distribute entire works, as this would not constitute fair 
practice. Works can be used for illustrative purposes, but not as the primary medium of 
instruction.  
The CDPA provides a similar exception for users of literary, musical, dramatic and artistic 
works that have been made available to the public, provided the users are either giving or 
receiving instruction, a sufficient acknowledgement is made, a reprographic process is not 
employed and the use amounts to a fair dealing.148 This provision is clearly aimed at 
extending the fair dealing provisions of the Act, and enables both teachers and students to 
use copyright works for educational purposes without fear of infringement. This section is 
supplemented by section 32(1) of the CDPA, which replaces the requirement that the use 
amounts to fair dealing with the requirement that the use is non-commercial, while not 
explicitly requiring that the work was made available to the public. The Australian 
Copyright Act contains a similar exempting provision, without the requirement of a 
sufficient acknowledgement or fair practice.149   
These two provisions directly incorporate all of the constitutive elements of article 10(1)-(3) 
of the Berne Convention, which endorses this exception.150 Whether a sufficient 
acknowledgment has been made will in most cases be easily verifiable, while this is not 
the case with the condition that the conduct complies with fair practice.151 Dean contends 
                                            
145
 The term “publication” is problematic, as the definition provided in s 1 is unhelpful in this context: Gibson 
JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and Company Law (8
th
 
ed 2003) 726-727. It is submitted that the term is used to connote writing or drawing on a suitable medium 
that can be reproduced and distributed for the purposes of teaching. 
146
 Copeling AJC Copyright and the Act of 1978 (1978) 43; Gibson JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & 
van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and Company Law (8
th
 ed 2003) 726. 
147
 Gibson JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and 
Company Law (8
th
 ed 2003) 726. 
148
 S 32(2A) of the CDPA. 
149
 S 200(1)(a). 
150
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886). See the discussion of this provision in chapter 3 section 2 1. 
151
 S 32(3A) of the CDPA provides that an acknowledgement can be dispensed with when it would be 
impractical to make such an acknowledgement. The South African Copyright Act does not make this 
allowance.  
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that “fair practice” is synonymous with “fair dealing” and that the same considerations are 
relevant to determining whether the conduct is lawful.152 This view is sensible and can only 
be correct, and the discussion of the fairness inquiry involved in the determination of 
whether specific conduct qualifies as fair dealing can be equally useful to this provision. 
 
5 2 3 6 The Fairness Inquiry 
South African courts have not had the opportunity to consider the interpretation or 
application of any of the above fair dealing exceptions and have not considered the 
question of the fairness of a user’s conduct. For this reason the judicial analysis of the 
elements of the provisions in the CDPA and Australian Copyright Act should be consulted 
when such a case presents itself. Likewise, it is submitted that South African courts should 
take heed of the manner in which the concept of fairness is applied in these foreign 
jurisdictions, given the similarity of the respective statutes. The factors comprising fairness 
as determined by the courts in Australia and the United Kingdom therefore bear 
reiterating.153 
The fair dealing test is divided into two steps: does the conduct fall into one of the 
exempted categories and was the use of the work fair? The first question is easily dealt 
with by determining whether the allegedly infringing conduct can properly be classified as 
one of the statutorily exempted activities (which activities comprise an exhaustive list).154 If 
the actions of the defendant fall into one of these categories, the courts look at the fairness 
of the dealing.  
The general fairness inquiry is based on the objective standard of whether a “fair minded 
and honest person would have dealt with the copyright work in the manner in which the 
defendant did for the purpose in question”.155 A number of factors have been employed by 
courts to assist with this evaluation. An important, but by no means dispositive, factor is 
the extent to which the use of the copyright work competes with the copyright owner’s 
exploitation of the work.156 This amounts to a practical application of the third step of the 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-95. 
153
 For the full discussion of these factors see chapter 4 generally. 
154
 There is no general defence of fairness as found in, for example, the American defence of fair use. 
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 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 para 44; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 38; Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 498. 
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 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
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 ed 2005) 498. 
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article 9(2) test of the Berne Convention.157 Another important factor that has surfaced is 
the amount of the work that has been used, and the extent of the use.158 In cases where 
the work was not previously made available to the public, courts have considered whether 
the work was obtained by the user in breach of confidence.159 Other relevant factors 
include the motives of the user (including the actual purpose of the use and whether the 
averred attempt at fair dealing is merely a simulation) and whether the reproduction of the 
work unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the copyright owner (which is also 
in accordance with article 9(2) of the Berne Convention).160 The factors will be of varying 
importance, depending on which instance of fair dealing is relevant and the facts of the 
particular case.  
5 3 Parody 
5 3 1 Fair Dealing for the Purposes of Parody 
As discussed in chapter 4, the Australian Copyright Act provides for fair dealing for the 
purposes of parody or satire.161 The South African Copyright Act, like the CDPA, does not 
contain a fair dealing (or any other type of) exception allowing the use of a copyright work 
for the purposes of parody or satire. If a parodist wants to rely on an exception in the 
Copyright Act, he will have to bring his defence in line with one of the statutorily 
recognised grounds of fair dealing, the most likely choice being fair dealing for the 
purposes of criticism or review.162 Parody will not easily slot into the structure of this 
provision, but it is conceivable that a parody that delivers genuine commentary in an 
appropriate manner will be protected.163 This section examines the need for and 
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 Art 9(2) of the World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
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 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 40; Ashdown v Telegraph Group 
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 S 41A. See section 3 3 5 of chapter 4. 
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 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 336. 
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 Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-148 – 42-149. As a matter of practice a parodist 
does not make an acknowledgement of the author of the work, as a parody relies on the work being 
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hypothetical functioning of an exception for parody in South African copyright law; related 
notions such as “satire” and “pastiche” will not be considered, although it is advisable that 
at least one of these terms is included if legislative intervention of this nature is 
undertaken. Although the general defence of freedom of expression is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, it will be considered specifically in the context of parody and assessed as a 
justification for the promulgation of such an exception.164 
It is trite that the exception of fair dealing for the purposes of parody or satire (as contained 
in the Australian Copyright Act) is founded on the right to freedom of expression. The 
parody exception will therefore not be out of place in South African law, as the fair dealing 
exception for criticism or review is likewise based on this consideration.165 It is accepted 
that the public interest (manifest in freedom of expression) can curtail the application of 
copyright law and intellectual property rights generally.166 Accordingly, it is argued that the 
right to freedom of expression, entrenched in section 16 of the Constitution, should allow a 
greater use of copyright works for the purposes of parody, satire or pastiche than of 
trademarks for the same purposes. 
Copyright entails the protection of the expression of ideas and opinions, while parody is 
likewise the expression of an idea or opinion, even if it uses a copyright work as a basis for 
its expression. It is submitted that the fair dealing provisions relating to criticism or review, 
and parody or satire, have a greater vested interest in the right to freedom of expression 
and the dissemination of ideas and opinions than is the case with a parody of a corporate 
logo. This is because copyright law is aimed at promoting (rather than suppressing) the 
creative expression of ideas and opinions.167 The same underlying considerations should 
therefore apply to a parody as to the protection of copyright, while the justifications 
                                                                                                                                                 
identifiable for its effectiveness, which will disqualify it from the criticism/review provision. See Visser C “The 
location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 Comparative 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 336. However, as Visser contends here, it is 
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satisfy the requirement of a sufficient acknowledgement, as the purpose of the requirement has been met. 
164
 The discussion of parody and satire is confined to the author’s economic rights and does not consider the 
effect on moral rights, as explained in the introductory chapter.  
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 Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-145 – 42-149. Lahore J Copyright and Designs: 
Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40091-40092. 
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 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 44; Prinsloo v RCP Media Ltd 
t/a Rapport 2003 (4) SA 456 (T) 465-466; Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 
1-120; Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
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nd
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Property (2011) 192-194. See the discussion in chapter 2 sections 2 and 3. 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-1 – 1-2; Lahore J Copyright and 
Designs: Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40091-40092.  
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underlying the allowance of criticism and review equally and additionally apply to a 
parodying use of a work. The uninhibited criticism or parody of publicly expressed views 
and ideas arguably has a greater social justification than the parody of a mark used to 
distinguish products from one another. Although the latter undeniably serves an 
indispensable function in an open and democratic society, it is contended that the former 
type of free speech should exceed the sphere of application and scope of permissibility 
allowed in relation to a trademark. 
A user who employs parody as a means to express himself will have no defence according 
to the Copyright Act and, in terms of the principle of subsidiarity, will be precluded from 
relying on the general defence of freedom of expression in terms of section 16(1)(b)-(c).168 
This indicates a need for legislative intervention to give proper expression to section 16 of 
the Constitution in South African copyright law.169 If an exception for parody is statutorily 
introduced with comprehensive guidelines, a user’s right to freely express himself will find 
legislative embodiment and would not invariably be a constitutional matter. Section 16 
could then be used in a more limited but equally effective way by informing the 
interpretation of the statutory provision. An explicit statutory exception for parody would 
therefore facilitate a greater circulation of ideas and prevent unnecessary self-censorship 
for fear of “being engaged in a ruinous lawsuit”,170 which is implicit in legal uncertainty. 
The Australian exception for parody and satire was introduced as a result of the increased 
standards of protection brought about by the Free Trade Agreement concluded with the 
United States (AUSFTA).171 This agreement compelled Australia to increase the standards 
of protection granted to copyright owners, which left concerns regarding the imbalance of 
the interests of copyright owners and users.172 Accordingly, the additional protection was 
accompanied by the additional exception. However, it is submitted that the South African 
position indicates that the legislature would be justified in adopting a similar exception. 
South Africa has a stronger basis for the right to freedom of expression than Australia 
                                            
168
 However, see Rapid Phase Entertainment CC and Others v SABC [1997] JOL 393 (W) where the court 
considered parody as a defence to copyright infringement. 
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 See generally Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative 
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does.173 Australia’s Constitution174 does not explicitly make provision for this right, while 
the South African Constitution does. Section 16 of the Constitution expressly grants the 
right to freely receive or impart information and ideas, as well as the right to freedom of 
artistic creativity, both of which have obvious bearing on the parodying use of a work. If the 
exception is drafted properly (see, for example, the Australian provision175 or the 
framework in the Information Society Directive176) it will conform to the standards of article 
13 of TRIPS.177  
Apart from bringing South African law in line with international standards, an exception for 
parody could stimulate a culture of creativity and user-generated content. The obstacles of 
obtaining permission (which in itself could present an insurmountable hurdle in the case of 
parody) and high transaction costs will be eliminated, which will encourage users to 
become creators of copyright content. In the current digital age, consumers are able to 
produce works on inexpensive computers and distribute them across the globe instantly, 
whereas a few decades ago this was only possible with considerable investment and 
specialised facilities. However, the chilling effect of legal threats often stifles creativity and 
aggravates market failure.178 Moreover, there is no evidence that a parody will cause 
detriment to the economic value of the work that is being parodied.179 While it is possible 
that this may occur with certain works, it is also possible that a parody will be beneficial to 
the original work by increasing publicity and awareness of the original.180 This effect is 
evident where a parody of a song revives interest in the original and stimulates sales.181 
                                            
173
 See generally the discussion of the relation of South Africa’s position to those of America and the United 
Kingdom in Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-145 – 42-149. 
174
 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. 
175
 S 42A reads: “A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the work if it is for 
the purpose of parody or satire.”  
176
 “Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights [of reproduction and public 
communication…] for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche”: art 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29/EC.  
177
 See section 2 2 of chapter 3. 
178
 Anonymous “Parody, pastiche & caricature: Enabling social and commercial innovation in UK copyright 
law” (2011) Consumer Focus 1-4 at 4 <available at http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/files/ 
2011/07/Consumer-Focus-Parody-briefing.pdf> (accessed 10-07-2012). 
179
 Rogers M, Tomalin J & Corrigan R “The Economic Impact of Consumer Copyright Exceptions: A 
Literature Review” (2010) 11 Consumer Focus 1-40 at 7, 32; Consumer Focus Consumer Focus Response 
to the Consultation on Proposals to Change the UK’s Copyright System (2012) 18 <available at 
http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/files/2010/10/Consumer-Focus-response-to-the-consultation-on-proposals-
to-change-the-UK-copyright-system.pdf> (accessed 15-07-2012). 
180
 Rogers M, Tomalin J & Corrigan R “The Economic Impact of Consumer Copyright Exceptions: A 
Literature Review” (2010) 11 Consumer Focus 1-40 at 17. 
181
 This happened when a 2002 parody of the 1971 song Is This The Way To Amarillo? led to the original 
song being reissued due to public demand, which subsequently became the highest selling single of 2005 in 
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Furthermore, the most recent review of the United Kingdom’s copyright law conservatively 
estimates that introducing an exception for parody will result in an annual cost saving of £1 
million in the United Kingdom, and a possible additional economic growth of between 
£130-650 million per annum.182 This same review concludes that an exception for parody 
“should not have an effect on the incentive to produce new works”.183 The United Kingdom 
has indicated that it will publish proposals for the inclusion of an exception for parody by 
the end of 2012.184 The benefits of promulgating an exception for parody in the South 
African context therefore require prompt legislative intervention to foster a culture of social 
and commercial innovation.  
The Australian Copyright Act allows the parody and satire of artistic, literary, musical and 
dramatic works, or an adaptation of such a work.185 The Act also provides for the parody of 
audio-visual items in section 103AA. It seems sensible to extend the subject-matter to 
these items so that the exception is not unduly confined to, for example, musical works 
while not finding application to the sound recording of the musical work.  
An exception for parody should be construed both narrowly and liberally: narrowly in the 
sense that its field of application should not overlap with the exception for criticism or 
review,186 and liberally in terms of the forms of parody that it should exempt.187 Once the 
scope of the exception has been distinguished from that of criticism or review, courts 
should be willing to accommodate various forms of parodic expression under the 
exception. Statutory exceptions often include variations and extensions of the term 
“parody”, such as “satire”,188 “caricature” and “pastiche”.189 The more accommodating a 
definition is of forms of expression related to parody, the more embodiment the right to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the UK: Rogers M, Tomalin J & Corrigan R “The Economic Impact of Consumer Copyright Exceptions: A 
Literature Review” (2010) 11 Consumer Focus 1-40 at 17. 
182
 Hargreaves I Supporting Document EE: Economic Impact of Recommendations (2011) 29 <available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-doc-ee.pdf> (accessed 23-06-2012). 
183
 Hargreaves I Supporting Document EE: Economic Impact of Recommendations (2011) 29 <available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-doc-ee.pdf> (accessed 23-06-2012). 
184
 HM Government The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and 
Growth (2011) 16 <available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf> (accessed 27-06-2012). 
185
 S 41A. 
186
 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 343. 
187
 This is consistent with the liberal interpretation of the terms “criticism” and “review” adopted by courts in 
the United Kingdom: see Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another [2005] 
EWHC 472 (Ch) paras 36-37; Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 CA 620. 
188
 For example in Australian law: see s 41A of the Australian Copyright Act. 
189
 “Caricature” and “pastiche” are given equal footing to “parody” in, among others, France: see s 122-5.4 no 
4
0
 of the Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle Loi n
o
 92-597 du 1 juillet 1992. Official WIPO English translation 
<available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180336> (accessed 28-7-2012). See also art 
5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC. 
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freedom of expression is afforded, and artistic and social value consequently promoted.190 
It is submitted that the semantics of an exception should not prevent courts from giving 
proper expression to the section 16 right.191 This is in line with the dictum of the 
Constitutional Court in the Laugh It Off case, where the categorisation of the use was 
deemed irrelevant once the expression was found to be constitutionally protected.192 To 
restrict the use of a work because it does not fall within the precise linguistic parameters of 
the term employed would cheapen the guarantee of freedom of expression granted by the 
Constitution. 
A parody will necessarily constitute an adaptation of a work. The definition of an 
adaptation varies according to the type of work in question, but the essential feature is the 
reproduction of a substantial and recognisable part of the original work while 
demonstrating a transformative character.193 Parody is similarly defined as the 
“transformative use of a well-known work for purposes of satirising, ridiculing, critiquing or 
commenting on the original work”.194 It follows that for an exception for the purpose of 
parody to have any meaning, it should exempt the parodying use from infringing the 
restricted act of making an adaptation.195 This problem will be avoided by the phrase 
“copyright shall not be infringed”, as used in section 12(1) for the existing fair dealing 
exceptions.  
Another problem arises where an adaptation of a work intends to deliver commentary on 
the work, but in a way that is not necessarily humorous. Although courts have consistently 
held that the subjective nature of humour precludes it from being a determinative factor,196 
it is accepted that to rely on parody as a defence an attempt must be made to render the 
adaptation humorous.197  
                                            
190
 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 326. 
191
 Once the right has found statutory embodiment in the Copyright Act, s 16 should be consulted to inform 
the interpretation of the provision in line with the values entrenched in the Constitution. 
192
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 66. 
193
 See s 1 of the Copyright Act for the full definition.  
194
 Garner BA Black’s Law Dictionary (8
th
 ed 2004) s v “parody”. 
195
 See Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” 
(2005) 38 Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 323 where he discusses this 
approach as adopted in Spanish law. 
196
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 55; Campbell aka Skyywalker 
et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 US 569 (1994) 582. 
197
 Campbell aka Skyywalker et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 US 569 (1994) 582, where the court stated 
that a parodic character must be perceivable. 
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The liberal interpretation afforded to fair dealing exceptions in the United Kingdom and 
Australia should apply equally to a fair dealing exception for parody; accordingly, a parody 
of the ideas and philosophies underlying the original work should be allowed.198 However, 
it is submitted that a parody of an unpublished work should not be permitted.199 A parody 
relies greatly on the work being identifiable for it to be effective.200 It follows that a parody 
of a work that has not been made available to the public can be neither effective nor fair. 
However, once a work has been published in any form, the author should reconcile herself 
with the possibility of a user parodying the work in the same sense as she would with 
criticism or review.  
The fairness element of any fair dealing defence inherently involves a measure of 
uncertainty, as its determination is contingent on the factors that the court considers 
relevant. Alas, no case law concerning the use of a copyright work for the purposes of 
parody has yet been reported in Australia, as the fair dealing exception was only 
introduced in 2006.201 For this reason it is prudent to analyse the factors consulted by the 
Constitutional Court in Laugh It Off (bearing in mind that the claim was one of trademark 
infringement), as well as the prominent American cases involving fair use that the court 
referred to.202 
In a judgment concurring with Moseneke J (who wrote for the majority), Sachs J pointed 
out that “[i]f a parody does not prickle it does not work”,203 referring to the inherently 
paradoxical nature of a parody. A parody will necessarily have a simultaneously original 
and derivative character, making substantial use of a known work while transforming it in a 
                                            
198
 See Lahore J Copyright and Designs: Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40090; Pro Sieben Media AG v 
Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 CA; Time Warner Entertainment Ltd v Channel 4 Television 
Corporation Plc [1994] EMLR 1; Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another 
[2005] EWHC 472 (Ch). See also section 2 3 3 of chapter 4. 
199
 This has been held to be an important factor in the fairness analysis in the United Kingdom: HRH The 
Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 Ch; Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] 
Ch 149 CA; Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143; Hubbard v Vosper[1971] 1 All 
ER 1023 CA. 
200
 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 337. 
201
 The exception was introduced by the Copyright Amendment Act 158 of 2006. The possibility of a parody 
falling within the scope of the fair dealing exception for criticism or review was acknowledged in the UK 
cases Williamson Music Ltd and Others v Pearson Partnership Ltd and Another [1987] FSR 97 and Joy 
Music Ltd v Sunday Pictorial Ltd [1960] 1 All ER 703 (QB), although the exception finds no statutory 
embodiment. Cf Schweppes Ltd and Others v Wellingtons Ltd [1984] FSR 210. 
202
 Although the case involved alleged trademark infringement, the ratio decidendi can still be helpful in the 
context of copyright as an indication of where the boundaries of freedom of expression in the form of parody 
lie with regard to intellectual property rights. Courts in the UK have also referred to American case law when 
dealing with parody: Williamson Music Ltd and Others v Pearson Partnership Ltd and Another [1987] FSR 97 
at 103-104. 
203
 Para 75. 
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humorous way.204 The larger the original contribution, the more of the original work the 
parody is allowed to use. The nature of the protected work will also be relevant for this 
purpose.205 Depending on the nature of the original work, using a larger or smaller amount 
may be judged as fair; using a larger portion of an artistic work will be necessary for it to 
be recognisable and the parody therefore effective, than, for example, with a literary 
work.206 In respect of the nature of the use, the court paid particular attention to whether 
the parody was primarily communicative or primarily commercial.207 The purpose and 
character of the use is of great importance in the sense that a parodist cannot simply use a 
work without contributing something original and thereby transforming the original into an 
adaptation, as opposed to a mere reproduction.208 Sachs J was quick to point out in the 
Laugh It Off case that the fact that a parody has some commercial element does not 
render it outside the boundaries of protection and is by no means determinative.209 
Although a commercial aspect of a parody will not preclude it from exemption, it is clear 
that the primary aim of the parody must be communicative.210 Furthermore, courts should 
be wary that the alleged parody is “not a commercial activity masquerading as a free 
speech one”.211 The Australian Copyright Amendment Explanatory Memorandum explicitly 
states that the exception for parody is not intended to exempt only non-commercial 
uses.212 The exception is aimed at allowing parody and satire by the commercial media as 
well, which relegates this factor to an inferior rank of importance.213  
                                            
204
 Para 76. 
205
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 37. See also Visser C “The 
location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 Comparative 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 328 and the discussion of this fair use factor.  
206
 See Hustler Magazine Inc v Moral Majority Inc 796 F 2d 1148 (9
th
 Cir 1986) 1154; Kelderman RS “You 
cannot hide behind religion in copyright law: The Ninth Circuit correctly rejected a religious extension to the 
fair use defense in Worldwide Church of God v Philadelphia Church of God Inc” (2002) 35 Creighton Law 
Review 1107-1150 at 1126, 1136. 
207
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) paras 62, 85. 
208
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) paras 14, 25, 77. This factor was 
borrowed from the fair use analysis in American law, specifically from the case Campbell aka Skyywalker et 
al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 US 569 (1994). See also Visser C “The location of the parody defence in 
copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 Comparative International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 321-343 at 326-327; Pistorius T “Trade-mark tarnishment: Should we ‘Laugh It Off’ all the 
way to ‘Telkomsucks’ and ‘Hellcom’?” (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal 727-740 at 739. 
209
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 84. Sachs J illustrated this 
with a quote from Samuel Johnson, saying that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money”. 
See also City of Cape Town v Ad Outpost (Pty) Ltd 2000 (2) SA 733 (C), where the court held that 
commercial speech is no less worthy of constitutional protection than other forms of speech. 
210
 The communication must therefore be more significant than the trade: Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB 
International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 102.  
211
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 102.  
212
 Explanatory Memorandum on the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (2006) 111 <available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/cab2006223/memo_0.html> (accessed 4-1-2012). 
213
 See section 3 3 5 of chapter 4. 
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Apart from whether the parody itself is properly classified as a commercial activity, the 
potential effect that it has on the market for the original work will also be considered.214 
The party alleging infringement must adduce evidence to show that the parody has or is 
likely to materially detriment the marketing magnetism of the trademark, or the correlative 
exploitation of economic rights in copyright.215 The court warned that in our constitutional 
democracy, expressive acts such as parody should not be “lightly trampled upon by 
marginal detriment or harm unrelated to the commercial value that vests in the mark 
itself”.216 This dictum can be extended to the context of copyright: marginal detriment, or 
the allegation of such detriment, should not unduly cripple the operation of free speech.217 
Akin to this is whether the parody is likely to confuse the average person as to the 
distinction between the original and the parody.218 It is likely that the greater the original 
contribution made by the parodist, the smaller the likelihood of confusion will be. This is 
consistent with considering whether the parody is critical transformative use and 
contributes something original, or is merely parasitic. It is submitted that a parody of a 
work cannot meaningfully be said to detract from the original in any way if the original is 
recognisable (which is required for the parody to be effective and communicative to 
anyone who perceives it) and there is no confusion as to the distinction between the 
parody and the original.219 
The Laugh It Off case illustrates that the subjective nature of the humour is completely 
irrelevant, which is consistent with American case law.220 Whether the humour resonates 
                                            
214
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) paras 56-59, 98. This is expressed 
as “[taking] unfair advantage of, or be[ing] detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the 
registered trade mark” in s 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. 
215
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) paras 51-59.  
216
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 56. 
217
 It is submitted that this approach, where the commercial effect of the parody is but one of the relevant 
factors and not the most important or dispositive consideration, is correct. American courts held the contrary 
position, formulated in Sony Corporation of America et al v Universal City Studios Inc et al 464 US 417 
(1984) and Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises 471 USS 539 (1985), where the commercial 
aspect was hailed as the most important factor and rendered the use presumptively unfair if it had a 
commercial aspect. This emphasis was displaced in Campbell aka Skyywalker et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 
510 US 569 (1994) 577, where the Supreme Court warned against undue adherence to concrete rules or 
presumptions, and held that each case must be judged in its unique context. See Visser’s discussion of the 
development of the American courts’ methodology: Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright 
law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
321-343 at 324-326. 
218
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 96. 
219
 The impact that an effective parody may have on the market for the original work can be equated to an 
unfavourable review, which is protected by s 12(1)(b). See Lahore J Copyright and Designs: Commentary I 
(RS 77 2008) 40094. See also section 3 of chapter 2. 
220
 See Campbell aka Skyywalker et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 US 569 (1994) 582 respectively. Cf Illsley 
T “How to tell a take-off from a rip-off: Trade mark parody and freedom of expression in South Africa” (2006) 
22 South African Journal of Human Rights 119-125 at 124. 
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with the court should play no role in the determination of whether the expression qualifies 
for protection. Once the expression has been found worthy of protection, whether the 
humour is in good taste is an irrelevant consideration.221 This approach finds support in 
American case law applying the fair use exception.222 Interestingly, the Constitutional 
Court found that the subjective intention of the defendant is as irrelevant as whether the 
parody may cause offence.223 The Constitutional Court faulted the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in this regard, explaining that anteriorly considering whether there is an 
infringement prevents the court from properly determining whether the expression musters 
constitutional protection.224 The medium of expressing the parody is likewise irrelevant.225 
These factors are not, nor are they meant to be, exhaustive.226 The crux of all fair dealing 
exceptions is whether an honest and fair-minded person would have used the work in the 
way the defendant did, given the specific context.227 This should remain the benchmark for 
fair dealing exceptions, including the hypothetical exception of fair dealing for the purposes 
of parody.  
 
5 3 2 Constitutional Analysis in Terms of the Property Clause 
This section examines the constitutional implications of promulgating a new fair dealing 
exception for parody. To date the Constitutional Court has not formulated a general 
principle to indicate whether or not all intangibles should be recognised as property for the 
purposes of section 25 of the Constitution (the property clause).228 However, it is generally 
accepted that intellectual property rights qualify as property for the purpose of section 
25.229 For this reason it is necessary to consider the constitutional implications of adopting 
an additional fair dealing exception for parody. 
                                            
221
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) paras 55, 75, 88. 
222
 See eg Campbell aka Skyywalker et al v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 US 569 (1994) at 582. 
223
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 95.  
224
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 44. 
225
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 86. See the SCA’s differing 
opinion in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark 
International 2005 (2) SA 46 (SCA) paras 30-32. 
226
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 89. 
227
 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 para 44; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 38; Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 498. 
228
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 113. 
229
 The Constitutional Court refused to award intellectual property independent constitutional recognition or 
protection, concluding that it is not a universal norm to afford intellectual property separate protection: Ex 
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A distinction must to be drawn between exceptions to copyright before the advent of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, and those that were incorporated (even 
hypothetically) after the Constitution took effect. In the first situation, exceptions to 
copyright could not infringe the copyright owner’s constitutional property rights for the 
simple reason that none existed.230 This links up with the internal modifier argument in 
chapter 2, whereby the copyright owner did not have the rights in the first place as the 
original source of the rights delimits them.231 The copyright owner’s rights therefore do not 
extend to instances of fair dealing. However, the theoretical analysis differs if the rights 
existed at the dawn of the constitutional era, subsequent to which additional delimitations 
were placed on the copyright owner’s rights by means of amendments to the source of the 
rights (the Copyright Act). In this case, the additional delimitation will have to be analysed 
to determine whether it could reasonably be perceived as a deprivation of the copyright 
owner’s property rights in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.232 As neither the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997 nor the Copyright Amendment Act 9 
of 2002 made any substantive amendments to the fair dealing exceptions in the Copyright 
Act,233 the investigation focuses on the post-1996 promulgation of a hypothetical fair 
dealing exception for parody as proposed above. This analysis should be undertaken in 
terms of the methodology set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance (hereafter FNB).234  
                                                                                                                                                 
Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 75. Intellectual property is therefore considered one form of 
property protected by s 25: Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 143-145. See also 
Kellerman M The Constitutional Property Clause and Immaterial Property Interests (LLD thesis Stellenbosch 
University 2010) for a full justification of affording intellectual property rights constitutional protection. See to 
the contrary Dean OH “The case for the recognition of intellectual property in the Bill of Rights” (1997) 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaags Romeins-Hollandse Reg 195-119, who argued for the separate recognition of 
intellectual property rights; the author subsequently accepted the Constitutional Court’s implicit 
acknowledgement of the equal status of trademarks and freedom of expression in the Laugh It Off case as a 
basis from which to proceed with intellectual property discourse: Dean OH “Trade mark dilution laughed off” 
(2005) Oct De Rebus 18-22; Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-3 n 3. See 
also Oilwell (Pty) Ltd v Protec International Ltd and Others 2011 (4) SA 394 (SCA), where the court equated 
the nature of intellectual property to that of immovable property, which – it is submitted – is clearly incorrect. 
230
 The constitutionality of the Copyright Act generally is beyond the ambit of this thesis; only the 
constitutionality of post-Constitution amendments that introduce exceptions to the Copyright Act will be 
considered. 
231
 See chapter 2 section 4. 
232
 S 25(1) states that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
233
 S 54 of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997 amended the terminology in s 12(5) of 
the Copyright Act, but this does not influence the delimitation of rights as explained in chapter 2 section 5. 
234
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). As will become apparent, 
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The point of departure for any constitutional property dispute is always section 25(1).235 
The first question is whether the interest amounts to property for the purpose of section 
25.236 It can be accepted that a copyright owner’s rights in a work constitute property rights 
for that purpose.237 The next stage in the FNB methodology is to establish whether there 
has been a deprivation of such property.238 The term “deprivation” denotes a regulatory 
interference with the use of property.239 The property interest in question is the copyright 
owner’s exclusive right to authorise any of the restricted acts.240 A fair dealing exception 
that allows the public to use a copyright work without authorisation clearly interferes with 
the copyright owner’s pre-existing rights to her work. However, the wide meaning attached 
to the term “deprivation” by the Constitutional Court in FNB has been subjected to 
alteration in subsequent cases. The Constitutional Court held that whether there has been 
a deprivation is contingent on the extent that the regulation interferes with the use, 
enjoyment and exploitation of the property.241 However, for the purposes of this thesis the 
hypothetical exception is regarded as a deprivation of property rights.242  
The next question is whether the deprivation is consistent with the provisions of section 
25(1).243 This clause requires the determination of whether the deprivation is in terms of 
law of general application and, if so, whether it constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
it is unnecessary to attempt to justify a limitation of a constitutional property right in terms of section 36(1), as 
this analysis is (in practically every case) subsumed by the third stage of the FNB methodology: Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 78-79.   
235
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 60. 
236
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
237
 Kellerman M The Constitutional Property Clause and Immaterial Property Interests (LLD thesis 
Stellenbosch University 2010) 35, 329-331; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 145. 
238
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
239
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 192, 196-197. The Constitutional Court affords 
a wide interpretation to deprivation, saying that it encompasses “any interference with the use, enjoyment or 
exploitation of private property”: First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 57. 
240
 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-52. 
241
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 
2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
242
 Viewing the exception as not imposing a severe enough limitation on the use, enjoyment and exploitation 
of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights to constitute a deprivation would serve no purpose in this thesis, as 
that would mean the end of the constitutional analysis and the exception would be constitutional. 
Accordingly, it is accepted without deciding that the hypothetical exception may constitute a deprivation to 
guard against this possibility. 
243
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
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property. It is clear that if a fair dealing exception for parody is promulgated – either by 
means of an amendment to the Copyright Act or by regulation as envisaged by section 
13244 – it will qualify as a deprivation authorised by law of general application.245 A law is 
arbitrary if it “does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or 
is procedurally unfair”.246 If a deprivation is effected by legislation, the section 25(1) 
procedural analysis will likely follow the principles that have developed to determine this 
question in administrative law.247 These principles should not present difficulty, as the 
proposed exception will go through the normal legislative process and be open to public 
participation, which is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that all relevant interests and 
points of view are placed before the administrator (or in this case the legislator).248 The 
second principle proscribes bias, which will be achieved by the express requirement that 
the law is of general application.249 The exception would neither impose any sort of 
procedures on copyright owners, nor detract from a copyright owner’s normal judicial 
recourse. For these reasons the rights of the copyright owners will not be affected in a 
procedural manner.  
Section 25(1) implicitly requires that the alleged deprivation must be for a public purpose 
or in the public interest.250 Accordingly, the promulgation of a new exception that arguably 
constitutes a deprivation of existing property rights must be justifiable in terms of this 
reading of the property clause. In this regard the public interest manifest in freedom of 
expression, embodied in section 16 of the Constitution, should be consulted. The right to 
freedom of expression is fundamental to the proper functioning of a democratic society, 
but is not of paramount value in the larger scheme of the Bill of Rights.251 This position 
                                            
244
 It is submitted that the incorporation of a parody exception by means of regulation is unsuitable, as s 13 
only allows exceptions to the reproduction right. A parody will necessarily also infringe the right to make or 
authorise an adaptation of a work, and will therefore not be exempted in terms of s 13. 
245
 The Constitutional Court made it clear that (properly enacted) legislation amounts to law of general 
application: First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61. See also van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 232-237. 
246
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
247
 Van der Walt AJ “Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 88-
94 at 91, 93; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 266, 269. Administrative law will not 
be directly applicable in this case, as there is no administrative action involved. 
248
 Klaaren J & Penfold G “Just administrative action” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa IV (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 63-81. 
249
 Van der Walt AJ “Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 88-
94 at 93. 
250
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 225, 227-232. 
251
 Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-9, referring to O’Regan J’s dictum in Khumalo and 
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also applies to property rights for determining whether a specific deprivation is 
substantively arbitrary. The rationales that underpin the right to freedom of expression as a 
fundamental right (as relevant to this analysis) include the proper functioning of 
democracy,252 individual self-fulfilment and audience autonomy,253 the promotion of 
tolerance through the co-existence of diverging opinions,254 and the search for truth.255 
These justifications form the broad basis for entrenching the right to freedom of expression 
in its various incarnations, and apply specifically to the freedom to express an opinion by 
parodying a copyright work in order to illustrate the parodist’s opinion. In addition to these 
principles, the desire for copyright law to be transformative rather than suppressive 
provides a powerful justification for the small infringement that a parody constitutes.256 
Considering these factors, it is highly unlikely that a court would even think about 
describing the effects of the provision as arbitrary, even against the proportionality 
standard, save for the most extraordinary cases. 
The question of whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation requires an enquiry 
into the relationship between the reasons for the provision and the effects it has, the 
stringency of which lies on a continuum between rationality- and proportionality-type 
evaluation.257 The applicable standard is to be determined according to the severity of the 
deprivation: the more extensive the effects, the closer to the proportionality end of the 
spectrum the test will be. The Constitutional Court set out certain factors in FNB for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 25. See also Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 
2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 47. 
252
 This is achieved by allowing criticism of government and key role-players in society, and should not be 
unnecessarily stifled by copyright (or any other) law: see Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of 
expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 
2008) 42-21 – 42-25.  
253
 This rationale recognises the intrinsic value of allowing free communication between people in pursuit of 
self-fulfilment, and the ideal of independent evaluation and free criticism of others’ views in order for every 
member of the public audience to reach their own conclusion: see Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of 
expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 
2008) 42-25 – 42-27. 
254
 A society that protects freedom of expression is more likely to encourage tolerance of a diverse array of 
ideas, opinions and ways of life by restraining the impulse to censor contrarian views: see Milo D, Penfold G 
& Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-28 – 42-30. 
255
 This justification relies on the premise that many opinions that would otherwise be supressed may contain 
elements of truth, and by promoting freedom of expression the likelihood of establishing truth is increased: 
see Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A “Freedom of expression” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa III (2
nd
 ed OS 2008) 42-16 – 42-21.  
256
 Lahore J Copyright and Designs: Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40092. 
257
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 243. The “thickness” of the test may vary 
according to the context, and a rationality-type enquiry can suffice: Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 245-246. However, the more stringent standard of proportionality will be used in this 
analysis. 
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assessing whether sufficient reason exists to justify a deprivation.258 These include the 
relation between the deprivation in question and the purpose it seeks to achieve, the 
purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected, the nature of the 
property and the extent of the deprivation, and whether the deprivation affects all incidents 
of ownership.259 The court explicitly stated that if the deprivation only impacts on some 
incidents of ownership and only partially, or if the property in question is not of a corporeal 
nature, less compelling reasons will be required for purposes of justifying the particular 
interference.260 In this regard it is worth emphasising that only the rights of reproduction 
and adaptation will be impinged upon, and not ownership in its entirety.261  Furthermore, a 
parody of a copyright work is unlikely to usurp the market for the original work, and 
therefore does not interfere with the copyright owner’s commercial exploitation of the 
work.262 The appropriate test in this instance will therefore gravitate towards the rationality 
end of the continuum, considering the factors propounded by the Constitutional Court in 
FNB. Accordingly, there must be a rational link between the provision and a legitimate 
purpose that it strives to achieve.263 The deprivation in question easily meets this standard, 
and in most cases will even meet the higher standard of proportionality, which requires 
that the deprivation must be justifiable considering the reason for its occurrence and the 
effect it has on the property owner’s rights.  
It follows that the deprivation that would be caused by the incorporation of a fair dealing 
exception allowing a parodying use will not be arbitrary. Rather, it will contribute to an 
equitable balance (served by the proportionality principle) between the property rights of 
copyright owners and the public use of copyright works. The promulgation of the proposed 
exception is therefore in line with the third stage of the FNB methodology.  
The fact that the third stage is answered in the affirmative negates the application of the 
fourth step, which requires a court to test the deprivation against section 36(1) of the 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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261
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 245. Visser asserts that the public 
communication right will also be infringed: Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: 
Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-
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 Rogers M, Tomalin J & Corrigan R “The economic impact of consumer copyright exceptions: A literature 
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Constitution if the said deprivation is inconsistent with the requirements of section 25(1). 
Yet, it remains to be ascertained whether the interference could amount to an 
uncompensated expropriation contrary to section 25(2) of the Constitution.264 In this 
context it is clear that the suggested exception will not constitute an expropriation of 
property, as the owner does not lose her rights to normal commercial exploitation. This 
view is fortified by the fact that expropriation involves the acquisition of property rights by a 
“public authority”, which will evidently not be the case here.265 Furthermore, judicial 
expropriation can only be exercised if there is explicit legislative authorisation, which the 
suggested exception does not provide.266 The fact that South African courts have no 
common law power to order expropriation strengthens such a conclusion.267 Accordingly, 
the exception passes constitutional scrutiny.  
It is argued above that the promulgation of a fair dealing exception for parody will serve the 
public interest while not arbitrarily depriving copyright owners of their property rights. The 
need for legislative intervention in this area is apparent.268 Once an exception for parody 
exists, the balance between property rights and freedom of expression (which were given 
equal status by the Constitutional Court in the Laugh It Off case)269 will reflect the 
transformative ideal of copyright law by protecting vested commercial interests in creative 
works, while allowing an adequate degree of parodic expression. The proposed exception 
will further enable commentary on existing works and the creation of new works by 
allowing the public to use copyright works in a transformative way. Once the right to 
freedom of expression is statutorily embodied in this way, users will be able to align their 
conduct with the legislative guidelines ex ante and pursue a wider array of creative 
expressions.   
 
 
5 4 Conclusion 
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South African and Australian copyright law find their inception in the law of the United 
Kingdom. Over the course of the twentieth century both South Africa and Australia 
emancipated themselves from the original statutory sources and proceeded to develop in 
parallel with the United Kingdom. The same types of works currently qualify for protection 
in all three jurisdictions, albeit under different categories.  
The fair dealing provisions contained in the Copyright Act largely correspond with those in 
both the CDPA and the Australian Copyright Act. The terminology in section 12(1) of the 
Copyright Act makes the analyses undertaken in chapter 4 variously applicable. In the 
case of research and private study, the terminology falls between that used in the CDPA 
and the Australian Copyright Act: any research undertaken is not required to be of a non-
commercial nature, although studying is qualified by this condition. In the United Kingdom 
both of these activities must be non-commercial in nature, while in Australia both can be 
undertaken for a commercial purpose. Depending on which part of the clause is invoked, 
courts should look to one of these jurisdictions for interpretive standards. The Australian 
Copyright Act provides imperative guidelines that the courts should take into account when 
assessing a fair dealing for the purpose of research or study, especially the quantitative 
threshold embodied in section 40(5). Although the normative factors in Australian law were 
proposed as an addition to the South African Copyright Act, the Department of Trade and 
Industry appears to have lost interest and the proposal lapsed into disuse. 
South African law contains an interesting addition to the research/private study exception 
that allows users to utilise copyright works for personal or private use. This exception does 
not appear in either the CDPA or the Australian Copyright Act. It is suggested that the 
phrase is intended to extend the scope of the exception beyond uses for educational or 
academic purposes. Accordingly, the clause should be seen as extending the types of use 
allowed to accommodate any use of a copyright work that is for a personal or private 
(read: non-commercial) purpose and complies with fair practice. South African courts 
should consult the factors employed by courts in the foreign jurisdictions considered to 
determine whether the use complies with the fairness component inherent in the 
exceptions.  
The fair dealing exception for criticism or review poses no difficulties regarding its 
interpretation. In this respect the liberal interpretations that courts have afforded this 
provision can be applied mutatis mutandis in a context-sensitive manner. The liberal 
interpretation includes the criticism or review of the copyright work or another work, as well 
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as the ideas and philosophies underlying the work. It is imperative that the user 
acknowledges the source and author of the work, if available. A fair dealing for the 
purposes of reporting current events should be accommodated under a similarly liberal 
interpretation to include news events as envisioned in the Australian Copyright Act. 
Photographs are included in the definition of artistic work in South Africa and may 
therefore be used in terms of this exception, while in the United Kingdom the use of a 
photograph will not be allowed in this context. No distinction is made between works that 
have been made available to the public and those that have not. The use of unpublished 
works can therefore qualify for protection, although the fact that it was not made available 
to the public will likely be considered as relevant to determining the fairness of the dealing. 
If the work was used in an appropriate manner to convey information to the public, it is 
probable that the use will be exempted.  
Australian law contains an exception for parody and satire, while the law of South Africa 
and the United Kingdom do not. This exception is founded primarily on the right to freedom 
of expression, which has been known to limit intellectual property rights. It is clear that the 
South African Constitutional Court places immense value on this right, no less so when it 
manifests itself in the form of parody. This chapter has shown how an exception for parody 
will function in South African law, which factors should take precedence in the contextual 
analysis that will be required, and how it is desirable that the legislator takes action in this 
regard. Furthermore, the exception is justified in the constitutional sense, as was shown by 
subjecting it to the FNB methodology to ascertain whether it would amount to an 
unjustifiable arbitrary deprivation of constitutional property rights. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that the proposed exception has a vested interest in South African constitutional 
law and a sound basis for its incorporation into copyright law. Legislative intervention 
would therefore be welcome. 
The fair dealing exceptions are certainly not characterised by their clear cut boundaries of 
exemption, but they contribute immeasurably to the transformative and social value of 
copyright works. The exceptions provide users with the entitlements to engage in and 
promote academic development, freedom of information, and the dissemination of ideas. 
As evidenced in this thesis, the need for the exceptions is universally endorsed and 
indispensable to the adequate balance of the protection of intellectual property rights and 
the public interest.  
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6 Conclusion 
6 1 Introduction 
Two reviews of the United Kingdom’s copyright regime have been undertaken in recent 
years.1 These reviews found the law to be largely satisfactory, but concluded that the 
exceptions to copyright in particular were lagging behind the international community. An 
exception for parody was specifically recommended by both reviews,2 and the government 
has indicated that it will publish proposals for the introduction of an exception for parody 
towards the end of 2012.3 South African copyright law finds itself in a similar situation, as it 
originates from the legislation of the United Kingdom and has not been subjected to any 
substantial review in the past few decades. Copyright exceptions have gradually 
developed to their current state, with the fair dealing exception for parody being the most 
recent international addition.  
Current South African copyright legislation and jurisprudence leave a conspicuous lacuna 
regarding the scope and application of the fair dealing exceptions. This area of legal 
uncertainty affords courts the opportunity to delineate and develop the exceptions in the 
interest of allowing legitimate uncompensated uses and stimulating creativity. However, 
South African courts have not had the chance to engage with this aspect of copyright law 
and the defence therefore remains as vague as it was at the time of its promulgation.  
This thesis set out to critically and comparatively evaluate the state of the fair dealing 
exceptions in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 in relation to their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom and Australia. The study aimed to clarify the application of the fair dealing 
exceptions so that courts may be more willing to consider foreign and international law, as 
mandated by section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. This 
is achieved by analysing the provisions relating to limitations on copyright in international 
treaties and foreign legislation. Parallels can be drawn between fair dealing exceptions in 
                                            
1
 Gowers A Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (2006) <available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf> (accessed on 23-01-2012); Hargreaves I Digital 
Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (2011) <available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ 
ipreview-finalreport.pdf> (accessed 23-06-2012). 
2
 Gowers A Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (2006) 68 <available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 
d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf> (accessed on 23-01-2012); Hargreaves I Digital Opportunity: A Review of 
Intellectual Property and Growth (2011) 49-50 <available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf> 
(accessed 23-06-2012). 
3
 HM Government The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and Growth 
(2011) 16 <available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf> (accessed 27-06-2012). 
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South Africa, the United Kingdom and Australia regarding the application and impact of 
these provisions. Judicial guidelines for each of the exceptions are set out where possible 
and specific areas of divergence are pointed out.4 Nebulous elements of these provisions 
are identified and clarified by comparative evaluation, allowing foreign judicial experience 
to be applied to similar cases that may arise. The impact of the constitutional property 
clause (section 25) on the validity of exceptions to copyright is considered to ascertain 
whether these exceptions are constitutionally permissible.5  
 
6 2 The Purpose of Copyright Exceptions 
Chapter 2 analyses the economic and social justifications that warrant the promotion and 
protection of works, which form the basis of modern copyright law. The limitations on 
copyright are then considered in light of these social objectives. These objectives 
constitute a concrete basis for awarding real rights over intellectual property, and for 
limiting these rights in certain instances.  
The primary rationale for granting exclusive rights over intellectual creations is the 
utilitarian aim of encouraging socially beneficial activities by providing economic incentives 
for authors.6 The beneficiaries of these rights are economic rational actors who exploit the 
exclusive rights awarded to them to their maximum advantage. This results in works being 
extensively protected against uncompensated use, which limits the use and distribution of 
intellectual property. Granting economic rights can thus frustrate the policy objectives that 
led to their existence. The paradox created by this approach is self-evident; the socially 
beneficial uses that copyright law purports to promote are being partially prevented by the 
conferral of exclusive rights. This means that one person’s freedoms are enhanced at the 
expense of everyone else’s.7 When individual property rights hinder more highly valued 
social objectives, the rights must be limited to allow the pursuit of these social objectives.8 
To ease this intrinsic tension, copyright owners’ rights are limited in certain instances. 
Exceptions allow free uses either when such uses have an insignificant detrimental effect 
                                            
4
 See chapter 4 sections 2 3 and 3 3, and chapter 5 section 2 3. 
5
 See chapter 5 section 3 2. 
6
 Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 25; Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in 
Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 107-108. See chapter 2 
section 3. 
7
 Hettinger EC “Justifying intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts 
in Law I (2006) 97-113 at 100. 
8
 Gray K “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 at 297. 
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on the owner’s economic rights, or when these rights start encroaching on other basic 
liberties. Fair dealing exceptions embody the public interest in education, free 
dissemination of information, and freedom of expression. Every exception is intended to 
provide a greater social benefit than the loss it causes to the individual copyright owner.9 
These provisions serve as a mechanism for the public to use protected works without 
consent or compensation. 
In addition to mediating the relationship between owners’ property rights and other 
fundamental constitutional rights, this thesis shows how fair dealing exceptions address a 
number of significant economic and social policy issues that arise from the creation of real 
rights over incorporeal objects.10 Copyright owners are able to levy excessive fees in 
cases where there are no substitutes for a work.11 The transaction costs involved in 
obtaining the required licences to use copyright works can also be fatal to many legitimate 
uses that require a work to be reproduced.12 Copyright owners could also simply withhold 
their consent for certain uses, like the criticism of their works. In these cases copyright 
works will be underused, resulting in economic inefficiency. Fair dealing allows limited 
uses of works in these situations to enable users to pursue legitimate public objectives. 
This means that users do not need to spend valuable time and resources locating the 
copyright owners and negotiating for licences. Users can rely on fair dealing exceptions to 
pursue objectives like research and study, news reporting, to criticise or review another 
person’s work, or even to parody a work.  
Parodies of protected copyright works demonstrate the role that fair dealing exceptions 
can play in enabling transformative, creative uses of existing copyright works to produce 
new works. Authors often rely on existing culture to create new products, using prominent 
elements of a particular work in this process. A parody copies the main elements of a work 
to ensure that it is still recognisable, but with considerable original creative effort. The fair 
dealing exception for parody and satire acknowledges and legitimates this process, if the 
work is properly used and the resulting product genuinely passes satirical comment on it. 
Courts guard against users invoking the exception as a defence when there was no clear 
                                            
9
 Aufderheide P & Jaszi P Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright (2011) 24. 
10
 See chapter 2 section 3. 
11
 Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” (2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 30-
36 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 20-5-2012). 
12
 This is demonstrated by the tragedy of the anticommons: see Heller M “The tragedy of the anticommons: 
Property in the transition from Marx to markets” (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621-688. 
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intention of parodying a work, but merely of copying it.13 However, without this exception 
creators are discouraged by the intellectual property regime that grants exclusionary rights 
to the owners of existing works. This obstructs the creation of new works, contrary to the 
primary objective of copyright law.  
Reasonable limitations on rights can even benefit copyright owners, one pertinent example 
being the fair dealing exception for criticism and review. If reviewers were required to 
obtain consent to criticise or review a work, the consequent review would lack credibility 
because copyright owners would be able to influence what is said about their works.14 
Even negative reviews have been shown to hold benefit for authors if the alternative is no 
review at all.15 Moreover, any detriment that a review causes to the potential market for a 
work would be because the reviewer draws attention to specific ideas or flaws in the work. 
This is not the kind of harm that copyright law seeks to prevent, and it will have no impact 
on the incentive to create valuable intellectual products.16 This shows that some limitations 
on rights can hold benefits for copyright owners, resulting in negative marginal costs.17  
The law both awards and limits property rights in the interests of dissemination of ideas 
and information. The fair dealing exceptions are an essential part to the balance of private 
property rights and public interest, and are calculated to either cause minimal economic 
harm to copyright owners’ interests or place a restraint on their rights when they pose a 
threat to other important interests. 
 
6 3 Nature and Construction of Exceptions 
The nature and construction of copyright exceptions determine their scope and application. 
Two approaches (or a combination of the two) are usually followed in the construction of 
exempting provisions.18 The first approach employs a rule or set of criteria that will 
                                            
13
 Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 CA 620, Banier v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 812 at 815, Hyde Park Residence v Yelland [2001] Ch 143 para 40, Time 
Warner Entertainments LP v Channel Four Television Corporation Plc [1994] EMLR 1 at 14, Johnstone v 
Bernard Jones Publications Ltd [1938] 2 Ch 599 at 603-604. 
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 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
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 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
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 Posner RA Economic Analysis of Law (8
th
 ed 2011) 54. 
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 Posner RA “The law and economics of intellectual property” in Vaver D (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law I (2006) 157-165 at 159; Boyer M “The economics of copyright and fair dealing” 
(2007) CIRANO Scientific Publications 1-48 at 1 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133595> (accessed 
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legitimate conduct,19 while the second approach adopts specific purposes that will be 
rendered lawful.20 It is possible to combine the two by stipulating general criteria that will 
exempt conduct, complemented by specific purposes which will deem conduct fair. This 
hybrid system allows ample flexibility to determine whether a particular use is justified, with 
a degree of legal certainty embodied in the specific socially beneficial purposes.21  
The fair dealing exceptions can be raised as affirmative defences to claims of 
infringement, which means that they render certain conduct lawful instead of merely 
excusing it. The legislation that grants the real rights delimits them short of certain 
instances of application. This internal modification approach demarcates the limits of rights 
and creates a range of privileges. Copyright owners can enforce their rights in the normal 
way, but these rights do not apply in the circumstances envisioned by the fair dealing 
exceptions. In terms of South African constitutional property law analysis, this approach 
means that there is no right and thus no deprivation that needs to be justified. The 
language used in the South African, Australian and the United Kingdom’s legislation 
indicates that the rights are delimited from the outset, intentionally creating user 
entitlements in the form of privileges. Privileges allow the beneficiaries to act in a certain 
way without liability; the copyright owners’ rights do not apply and they are left with no-
rights. However, privileges are not necessarily accompanied by correlative duties on 
others to respect these privileges. In the absence of such a duty, the holder of a privilege 
can raise the entitlement as a defence, but cannot enforce it positively because copyright 
owners are not obliged to allow these uses.22 The law therefore legitimates users’ conduct, 
but does not provide protection for them.  
 
6 4 International Law 
South Africa is obliged to implement the substantive provisions of the Paris Act23 of the 
Berne Convention,24 even though it has not signed this version of the treaty. This is 
                                            
19
 Referred to as the unitary system: Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in 
Creative Works (2011) 141. 
20
 This approach is known as the particle system: Rahmatian A Copyright and Creativity: The Making of 
Property Rights in Creative Works (2011) 141-142. 
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 An example of the hybrid system is the fair use doctrine found in American law. 
22
 Hohfeld WN “Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16-59 at 30-32; Singer JW Entitlements: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 132. 
23
 1161 UNTS 3 (1971). 
24
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(9-9-1886) 1161 UNTS 3 (1886). 
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because of the effect of article 9 of TRIPS25 and article 1(4) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT),26 both of which incorporate the substantive provisions of the Paris Act. 
Accordingly, the rights and limitations contained in the latest text of the Berne Convention, 
as well as those added by TRIPS and the WIPO treaties, are directly relevant to South 
African copyright law. 
The most prominent exempting clause in the Berne Convention is the three-step test in 
article 9(2). This provision states that any exceptions to the reproduction right of literary 
and artistic works are to be confined to certain special cases that do not conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author. This provision has been extended by TRIPS and the WCT to all rights 
granted in terms of these treaties, including the rights incorporated from the Berne 
Convention.27 TRIPS also extends the last leg of the test to apply to rights holders, not 
only authors as is the case with the Berne Convention.  
The Rome Convention permits member states to extend any exceptions they have 
promulgated in relation to literary and artistic works to neighbouring rights.28 This is in 
addition to the exceptions for private use, reporting current events, ephemeral fixations 
and teaching or scientific research that the Rome Convention expressly allows.29 It is clear 
that none of these envisioned exceptions could feasibly pose a threat to the economic 
exploitation of the rights granted by this treaty. These exceptions illustrate the balance 
between rights holders and the public that this area of law tries to achieve. These 
provisions are expressly endorsed by TRIPS,30 while the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) adopts the three-step test and extends the exceptions 
applicable to literary and artistic works to neighbouring rights.31 
The WCT contains an agreed statement in the appendix, which is equally applicable to the 
WPPT, to the effect that member states can extend limitations that comply with the three-
step test to the digital environment, and may further “devise new exceptions and limitations 
                                            
25
 World Trade Organisation Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (15-4-1994) Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 1869 UNTS 299 (1994). 
26
 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (20-12-1996) 36 ILM 65 (1996). 
27
 Art 9 read with art 13 of TRIPS and art 1(4) read with art 10 of the WCT. 
28
 Art 15(2). 
29
 Art 15(1). 
30
 Art 14(6). 
31
 Art 16 of the World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20-12-1996) 
36 ILM 76 (1996). 
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that are appropriate in the digital network environment”.32 The South African legislature 
should follow this suggestion when reviewing the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. One example 
of this exception is section 28 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which 
exempts transient and incidental copies that are necessarily made as part of a 
technological process.33 This exception is compliant with the three-step test as it stands 
and the independent tenets of the test are not required as additional qualifications.34  
 
6 5 Fairness Inquiry 
The study of case law shows that courts distinguish between the classification of an 
allegedly infringing act and the fairness of the act.35 Before drawing conclusions from 
specific provisions, the judicial approach to resolving fair dealing disputes should be 
understood. Courts first examine the actions of the defendant objectively to determine 
whether the conduct can properly be categorised as one of the acts of fair dealing. If it is 
established that the act does indeed fall within the scope of one of the fair dealing 
provisions, the fairness of the use is evaluated. The statutory exceptions considered here 
state that fair dealing “does not infringe any copyright in the work”, so any one particular 
restricted act will not present an obstacle to the proper functioning of the exceptions.36 This 
is justified by the extension of the three-test step to all exclusive rights that TRIPS 
effects.37 
The Australian Copyright Act adopted five factors that courts must consider when 
establishing whether a particular use qualifies as fair.38 These factors were included in the 
South African Draft Amendment Bill39 that was published for comment in 2000, but the Bill 
has since been abandoned. The construction of the Australian provision suggests that 
these factors should apply to all evaluations of fair dealing, not only those regarding 
research and study. These factors correspond with the four factors traditionally associated 
with fair use which courts have frequently consulted in fair dealing cases. This statutory 
mandate ensures that courts follow the same methodology, although the importance of 
                                            
32
 Agreed statement to art 10 of the WCT. 
33
 Ss 43A, 43B of the Australian Copyright Act also contain this exception. 
34
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 478-479. 
35
 See specifically chapters 4 sections 2 3 3-2 3 4 and 3 3 3-3 3 4. 
36
 See eg s 29(1) of the CDPA. 
37
 Art 13. 
38
 S 40(2), restated in s 103C. 
39
 GN 1805 in GG 21156 of 2000-05-10. 
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each factor will vary to accommodate each specific set of facts. These judicial guidelines 
take the elements of the three-step test into account, explicitly instructing courts to 
consider the effect that the use has on the potential market for the work and the possibility 
of obtaining the work within a reasonable time at an ordinary commercial price.40 If the use 
competes with the copyright owner’s normal commercial exploitation of her work, this will 
indicate that the use is not fair.41 Courts consider various other factors which are of varying 
importance depending on the particular facts of each case.42  
The amount and substantiality of the use is considered to determine the quantity and 
quality of the portion reproduced.43 No single factor is determinative and using a work in its 
entirety can qualify as a fair dealing if all of the factors combined point to this conclusion. If 
the work was unpublished, the court will consider whether the work was obtained in breach 
of confidence.44 The subjective intentions of the user can be relevant, both with regard to 
the particular use and the attitude that the user had toward intellectual property rights 
throughout the process of use.45 However, the fairness is to be determined against the 
objective standard of whether a “fair minded and honest person would have dealt with the 
copyright work in the manner in which the defendant did for the purpose in question”.46 
Individual factors have been advanced by courts in the context of a specific type of fair 
dealing, which should be taken into consideration for those purposes. With this discussion 
in mind, the fair dealing provisions are analysed individually. 
 
6 6 Research and Private Study 
Fair dealing allows the use of works for research and private study to enable students and 
researchers to use works for didactic purposes without fear of copyright infringement. The 
                                            
40
 The first requirement of the test – that the exceptions must be confined to certain special cases – is 
satisfied by the specific purpose envisioned by each exception. 
41
 Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 498. 
42
 See section 2 3 6 of chapter 5 for an exposition of the factors that courts frequently consider. 
43
 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 40; Ashdown v Telegraph Group 
[2002] Ch 149 CA paras 76-81. 
44
 HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 Ch paras 176-177; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 75; Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another 
[1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA para 38. 
45
 Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch). 
46
 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] 3 All ER 977 para 44; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 38; Garnett K, Davies G & Harbottle G Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright I (15
th
 ed 2005) 498. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 151 
 
CDPA requires that both of these activities must be for non-commercial purposes,47 while 
the Australian exception makes no such demand. The South African Copyright Act falls 
neatly between these provisions, requiring that any study undertaken in terms of this 
provision is “private”, but does not impose this condition on researchers.48 Nonetheless, 
whether the research was carried out for direct economic advantage will likely be 
considered relevant to the fairness of the research. The Information Society Directive, to 
which the United Kingdom is party, contains a useful explanation regarding the nature of 
research, which instructs courts that the activity in question should be characterised by the 
activity as such and not only by the organisational structure or the means by which the 
institution involved (if any) is funded.49 
None of the international conventions on copyright explicitly permits the limitation of rights 
for these purposes, although the preamble of the WCT expressly recognises the need to 
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the public interest inherent in 
education and research. The Rome Convention contains an exempting clause in favour of 
teaching and research. Art 15(1)(d) allows exceptions to neighbouring rights “solely for the 
purposes of teaching or scientific research”. However, the proper application of this 
provision is unclear, as scientific research is usually not embodied in a performance or 
phonogram. It has been suggested that this exception could operate more effectively in the 
cultural and social sciences than other fields of research.50  
South African courts should take heed of Australian case law51 regarding the interpretation 
and application of this provision, bearing in mind that the Australian provision does not 
impose the requirement that any study undertaken in terms of this clause must also be of a 
non-commercial nature. The Federal Court of Australia adopted the dictionary definitions 
of “research” and “study”,52 which proved unproblematic. The South African exception (like 
the Australian equivalent) does not require an acknowledgement of the author or source of 
the work that was used, which the CDPA does.53 Notwithstanding, whether a sufficient 
                                            
47
 The CDPA was amended to bring it in line with art 5(3)(a) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC, 
which requires that for research to be exempted it must be of a non-commercial nature. 
48
 S 12(1) of the South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
49
 Recital 42 of the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC. 
50
 Nordemannn W, Vinck K, Hertin PW & Meyer G International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Law: 
Commentary (1990) 411. 
51
 Eg Haines v Copyright Agency Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 549; De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 
IPR 292. 
52
 De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292 at 298. 
53
 S 29(1). This requirement can be dispensed with in terms of s 29(1B) where it would be impossible to 
make an acknowledgement for reasons of practicality or otherwise. 
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acknowledgement has been made will form part of the fairness inquiry during the judicial 
analysis, depending on whether acknowledging the source would serve any purpose in the 
specific case. 
Section 40(3)-(5) of the Australian Copyright Act provides user guidelines that will 
automatically exempt qualifying conduct. This provision sets quantitative thresholds which 
aid users in aligning their conduct with what the law permits. Any use of a work that falls 
within the scope of these subsections will be deemed fair dealing with that work. This 
section creates a degree of clarity and extra-judicial certainty to an exception that has 
been notoriously vague, and the South African Copyright Act will undoubtedly benefit from 
the promulgation of a similar provision. If conduct does not qualify for exemption under 
section 40(3)-(5), the use can still be exempted by the normal judicial evaluation. These 
standards therefore do not detract from users’ entitlements, but provide a valuable extra-
judicial mechanism to determine the legitimacy of users’ conduct ex ante and prevent 
unnecessary litigation. For these reasons, South African courts should consult the 
Australian provision rather than the United Kingdom’s when applying section 12(1) of the 
South African Copyright Act. 
The South African provision extends the exception to allow personal and private uses of 
works.54 This addition permits uses of works similar to research and private study, but for 
purposes unrelated to education or academia. This clause extends the range of permitted 
uses beyond specific purposes; if the use can properly be classified as personal or private, 
a work can feasibly be used for any purpose.  
The purpose of the use is not relevant to determining whether the conduct qualifies for 
exemption. This means that the first step of the judicial analysis will differ: instead of the 
purpose of the use determining whether the act can be exempted, the nature of the use 
will be determinative. The purpose of the use is relegated to the second stage of the 
judicial analysis, where the court considers a multitude of factors to establish the fairness 
of the use. This exception can therefore exempt a potentially open-ended array of uses, 
provided they are personal or private.55 The construction of the exception is clearly 
compatible with the Berne three-step test, as it is sufficiently narrowly defined, cannot 
interfere with the normal exploitation of the work and is unlikely to be prejudicial to the 
                                            
54
 S 12(1)(a). 
55
 An important application of this exception is the exemption of reproductions that are necessarily made by a 
computer’s Random Access Memory when browsing the internet: Ital EG Copyright Law and the Internet in 
Modern South African Law (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2000) 84-85. 
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owner’s rights. This clause therefore allows the reproduction of a reasonable portion of a 
work if the reproduction is used solely by the reproducer – the distribution of the work will 
not be exempted.56 
 
6 7 Criticism and Review 
The fair dealing exception for criticism and review is justified by the public interest in 
freedom of expression that it embodies.57 The aim of this exception is “to protect a critic or 
reviewer who may bona fide wish to use copyright material to illustrate his review or 
criticism”.58 The Australian Federal Court accepted the standard dictionary definition of 
these terms, as with research and study.59 The exception is substantively identical in all 
three statutes, except that the CDPA only allows the use of a work that has been made 
lawfully available to the public.60 This is in line with article 5(3)(d) of the Information Society 
Directive, which permits only the use of quotations from works that have been made 
lawfully available to the public. This is not required in South Africa or Australia, although 
this will be an important factor regarding the fairness of the use and it will be difficult to 
prove that a use was fair if the work was obtained in breach of confidence.61 For this 
reason Australian case law is more applicable to South African law, although earlier cases 
from the United Kingdom are equally useful.62 The exception extends to the criticism of the 
work that was used or criticism of “another work”.63 Courts have given this exception a 
liberal construction, as with the other fair dealing exceptions, and have held that “another 
work” includes the ideas and philosophies underlying a work, or even the process of 
                                            
56
 This exception applies to all rights in a work, but the act of distribution will likely invalidate the use because 
it is improbable that a distribution will be personal or private, unless confined to the users’ family circle. See 
Gibson JTR, Visser C, Pretorius JT, Sharrock R & van Jaarsveld M South African Mercantile and Company 
Law (8
th
 ed 2003) 724; Copeling AJC Copyright and the Act of 1978 (1978) 42. 
57
 Burrell R & Coleman A Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (2005) 42. 
58
 Banier v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 812 at 815. 
59
 De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292 at 299. 
60
 S 30(1). 
61
 HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 Ch paras 176-177; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143 para 75; Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another 
[1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA para 38. See also generally Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 149 CA. 
62
 Cases heard before the amendment of the CDPA include Hubbard and Another v Vosper and Another 
[1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA; Time Warner Entertainment Ltd v Channel 4 Television Corporation Plc [1994] 
EMLR 1; Banier v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 812; Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 
149 CA. Cases heard subsequent to the amendment will end at the first step of the fair dealing test and will 
therefore not be helpful. 
63
 S 12(1)(b) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978; s 41 of the Australian Copyright Act 63 of 1968; s 30(1) of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  
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producing the work including the style of journalism.64 This approach gives appropriate 
recognition to the freedom of expression that underlies the exception.  
It will generally be fairly evident whether a work has been used for the purposes of 
criticism or review, although courts are guarded against simulated uses where defendants 
invoke the defence after the fact.65 This is specifically relevant to South Africa and the 
United Kingdom where there is no defence for parody or satire, and defendants might want 
to rely on the criticism/review exception to exempt their actions. Although it is possible for 
parodies to qualify for exemption in terms of this exception, the requirement that a 
sufficient acknowledgement of the author and source is made will often preclude the 
success of this line of defence. A parody does not usually acknowledge the author or 
source of the work that it parodies, as an effective parody relies on the original work being 
sufficiently well-known for it to be recognisable as the subject of the parody. However, if a 
parody does provide a sufficient acknowledgement and genuinely criticises or reviews the 
work, it is conceivable that it may be exempted by this fair dealing exception.66 
 
6 8 Reporting Current Events 
The fair dealing exception allowing the use of works for news reporting enables journalists 
and other users to reproduce and distribute portions of a work, verbatim, to provide the 
public with untainted information regarding important current events. Both the Berne 
Convention and the Information Society Directive expressly allow these exceptions.67 
Although case law from the United Kingdom suggests the term “news” is more 
encompassing than the term “current events”, this distinction appears to be arbitrary and 
the terms should be seen as synonyms, especially considering the liberal interpretation of 
                                            
64
 Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch); Ashdown v 
Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] Ch 149 CA; Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 
CA; Time Warner Entertainments LP v Channel Four Television Corporation Plc [1994] EMLR 1; Hubbard v 
Vosper [1971] 1 All ER 1023 CA. 
65
 Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] EMLR 109 CA 620, Banier v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 812 at 815; Time Warner Entertainments LP v Channel Four Television 
Corporation Plc [1994] EMLR 1 at 14. 
66
 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 336-337. Conversely, as Visser 
argues here, it is possible that if the work is very well known and is clearly recognisable as the subject of the 
parody, this could be enough to satisfy the requirement of a sufficient acknowledgement. 
67
 Art 10 of the Berne Convention and art 5(3)(c) of the Information Society Directive. 
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fair dealing exceptions that courts follow.68 The exceptions for reporting current events do 
not require that the work must previously have been made available to the public. The 
absence of this requirement is understandable, as the proper functioning of an 
independent media is founded on the liberty to be able to report previously unavailable 
information.69  
The CDPA specifically excludes the use of photographs from the scope of exemption.70 
The rationale behind this is that one newspaper would be able to rely on this exception to 
reproduce a photograph that a competing newspaper has paid for dearly. Accordingly, the 
exception will not allow the use of photographs for reporting news in any situation, 
although photographs can still be used as the subject of the criticism or review. This 
qualification is absent from the South African and Australian provisions, and the 
appropriate use of photographs for reporting current events can still be exempted.71 The 
South African and Australian exceptions are therefore broader than the United Kingdom’s 
equivalent in this respect. Conversely, the CDPA does not limit the ways in which news 
can be reported, while the South African and Australian legislation prescribe the ways in 
which news should be communicated to the public.72 This prescription seems archaic in 
the current age. 
 
6 9 Quotations and Illustrations  
The Berne Convention allows quotations to be made from lawfully available works, 
provided that the quotation is compatible with fair practice and the extent of the quotation 
is justified by its purpose.73 A similar exception allows the promulgation of exceptions for 
illustrative use of literary and artistic works for teaching purposes.74 This provision is also 
                                            
68
 This contention is supported by the fact that s 30 of the CDPA is entitled “Criticism, review and news 
reporting”, while the term “current events” is used in the provision itself.  
69
 As with the exception for criticism or review, the fact that the work has not been made available to the 
public will be considered during the fairness inquiry: see HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 Ch; Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 149 CA; Hyde Park 
Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2001] Ch 143. 
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 S 30(2). 
71
 Photographs are included in the definition of artistic works in both statutes, and the exception specifically 
applies to artistic works in terms of s 12(1)(c) of the Copyright Act and s 42(1) of the Australian Copyright 
Act. 
72
 S 12(1)(c) of the Copyright Act and s 42(1) of the Australian Copyright Act only allow the use of a work for 
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73
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informed by the requirement of fair practice. Both of these exceptions are further qualified 
by the requirement that the use is accompanied by an acknowledgement of the source and 
the name of the author if it appears on the work.75  
The provisions in the Berne Convention were directly adopted in section 12(3)-(4) of the 
South African Copyright Act, which are consequently compliant with the international 
mandate. No specific purpose of the quotation is prescribed, leaving a broad spectrum of 
potentially justifiable uses. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the purpose of the 
use must be non-commercial, meaning that purposes traditionally not associated with fair 
dealing can be exempted if the ends justify the means.76 The judiciary’s nuanced approach 
will differ in the same way that it does with the exception allowing personal or private uses. 
The exception allowing illustrations for teaching purposes more closely resembles fair 
dealing, as the specific purpose of the use is identified. The CDPA and Australian 
Copyright Act both contain similar provisions, although additional constraints are 
imposed.77 The CDPA requires that the use must be a fair dealing, while the South African 
Copyright Act requires that the conduct complies with fair practice. These two concepts 
effectively amount to the same standard and the same factors will determine whether the 
use is exempted.78 The justifying purpose can therefore exempt a use in terms of section 
12(3) or (4) if it is compatible with fair practice and acknowledges the source and author of 
the work. 
 
6 10 Parody and Satire 
The Information Society Directive provides the framework for legislators from member 
states wishing to promulgate an exception for the purposes of caricature, parody or 
pastiche.79 Two reviews80 of the United Kingdom’s copyright law have recommended that 
this provision should be utilised by promulgating an exception for parody, but to date no 
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 Art 10(3). 
76
 Eg, an attorney would arguably be able to rely on this exception to quote from various sources when 
drafting an opinion for a client. 
77
 S 32(2A) of the CDPA and s 200(1)(a) of the Australian Copyright Act prohibit the use of reprographic 
appliances in making the reproductions. 
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 Dean OH Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-95. 
79
 Art 5(3)(k). 
80
 Gowers A Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (2006) 68 <available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf> (accessed on 23-01-2012); Hargreaves I Digital 
Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (2011) 49-50 <available at 
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action has been taken in this regard.81 Australia adopted an exception for parody in 2006 
following the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, but this provision has not yet 
been relied on in court. The fair dealing exception for parody and satire is in line with the 
three-step test and is encouraged by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union.82 
The need for the exception in South African law is evident.83 This exception will allow 
copyright law to foster a culture of creative discourse. The right to freedom of expression is 
given strong protection by section 16 of the Constitution, and an exception for parody will 
promote the freedom to impart and receive information and ideas, and the freedom of 
artistic creativity as contained in section 16(1)(b)-(c). Parodies are becoming increasingly 
valuable in the cultural and economic sense, given the exponential growth of traditional 
and social media forms. The obstacle of obtaining permission to use a work in this way will 
be fatal to most transformative uses, which demonstrates the need for an exception in this 
regard. It has even been suggested that the absence of an exception for parody amounts 
to implicitly allowing censorship by private parties.84 Moreover, legitimate parodies will 
hardly, if ever, derogate from the commercial exploitation rights of the original work, and 
has actually been shown to hold benefits for the copyright owner.85 The most recent review 
of the United Kingdom’s copyright law concluded that an exception for parody “should not 
have an effect on the incentive to produce new works”.86  
The same considerations underlying the protection of copyright works apply to allowing 
parodies of these works, with freedom of expression additionally supporting the exemption 
of such uses.87 The exception, which is an embodiment of freedom of expression, allows 
transformative critical uses of copyright works. This reflects the ideal that copyright should 
promote the creative expression of ideas and opinions, rather than suppress them.  
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 The government has indicated that it will take steps towards the promulgation of an exception for parody 
during 2012: HM Government The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property 
and Growth (2011) 16 <available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf> (accessed 27-06-2012). 
82
 Art 5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive. 
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 See chapter 5 section 3 1. 
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 Harper S “Westminster’s state of mind – Open to protection of parody?” (04-05-2012) Intellectual Property 
Magazine 1-4 at 2-3 <available at http://www.ipworld.com/ipwo/doc/view.htm?id=283805& 
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 Rogers M, Tomalin J & Corrigan R “The Economic Impact of Consumer Copyright Exceptions: A Literature 
Review” (2010) 11 Consumer Focus 1-40 at 17. 
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An exception for parody should be construed narrowly to prevent an overlap with the 
exception for criticism and review, but liberally enough to accommodate any legitimate 
uses.88 The amount of original creative contribution evident in a parody will be an 
important factor in the determination of whether the conduct amounts to fair dealing.89 
American case law makes it clear that a parodic or satirical character must be reasonably 
perceivable from the use of the work for it to be exempted.90 However, in keeping with the 
liberal interpretation that courts have adopted with regard to fair dealing provisions in 
general, this should not be a high threshold. It is clear that the subjective nature of humour 
should play no role in whether the use can properly be classified as a parody, or in the 
fairness evaluation.91 Once a use has been classified as parody during the first step of the 
judicial analysis, the subjective nature of humour should not detract from the protection of 
freedom of speech that the exception grants.92  
The extent of original contribution that the parodying use makes is an important, but 
flexible, factor. A parody will simultaneously have an original and derivative character, as it 
reproduces the main features of a well-known work while contributing certain features to 
transform the work appropriately.93 The original contribution that the parodist makes is 
therefore not the pivotal consideration, but is important in determining whether the use of a 
work is transformative or a mere reproduction.  
The effect that a parody has on the market for the original work is unlikely to be significant 
and expressive acts such as parody should not be “lightly trampled upon by marginal 
detriment or harm unrelated to the commercial value that vests in the [work] itself”.94 Even 
if a particular use does have a considerable impact on the market, this should be seen in 
the same light as an unfavourable review in terms of the fair dealing exception allowing 
criticism or review.95 The Australian Copyright Amendment Bill Explanatory Memorandum 
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 Visser C “The location of the parody defence in copyright law: Some comparative perspectives” (2005) 38 
Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa 321-343 at 343. 
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 Lahore J Copyright and Designs: Commentary I (RS 77 2008) 40094. 
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 Campbell v Acuff Rose Music Inc [1993] 510 US 569 at 588. 
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 See chapter 5 section 3 1. 
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expressly indicates that parodies of a commercial nature are permissible,96 and South 
African case law clearly supports this view.97  
A parody of an unpublished work will be ineffective and should not be permitted.98 An 
effective parody relies on the work being well-known and recognisable, especially if no 
acknowledgement of the author or source is made. If the work is not known by the public 
who perceives the parody, the context to understand and appreciate the parody will be 
absent. Accordingly, only parodies of published works should be permitted. 
 
6 11 The Constitutionality of an Exception for Parody 
In the interest of encouraging the promulgation of a fair dealing exception for parody in 
South African law, it is necessary to establish the constitutionality of this exception to 
ascertain whether the exception would be permissible in terms of the property clause, as 
applied in the methodology set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance (hereafter FNB).99  
Section 25(1) is the point of departure for determining whether an infringement or 
restriction of property rights amounts to a constitutional property dispute. The first question 
is whether the disputed interests constitute property rights for the purpose of section 25(1). 
Having shown that a copyright owner’s rights in her work do indeed constitute property 
rights for the purposes of section 25(1),100 it is necessary to determine whether there has 
been a deprivation of such property. As has been argued before, some exceptions are 
framed so as to define the right short of the permitted use, in which case there is no right 
and no deprivation. However, it is accepted that certain applications of an exception for 
parody can amount to a regulatory interference with the use of property, and it would 
therefore constitute a deprivation.101 This deprivation would be consistent with the 
                                            
96
 Explanatory Memorandum on the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (2006) 111 <available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/cab2006223/memo_0.html> (accessed 4-1-2012). 
97
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 84. 
98
 See section 3 1 of chapter 5 where this argument is made. 
99
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). See chapter 5 section 3 2 for the 
full, comprehensive application of this methodology. 
100
 Kellerman M The Constitutional Property Clause and Immaterial Property Interests (LLD thesis 
Stellenbosch University 2010) 35, 329-331; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 145. 
101
 The broad definition of deprivation as employed in FNB is relied on; if the exception does not amount to a 
regulatory interference, the exception will be constitutionally valid and this will be the end of the inquiry. 
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elements of section 25(1): the deprivation would be promulgated by means of legislation, 
which is law of general application.102 Administrative law principles considered in 
conjunction with the requirements of section 25(1) indicate that the proposed exception will 
not be procedurally arbitrary if it is properly enacted.103 
The implicit requirement in the property clause that the deprivation must be for a public 
purpose or in the public interest is satisfied by the public interest in promoting or upholding 
freedom of expression. The interests served by freedom of expression, coupled with the 
desire for copyright law to be transformative rather than suppressive, form a legitimate 
basis for allowing the deprivation in question. The FNB methodology then proceeds to 
consider whether the proposed deprivation is substantively arbitrary according to the 
requisite justification on the rationality-proportionality continuum. The factors propounded 
by the Constitutional Court in FNB show that in most cases of parody a rationality-type 
evaluation will suffice, but the parody exception will be justifiable even on the “thicker” 
standard of proportionality, save for extraordinary cases.104 Accordingly, the exception 
would be in the public interest and the deprivation that it would cause would not be 
arbitrary, either substantively or procedurally.  
The fourth stage in the FNB methodology becomes unnecessary if the deprivation is 
justifiable in terms of section 25(1). Furthermore, it is clear that a fair dealing exception will 
not amount to an expropriation of the copyright owners’ rights, as the owner does not lose 
her rights to normal commercial exploitation. The fair dealing exception for parody would 
therefore be constitutionally viable and would contribute to the equitable balance between 
the property rights of copyright owners and the public use of copyright works. It follows that 
legislative intervention in this regard would be constitutionally valid. 
 
6 12 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis started by considering the nature and function of fair dealing exceptions in light 
of their construction and origin. The statutory entitlements granted to users embody a 
number of highly regarded facets of the public interest, and allow valuable uncompensated 
                                            
102
 Properly enacted legislation will always be law of general application: First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61. See also van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 
ed 2011) 232-237. See the application of the methodology in section 3 2 of chapter 5. 
103
 See section 3 2 of chapter 5 for the full analysis of the administrative law principles. 
104
 Para 100; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 245-246. 
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uses of copyright works. The current Australian exceptions are more inclusive than that of 
South Africa or the United Kingdom. All of the fair dealing exceptions in the South African 
Copyright Act are compliant with the three-step test standard set in article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention, which was subsequently extended by article 13 of TRIPS, and the 
proposed exception for parody complies with section 25 of the Constitution. 
The United Kingdom is currently taking steps to promulgate a fair dealing exception for 
parody, and until the South African legislature does the same the Copyright Act will lag 
behind international standards. The need for this exception has been demonstrated and 
the potential sphere of application has been clarified by analysing the factors that should 
inform the judicial analysis. The constitutionality of the exception has been proven to 
vanquish any doubt in this regard. The absence of this provision is the primary pitfall of the 
current South African exceptions to copyright, and its inclusion will move the South African 
copyright regime forward considerably.  
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